A Chance to Avoid Nuclear Disaster

The catastrophic terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 sent an urgent and long overdue wake-up call to America to take seriously the continuing efforts by terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons. Had any of the attacks involved a nuclear device, we might now be discussing tens of thousands of fatalities, millions of casualties and potential radiation victims, and trillions of dollars in collateral damage. We would also be discussing America’s failure to take seriously Russia’s longstanding offer to sell its enormous under-secured nuclear stockpiles--the most likely source of terrorist nuclear capability--to the U.S. for use as fuel in nuclear power plants and other peaceful purposes. Fortunately, a deal is in the works to secure Russia’s “loose nukes” before they start slipping into terrorists’ hands.

When the Soviet Union was breaking apart 10 years ago, many Americans excitedly toasted the “end of the Cold War.” Most Americans failed to ask a crucial question: Wasn’t the impending collapse of a nuclear superpower’s entire social, political and economic system cause for concern?

A decade later, the discussion has definitively shifted from how much safer the world is now to how much more dangerous it has become. The collapse of the Soviet system has revealed a nuclear weapons infrastructure without reliable controls, protections or accountability. Some 700 to 800 tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and 150 to 200 tons of weapons-grade plutonium (WGP) are stored in makeshift warehouses protected by five-dollar combination locks. The government has no accounting system capable of keeping track of it all.

It would only take 15 to 20 pounds of HEU, or an even smaller amount of WGP, to arm a device capable of leveling downtown Washington or lower Manhattan. The blueprints and non-nuclear components necessary to build crude but highly effective nuclear weapons are readily available. Small amounts of stolen or diverted Russian HEU and WGP have already been confiscated by European law enforcement from sellers looking for buyers. The U.S. currently lists more than a dozen rogue states and terrorist organizations, including Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, that are looking for sellers. If any of them get their hands on enough material to arm a device, we won’t be talking about a 30-minute warning--we may not get any warning at all. One could say we’re already living on borrowed time.

Against this backdrop of loose nukes, rogue states, arms traffickers, and terrorist groups flush with cash has emerged one of the greatest opportunities of the post-Cold War era: buying Russia’s excess nukes. For several years, Russia has been hinting that it would be interested in selling its enormous stockpiles of excess weapons-grade uranium and plutonium to the United States for use as fuel in nuclear power plants. A deal was struck in 1993 by then-President Clinton and former Russian leader Boris N. Yeltsin for the United States to purchase all the uranium from the warheads Russia is dismantling in compliance with the Stategic Arms Reduction Treaties. Extending this agreement to include the rest of Russia’s excess fissionable materials, including both HEU and WGP, would seem to be the next logical step in this process. Unfortunately, the idea has never caught fire on Capitol Hill, despite a relatively low $10-billion price tag.

A group of international financiers has now come forward offering to underwrite the entire amount necessary to secure all of Russia’s excess fissionable materials. The money would be raised in the form of independently issued, government-backed bonds. Just before Congress adjourned for its August recess, Sen. Pete V. Domenici (R-N.M.) introduced a bill that establishes a framework for how such a transaction might take place. Now Rep. Lois Capps (D-Santa Barbara) will introduce a bill on the House side in the next few days. Under the Domenici bill’s provisions, the U.S. government would guarantee loans to Russia in increments of $20 million, up to $1 billion at any one time, accepting Moscow’s nuclear materials as security. For each $20-million loan, Russia would place one metric ton of HEU and one metric ton of WGP under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards at a facility in Russia that is mutually acceptable to both Russia and the IAEA. As part of the deal, Russia would guarantee that the materials placed under IAEA safeguards would remain there indefinitely, meaning until they are transformed into nuclear fuel or otherwise permanently disposed of. Without unforeseen delays, this entire process could likely be completed within a decade.

The current proposal is not without flaws. Among them, the bill currently sets an expiration date of Dec. 31, 2004, for extending new loans, failing to take into account the time frame necessary to complete the process under even optimal circumstances. And it puts a $1-billion cap on loans at any one time--an obvious potential roadblock that could bring the entire process to a halt should the Russians deliver the material to the IAEA-approved sites faster than it can be reprocessed and sold.

Still, Domenici’s bill is a giant step forward, and it provides a valuable foundation for what should become the first major nuclear-arms reduction agreement of the 21st century. Moreover, it represents a tremendous potential bargain for the American people, considering that international investors would be financing virtually the entire deal. The only significant cost to the U.S. taxpayer would be $10 million a year for the cost of administration in the U.S., and up to $15 million a year to help cover the expenses of the IAEA. This should appeal even to those members of Congress who are most reluctant to lend the Russians money for anything--even when their nuclear stockpiles are in jeopardy. If we let this opportunity slip away through inaction or partisanship, we will have no one to blame but ourselves when we run out of borrowed time.