Pilots’ Security Duties Make for Airborne Balancing Act

WASHINGTON — The MD-88 passenger jetliner was cruising above 25,000 feet but there was no one at the controls.

Preoccupied with protecting the cockpit door while they took turns going to the bathroom, the pilots momentarily forgot the cardinal safety rule that the captain or the co-pilot must be strapped in and in control of the aircraft at all times.

The November incident illustrates an emerging safety issue: The focus on aviation security since Sept. 11 has added new distractions to the already demanding duties of pilots, at times prompting missteps that could compromise a safe flight.

A Times analysis of a NASA database known as the Aviation Safety Reporting System found that reports of security-related problems more than doubled in 2001, rising to 315 from 125. The anonymous reports covered many concerns, including lapses in basic policies and loopholes in airport screening.

The increase reveals a system struggling to adjust to change and points to a need for better security-related training.

“Prior to the terrorist attacks . . . this error would have never happened,” wrote the captain of the jetliner that was briefly left pilotless. “But the post-Sept. 11 door-locking device and one bonehead move by a nonthinking pilot, and there you are.”

The plane was on autopilot, but an unexpected problem could have sent the pilots scrambling for the controls.

“These are not catastrophic things, but they definitely erode the margin of safety,” said Capt. Steve Luckey, security chairman for the Air Line Pilots Assn. “The paradigm of operations has to include security, but we just have to be more diligent and vigilant in guarding against distractions.”

The NASA database is intended to serve as an early warning system, spotting trends that could--if overlooked--create safety problems. It provides a candid look inside aviation in the aftermath of the Sept. 11 terrorist hijackings.

The Times analysis also found that security breaches at airports have created a burden for flight crews already busy attending to dozens of critical details before takeoffs. Pilots reported confrontations with passengers who were able to bring aboard knives, scissors, bullets, handcuffs and even an engine leaking gasoline.

“Pilots have been under a great deal of pressure since Sept. 11, and that alone creates concerns,” said aviation safety consultant Barry Schiff, a retired airline captain. “The job isn’t what it used to be.”

More Procedures, Added Confusion

The largest single category of reports--about one-third of the total--concerned breakdowns in policies and procedures. Most were minor, dealing with such things as a pilot who forgot to complete required paperwork because he was checking on a security matter. Others were more serious.

Mistakes in the air can have drastic consequences, so procedures are gospel in the airline business. Pilots’ adherence to prescribed routines for every aspect of a flight is a central article of airline safety programs. This conservative approach is designed to ensure safety through constant attention to detail.

Some of the security procedures grafted on since Sept. 11 have added confusion.

The new rule that requires pilots to remain behind locked cockpit doors during flight sounds simple enough. But carrying it out has led to several glaring mistakes. Pilots trying to coordinate lavatory breaks unwittingly triggered other problems. The MD-88 that was briefly left without a pilot is not the only example.

In an incident shortly after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, two pilots of a Boeing 757 had a misunderstanding about the use of a code word. It led Air Force jets to intercept the plane after one of the pilots mistakenly radioed that a hijacking was in progress.

The plane’s co-pilot had recently attended a security briefing in which pilots were told they should agree on a “duress word” before either of them left the cockpit in flight. If the pilot who left spoke the duress word over the intercom, the pilot who stayed behind would know there was trouble in the cabin and the cockpit door should stay locked. The idea was to prevent a hijacker from getting into the cockpit by overpowering a pilot on a bathroom break.

The captain had not received the same security briefing, however, and as he left the co-pilot in charge, he thought they were agreeing on a password for him to get back into the cockpit.

When the captain used the duress word to get back inside, the co-pilot immediately alerted ground control of a potential hijacking. Eventually the co-pilot realized the misunderstanding and let the captain back in. But then, ground controllers didn’t believe their assurances that everything was all right.

Air traffic control “took a conservative approach and assumed we were a possible hijacked aircraft,” the co-pilot wrote. The misunderstanding was resolved after the plane landed in Boston with an F-16 escort and was met by a state police security detail.

“Air traffic control had no way of knowing if those were the hijackers saying everything was OK,” said pilot John Russell, who is the union’s safety chairman in the West. “A very simple mistake obviously blossomed into something very, very big.”

The incident took place before cockpit doors were equipped with a metal brace to keep out intruders. Now a flight attendant must stay inside the cockpit to operate the metal brace when a pilot takes a lavatory break.

Israel’s El Al Airlines, known for its tight security, has recognized that something as innocuous as a bathroom break could become a vulnerability, so El Al pilots have a private bathroom between the cockpit and the cabin.

Such a solution is unlikely on U.S. planes, partly because it would require taking out revenue-producing passenger seats to accommodate a lavatory, some pilots say. However, pilot groups in the U.S. are calling for the installation of a video system that would let the cockpit crew see what is going on in the passenger cabin. They also hope new airline security training programs for dealing with hijackings will help.

In another case, confusion about security procedures led pilots to disregard an on-board collision avoidance warning.

A Falcon 900, a large corporate plane powered by three jet engines, was flying from Chicago to Baltimore on a cloudy day last fall. As the plane began its approach over central Maryland, ground controllers advised the pilots that military F-15s were in the area, investigating a possible unidentified intruder to the north.

Fighters Were Quickly Closing In on Jet

“We asked the controller if [the F-15s] were aware of us,” one of the pilots wrote in his report. “He said he would have to go ask. He was not talking to the F-15[s].” The pilots had no way of communicating with the fighter jets because military aircraft use a different radio frequency.

Monitoring their radar, the pilots could see the military jets quickly closing in. An on-board warning system told them to go to a lower altitude to maintain a safe distance. But the ground controller urged them to ignore the warning.

“He said we were in the vicinity of Camp David [the presidential retreat in Maryland] and unusual moves made the military nervous,” the pilot wrote. He saw the military jets darting by through a break in the clouds.

The corporate jet landed safely, but its crew was troubled. “We talked to the controllers by phone after landing,” the pilot wrote. “The controller’s supervisor told him it was wrong to tell us to ignore the [warning system]. Legally, I should have followed [it].”

Commenting about the incident later, a NASA reviewer wrote: “Event had the potential for degrading into a very unstable situation.”

Improving communication with military interceptors is a safety priority for pilots’ groups since Sept. 11.

“The threat isn’t as ominous as it seems because the military jets have very good radar systems and can maintain safe separation on their own,” the ALPA’s Luckey said. “But when you get into high-traffic areas and you have that fighter jet element in there, you do diminish the margin of safety.”

Airport screening problems were the second most common source of security-related reports to the NASA database. Nearly one-fifth of the reports involved loopholes in passenger security and 7% more dealt with complaints about overly intrusive searches of uniformed crew members carrying proper identification.

The reports told of repeated instances in which pilots became backstops for porous airport security systems that continued to allow passengers with knives, bullets and other prohibited articles to board. In one case, a man on the FBI’s watch list was allowed on a flight, but the plane was called back to the gate before it took off.

A typical incident in November involved a woman who boarded a London-bound flight at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport with a pocketknife in her purse.

She dropped the knife on the floor as she was trying to get into her seat. Other passengers saw it and called flight attendants. The woman hastily stepped on the knife to try to hide it.

A flight attendant confiscated the knife and brought it to the captain, who was preparing for takeoff. “I immediately brought the knife . . . to the security supervisor for the gate,” the captain wrote. “He shrugged his shoulders and said, ‘Yeah.’ ”

Security Process ‘Failed Miserably’

The captain said he felt “tremendous pressure” that it was up to him alone to ensure no one aboard his plane was a security risk. He decided the Boeing 777 would not take off with the woman aboard, and she was asked to leave. The incident delayed the flight by an hour and 10 minutes.

After arriving at London’s Heathrow Airport, the captain said he found out the woman boarded a later flight, but not before another prohibited item was found in her luggage. By then, she was drunk and had become abusive.

“Security screening procedures and security personnel failed miserably,” the captain wrote. “But what is worse [is] the arrogance that no one is to blame, no one is responsible, no one is accountable.”