Arafat Plans to Revamp Security Services

Ragtag vigilantes or symbols of national aspiration. Terror sympathizers, staunch guardians or Keystone Cops. The Palestinian security services have been called a lot of things, but efficient and streamlined are generally not among them.

Yasser Arafat hopes to change that with a proposal released this week under which his Palestinian Authority’s dozen or so security forces would be consolidated into four, with clear lines of authority, human rights safeguards and civic oversight.

Few believe that the 72-year-old Palestinian leader has suddenly become a champion of democracy or power-sharing. A more likely explanation: By launching a preemptive strike in the face of a growing chorus of domestic and overseas critics, he is trying to seize the initiative, bolster his standing with the Palestinian people--and keep his job.

The plan, as outlined by the Palestinian Al Ayyam newspaper and a senior Palestinian official, would create four new services: police, internal and external security forces roughly analogous to the FBI and CIA, and a general security arm to control the borders.

All four would fall under the Interior Ministry. Only the police and internal security would be allowed to make arrests, and all civilian cases would be handled by the attorney general’s office.

Although the structure may look good on paper, the real test will be in implementation. Arafat retains de facto control over the Interior Ministry, for instance, and could easily circumvent institutional safeguards at will by packing the ranks with cronies.

And though the plan attempts to address critics’ charges related to corruption, abuse of power and human rights violations, it does little directly to halt attacks by militia gunmen or suicide bombers. That is a treacherous issue politically for Arafat, given the general Palestinian perception that these are freedom fighters, not terrorists.

Arafat also is gambling that the plan will be enough to counter Israel’s argument in Washington that the Palestinian Authority and its security forces are so far beyond repair that only new leadership--as well as continued Israeli military occupation and incursions--can counter Palestinian violence.

President Bush plans to send CIA Director George J. Tenet to the region as early as this week to confer on a new structure for Palestinian security forces, and the spy chief’s verdict will be key.

Predictably, the Israelis haven’t been impressed with the latest proposal.

“Cosmetic reforms in the security structure are not enough,” said Raanan Gissin, spokesman for Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon. “If money and control remain in the hands of Arafat, nothing changes.”

The Palestinian security agencies employ between 30,000 and 40,000 people in possession of 8,000 to 40,000 weapons, depending on how it’s all counted. Each service, in turn, is divided into two parts to serve the geographically separated West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Lines Are Blurry

Not surprisingly, lines of authority, function and duties blur. Israeli roadblocks and military strikes have further undermined the services’ roles and ability to coordinate.

The Palestinian aviation police, for instance, have three planes based in Egypt, where they are less likely to be destroyed by the Israeli military. Even if the police flew the aircraft home, there is no place to land, given that the airport in Gaza has been shelled and its runway dug up by Israeli army bulldozers.

The maritime police lost their only ship, a modified fishing vessel used for training, in a recent Israeli strike. And Israel has steadily pared the distance even small boats are allowed to sail offshore to three nautical miles from 20.

Maritime police based in landlocked Bethlehem spend their days guarding a helipad that’s seen one landing in 18 months. There’s little chance things will get busier: Israel destroyed the Palestinian Authority’s three helicopters earlier this year. The unit’s members are well educated, generally proud of their jobs and hope one day to use their merchant marine training. For now, they’re 35 miles inland, separated from the sea by Israeli checkpoints and travel restrictions.

“That’s our ocean,” said Sub-Lt. Mohammed Thabet, pointing to a nearby water tank overlooking the city. “And it’s empty.”

Keeping your sense of humor helps, given the months of sustained Israeli attacks against Palestinian police stations, training facilities, weaponry and vehicles.

In better days at the Gaza City police complex, once a proud showcase of the Palestinian Authority, 3,000 police and cadets worked, trained and slept. Now all but two of the 28 buildings have been reduced to rubble. A few police officers sit guarding the concrete chunks that once were four- and five-story buildings, the floors now layered like sliced bread.

“Of course it’s dampened our spirits. It’s also made us angry,” said a senior police officer, who now works out of a tent. “But we’re still determined to try and do our job.”

Israeli officials say the punitive steps against Palestinian targets are the only way to persuade Arafat to end the attacks on Israelis.

Palestinian security officials counter that it’s impossible to police anything when their staffs, buildings and infrastructure are under constant attack. Israel’s intention, they argue, is to sow disorganization and thereby justify further crackdowns.

“If I can’t even send police out on patrol, how can I possibly guarantee security?” said Brig. Gen. Osama Ali, chairman of Gaza’s regional security committee.

While Israel has added to the Palestinian Authority’s security problems, the Palestinians have done plenty of damage themselves.

Pay as low as $200 a month, paychecks that are delayed for weeks and the Palestinian Authority’s financial woes have prompted many officers to look for extracurricular work, allegedly including trafficking in stolen vehicles, stealing and soliciting protection money.

Critics also charge that the security services are organized to serve one man--Arafat--over the interests of the state. In what some analysts say amounts to a classic divide-and-conquer strategy, the Palestinian leader has made himself sole arbiter as the units squabble over budget and turf.

Rights Abuses Alleged

Human rights watchdogs say Palestinian military courts and jails that function free of civil oversight, and security forces that operate against political prisoners and rivals, have spurred abuses.

“We seek a state with a security apparatus, not a state beholden to a security apparatus,” said Jabr Wishah, director-general of the Palestinian Center for Human Rights. “The rule of law should be master and maestro.”

Palestinian officials admit to problems but say the latest plan and a promised general election will go a long way. They claim they’re perfectly capable of cleaning their own house--for the sake of the Palestinian people--if Israel would only give them a chance.

“The duties of the security service must be clear, and there must be no overlapping between the different services in their work in the field for the sake of founding a Palestinian civil society that respects pluralism and democracy,” Gaza intelligence chief Maj. Gen. Amin Hindi told Al Quds, a Palestinian newspaper.

Officers say they welcome U.S. technical aid, CIA training, new equipment and advice, but draw the line at Washington micromanaging reforms. Not only could this doom them to failure, it could also undermine longer-term Israeli and U.S. interests, they argue.

Whenever the U.S. or Israel has weighed in by favoring a particular Palestinian security official or alternative leader, for instance, that person has tended to be discredited in the eyes of fellow Palestinians.

Likewise, argues Col. Samir Masharawi, a leader in Gaza with Arafat’s Fatah movement and a member of the Preventive Security Service, too much Israeli and U.S. pressure on the Palestinian Authority could spur infighting.

“Contrary to their aims, this could lead to more suicide attacks because no one would be even nominally in control,” he said. “Israel would also pay the price.”

Beginning in 1995, Israeli and Palestinian security teams conducted joint patrols in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Although the patrols ended after a Palestinian security official shot and killed his Israeli police partner at the time the current uprising began in the fall of 2000, those involved say that at their best, the patrols forced the two sides to cooperate--even, at times, to depend on each other.

“We’d sometimes have food together, even buy meat and grill it,” recalled Palestinian Lt. Abu Ramai of the district coordination office. “There was a good atmosphere.”

Zaidan Mustafan, Israeli deputy commander at the time, echoed Ramai’s view and said the experience, for a time, spurred hope of Israeli-Palestinian cooperation.

That all seems like ancient history now as security forces and citizens on both sides find themselves feeling anything but secure.

“It’s very difficult to imagine working together now,” Ramai said. “There’s just been too much lost trust.”