Bittersweet Time for Sharon

As the war in Iraq winds down, Israel and its leadership are in the grip of a dilemma. On one hand, Israel is one of the main beneficiaries of the end of Saddam Hussein’s regime and his reputed weapons of mass destruction. On the other, the Israeli government, led by Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, fears the political ramifications of Hussein’s defeat. “I am afraid,” said an Israeli Cabinet minister, “that we will be asked to pay for American efforts to appease the Arab world by forcing us to make concessions to the Palestinians.”

Israeli support of the U.S.-led war comes almost naturally. Hussein was one of Israel’s worst enemies, ceaselessly calling for the liquidation of what he termed “the Zionist entity.” Before Hussein, the Iraqi army participated in three wars -- in 1948, 1967 and 1973 -- against Israel. In March 1990, Hussein promised to “let our fire eat half of Israel.” Less than a year later, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Iraq launched 39 Scud missiles at Israel, one of them aimed at Israel’s nuclear reactor in the Negev desert. Hussein was also a rhetorical and financial supporter of Palestinian terrorist groups and suicide bombers.

One of the less-publicized aspects of the war in Iraq has been the coalition’s effective defense of Israel. Early on, American, British and Australian units were dispatched from Jordan to search for Scud missiles and weapons of mass destruction in western Iraq, an area of 60,000 square meters. “It was like finding a needle in a haystack,” said one American military official. Israeli military experts concede that Israel’s special forces couldn’t have done a better job.

On the eve of the war in Iraq, the government had ordered Israelis to seal off and equip rooms in their houses or apartments so they could serve as safe places in case of an unconventional attack; they were also told to carry gas masks at all times. Other than that, Israelis were urged to lead “routine and normal” lives.

A skeptical nation dutifully went through the motions of covering windows with plastic and tape. But as the first day of the war progressed, an ever-increasing majority of people dumped their gas masks. Given what Israeli intelligence knew, these Israelis were more rational than their government. According to intelligence estimates, the Iraqi threat to Israel was very low to nearly nonexistent because, unlike in 1991, Iraq had virtually no capabilities to launch a missile attack.

Initially, the government had rightly felt only a need to urge public calm. But after President Bush issued his 48-hour ultimatum to Hussein and the minutes began ticking away, Sharon and his defense minister, Shaul Mofaz, apparently panicked and called for the emergency measures. Their decision was a huge waste of money. The public tab for opening and testing the gas masks was nearly $300 million at a time of economic recession, high unemployment and painful budgetary cuts. Even when it became clear during the early phases of the war that the Iraqi threat was a phantom, Israeli political and military leaders, in face- saving defiance, refused to change the emergency orders.

But what is real and worrisome for the Israeli government is the plan known as the “road map” toward peace in the Middle East, and its potential links to the war in Iraq. The proposal, the fruits of a joint effort by the Bush administration, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations, lays out three stages to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The first is a cease-fire accompanied by the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Palestinian towns and a halt to the expansion of Jewish settlements in the occupied West Bank and Gaza. During the second stage, a provisional Palestinian state would be established by the end of this year. Then would come the difficult job of negotiating the final status of Jerusalem, borders between the two states, Jewish settlements and the return of Palestinian refugees. According to the road map, both sides would have to reach a final agreement and sign a peace treaty by 2005.

But there are disagreements not only between Israel and the Palestinians on how to implement the plan but also between Israel and the U.S. Before February’s parliamentary elections, Sharon declared that he accepts the two-state solution in principle. Last week, the Israeli government gave the Bush administration its 15 reservations regarding the road map. As for the Palestinians, they remain suspicious that any peace process led by Washington, as the road map stipulates, will favor Israel. They point out that the Bush administration promised to act once reforms of the Palestinian Authority were in place and Yasser Arafat’s authority reduced. Yet, despite the choice of Mahmoud Abbas, also known as Abu Maazen, as Palestinian prime minister, nothing has happened.

Washington insists that it’s not taking any detour from the road map. Bush said last week after his meeting with British Prime Minister Tony Blair in Belfast that he would release the proposal once Abbas and his Cabinet are confirmed. Asked how serious he is about the peace plan, Bush replied that Hussein also didn’t think he was serious. That answer must have grated on Sharon’s ears not only because it strongly hinted at the president’s determination; it also made an indirect comparison between Sharon and the former Iraqi leader.

Sharon knows he can’t afford a confrontation with Israel’s staunch ally. So, he’ll probably publicly profess his willingness to cooperate while working behind the scenes to delay the plan’s execution. Yet, there are many Israelis, including some moderate Cabinet ministers, who hope Bush will show his resolve. They believe that only U.S. pressure -- even in the form of an imposed solution -- can break the 30-month stalemate and bring about peace. If it happens, one can at least say that as far as the Israeli-Arab conflict is concerned, something sweet emerged from Iraqi bitterness.