Peace in Korea? First End the War

Fifty years ago today the Korean War ended or, more accurately, was suspended by an armistice agreement that brought a peace of sorts to the peninsula. The inconclusive end to the war, however, had a hefty price: Korea would remain divided into two heavily armed camps and perpetually fearful that hostilities might resume at any moment.

Today, with tensions rising after North Korea’s admission that it is developing nuclear weapons, the specter of war is again haunting the peninsula. Though a diplomatic solution may yet be found should talks resume between the United States, China and North Korea, only a truly comprehensive agreement promises to deliver real peace and stability. This requires concluding the Korean War once and for all.

After five decades, the need to replace the armistice agreement with a permanent settlement may seem unwarranted. Why fix it if it ain’t broke? And why now?

Two reasons: First, as many failed attempts to promote peaceful coexistence on the peninsula have shown, diplomatic agreements that skirt the root cause of the insecurity that both North and South Korea feel -- namely the unresolved state of the Korean War -- are unlikely to succeed.

Second, the system is, in fact, broke. We may be closer to war than we think, not only because military action to preempt North Korea’s nuclear ambitions is being considered but also because, in the growing climate of mistrust, the risk of hostilities because of miscalculation or accident is increasing.

The North Korean interception of a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace this year is a worrisome example. The likelihood of other incidents could grow if the U.S. implements a quarantine of North Korea to prevent the import or export of prohibited goods.

Thus, much rides on negotiations being resumed. For these to lead to a comprehensive settlement, however, they must be expanded in both participation and scope.

South Korea, as one of the four principal belligerents of the Korean War along with the U.S., China and North Korea, must have a seat at the table. At the same time, the core security concerns of all the parties have to be addressed.

Though the details of a comprehensive settlement would require intensive negotiations, the essential elements of a grand strategic bargain are readily discernable. As part of a political settlement ending the war, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of both Koreas would be reaffirmed, thereby clearing the way for the normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and North Korea. Reunification would remain a long-term goal without it becoming a stumbling block to peace.

To secure the peace, the U.S. and China would extend security guarantees to both Koreas in return for their commitment to forswear the development of weapons of mass destruction. To be credible, Pyongyang would have to submit to the permanent and verifiable elimination of its existing programs. Conventional-force reductions -- which have been agreed to but never implemented -- and other measures to reduce the risk of war also would be enacted.

Endorsement of the final agreement by the U.N. Security Council and the 15 other nations that fought in the war (as well as Japan) would be desirable. Similarly, complementary agreements involving economic assistance, access to international financial institutions and humanitarian aid probably would be necessary to secure the North’s acquiescence.

For those who recoil at giving security guarantees and economic assistance to a “rogue state,” it is preferable to the horrendous costs of another Korean war. And opening up North Korea to the world may ultimately produce regime transformation.

A serious, specific proposal by the U.S. would be seen by the larger international community as a sincere initiative to end the dangerous standoff on the Korean peninsula.

If, however, North Korea rejects the proposal or refuses to engage in sincere negotiations, a subsequent hard-line approach led by the U.S. to contain or coerce the Pyongyang regime is more likely to be supported by other states in the region and within the United Nations. As the war with Iraq has clearly demonstrated, the U.S. needs all the friends it can get.

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Paul B. Stares and William M. Drennan are, respectively, director and deputy director of the research and studies program at the United States Institute of Peace.