Resistance Grows as Iraqis Await a Government

“What is our fate? Where is our government? We have volunteered to serve Iraq,” said Ali Kudair Jabar, 33, at a protest Saturday as he held up a hand-lettered sign in Arabic demanding back his job as a policeman.

The angry demonstration outside the gates of Saddam Hussein’s presidential palace compound, headquarters for the U.S. occupation administration formally known as the Coalition Provisional Authority, was the latest warning that the authority is fast running out of time to establish the Iraqi government it promised.

Further delays could spawn increased resistance to the authority’s presence, endangering the lives of both Iraqi civilians and American soldiers. The delays also exacerbate frustrations over the dearth of reliable services, including electricity, telephones and, above all, security.

About a mile inside the imposing gates, in a palace ornamented with depictions of Hussein wearing military helmets, staff members are hard at work defining the role for Iraqis in the occupation government. But the task is proving far more difficult than anticipated.

“There’s no reliable census, no electoral rolls, no polls,” said authority chief L. Paul Bremer III, almost two weeks after talk of holding speedy elections was officially abandoned.

“The prospect of holding elections is premature,” Bremer reiterated last week.

But Bremer’s alternative -- a council giving Iraqis only an advisory role in their own affairs -- is being received warily at best by Iraqi political leaders and appears unlikely to satisfy grass-roots demands for government with an Iraqi face.

Although many experts on post-conflict situations, both Western and Iraqi, concur with Bremer’s assessment that it is too soon to hold elections, they also say that the authority is taking too long to integrate Iraqis into the administration.

Even if the authority does bring local leaders on board in an advisory capacity in the next few weeks, as promised, Iraqis may lose faith that it offers them any real power, the experts say.

At stake is the credibility of the U.S.-led administration and its ability to midwife a political transition to self-rule, according to a report released last week by the International Crisis Group, a Washington- and Brussels-based research organization that studies trouble spots.

“They may find Iraqis to carry out certain tasks, but are they going to find a real Iraqi leadership, or will Iraqis feel there’s nothing to be gained by being part of this interim administration?” asked Joost Hiltermann, director of the organization’s Iraq project.

One of Iraq’s major Shiite groups, led by former exile Abdelaziz Hakim, says it has doubts about whether an advisory council will have enough power to make it worth joining.

“What is the authority of Mr. Bremer? Will the final decisions be Bremer’s decisions and the council have only an advisory role? If that’s the case, we would be very reluctant to be involved,” said Adel Abdul Mahdi, an advisor to Hakim’s Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq.

According to United Nations Resolution 1483 approved in May, Bremer has final authority over decisions in governing Iraq, much as the U.N. administrator has in Kosovo and the high representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina -- both post-conflict regions in which governance was turned over to international bodies.

Neither is a particularly encouraging example: In Bosnia the high representative has been in place for nearly eight years, in Kosovo the U.N. has been there for four years, and in neither case is an end in sight.

Iraq in many ways is far more complex than the Balkans because of the powerful foreign influences on the country, most notably from Iran and Saudi Arabia. But it also has some distinct advantages, above all its enormous oil wealth.

“The Iraqis have no sense of sovereignty now, they haven’t even been given symbols of sovereignty,” said Faleh Jabar, an Iraqi sociologist who teaches at London University’s Birbeck College and has returned to Baghdad to do research.

“All the Iraqis I’ve met have said that they want something that will represent Iraqi sovereignty, something so that they feel this is still their country.”

Some of the provisional authority officials are keenly aware of the problem, but they say it would be a disaster to move too quickly and risk widespread chaos in the country. The only two serious power bases among Iraqis at this point are the now-outlawed Hussein-backed Baath Party and the Shiite clerics.

“In an ideal world we would have moved to elections sooner, but Iraq isn’t an ideal world,” said a senior authority official who is immersed in the political process.

“The hopes of the exiled parties were raised by earlier pronouncements, but the conditions for such a rapid movement does not exist. If there were an open election it would be very vulnerable to fundamentalist extremists and Baathist remnants.”

If the advisory council plan is to work, the provisional authority will have to take the following steps -- each fraught with problems, according to reconstruction experts and authority officials:

* Recruit credible members of all the major groups in Iraq to participate in the council.

* Balance the number of exile groups with representatives from inside the country and find female participants in a society that has became increasingly dominated by religious Iraqis who are uncomfortable with women in public positions.

* Deal with Iraqi demands for control over all aspects of governance despite the reality that under the recently approved U.N. resolution, the provisional authority has responsibility for all government and humanitarian functions until a constitution is written and an Iraqi government is elected.

* Convey its plans to the Iraqi people -- a difficult task in a country where electricity remains sporadic and television signals weak.

The provisional authority’s goal is to create an advisory council with 25 to 30 members who will represent the range of groups in Iraq.

The major exile groups will have representatives on the council, as will a number of groups representing Iraqis who remained in the country during the decades of Hussein’s rule.

So far, six of the seven most established Iraqi exile organizations appear ready to take a seat at the table. The exception is the Shiite group headed by Hakim.

Eight more leaders also appear likely to be involved, according to a senior authority official.

The authority is still searching for female representatives and credible tribal leaders. It is also struggling with how to involve the Hawza, a loosely knit group of Shiite factions based in the holy city of Najaf.

The U.S. wants to ensure that Shiite leaders play a major role because they represent more than half of the country’s population, but it wants to avoid encouraging the more fundamentalist Shiite clerics who might push for an Islamic government similar to Iran’s.

But the biggest debate is about the council’s powers. The council would have responsibility for nominating ministers and representing the country in delegations overseas and proposing policy initiatives such as writing a new curriculum and new textbooks for the Iraqi schools and determining a currency. It is also expected to interact both with a group writing a new constitution for the country and an economic council focused on attracting investment and jobs.

However, the council would have no control over the military or the police -- the two most visible symbols of power during Hussein’s rule.

Mindful of a demonstration last week that involved mostly members of the dissolved Iraqi army, during which two Iraqis died at the hands of American soldiers, some potential council members say it is mandatory that the advisory board have a say in military and security policy.

“We can do the job as well or better than they can,” said Adnan Pachachi, who heads the Liberal Democratic Group, which is generally supportive of most authority policy. “We have a lot of competent military officers, and in general, Iraqis are better informed about the situation in the country than foreigners are.”

But that appears to be a nonstarter. Authority officials say that until there has been a thorough overhaul of the Iraqi military, which was used as an instrument of repression under Hussein, they are worried about reconstituting any part of it.