Blame and Hope in Iraq

When the Bush administration entered office, it epitomized buttoned-down, tight-lipped managerial efficiency, with few leaks and a united front. But the size of the mess in Iraq seems to have triggered a rash of finger-pointing. For months, officials in the CIA and the State and Defense departments have been accusing each other of mishandling the occupation. A new entrant in the blame game emerged this week when “a senior official” of the dissolved Coalition Provisional Authority accused the Pentagon of failing even now to devise a coherent strategy.

“U.S. Response to Insurgency Called a Failure,” trumpeted The Times’ headline Tuesday, agreeing with a spate of other media reports. The critics may have spoken too soon. The Pentagon’s original bungled planning for the war’s aftermath gave the insurgents a free hand, but the U.S. military and the provisional Iraqi government may be starting to get it right, even if the definition of success has been seriously scaled back.

The administration hopes that Prime Minister Iyad Allawi will become a benevolent authoritarian leader who will impose order in Iraq, just as Lee Kuan Yew turned Singapore into a flourishing city-state. Like Lee, who faced potential ethnic strife, Allawi must unite and modernize his country. Allawi is moving forcefully to create security, with free elections definitely in second place. He rightly pushed for martial law powers that allow him to impose curfews, outlaw terrorist groups and detain anyone considered a security risk. This is no return to the bad old days of Saddam Hussein: Allawi can impose martial law in specific areas only for up to 60 days, and numerous other checks on his powers exist. The alternative? Chaos and the rise of even more militias.

Whether Allawi will have the manpower to enforce his decrees is another question. But here too there is room for a pinch of optimism. The Pentagon has finally given Lt. Gen. David H. Petraeus the go-ahead to set up several boot camps and train Iraqi police and military personnel. The United Nations has agreed to pitch in with training. In jobless Iraq, recruiting security forces has been easy, but the men have lacked uniforms, communications gear and automobiles. The Bush administration finally has money and peacekeeping weapons flowing into Iraq.

Down the road, the question will be whether the forces remain subordinate to civilian authority. As Daniel Byman notes in the National Interest, “Iraqi history is replete with strongmen using their position in the military and security services to secure power.” Among them was Hussein.

The task of U.S. military forces was never to create a full-fledged free-market democracy. The most they can accomplish is to create enough stability for Iraqis to run their own nation. In his May 24 speech at the Army War College, President Bush acknowledged that “Iraqis will raise up a government that reflects their own culture and values.”

The current bout of anonymous “he said, she said” bellyaching reflects the mood of officials in the administration who dreamed of transforming Iraq. Among their failures back then was castigating military leaders who warned how treacherous any occupation would be. They’re still blaming the messenger, even as U.S. forces stand at a rare moment of hope in the occupation.