The end of the unipolar era

Two seemingly unrelated events -- the recent bombings in London and the announcement that in late July China will host talks aimed at resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis -- are in fact very much related. Together, they dramatize the passing of the unipolar era.

The unipolar era was widely thought to have begun in November of 1989 -- 11/9, as it were -- when the Berlin Wall fell. The logic was obvious: With the end of the Cold War and the subsequent demise of one of the two poles, only one global superpower would remain.

Reinforcing this perception was the fact that U.S. power was unprecedented: above all, military -- as seen in Kuwait, Kosovo and Afghanistan, among other places -- but also economic, political and cultural. American primacy was a fact. The United States was demonstrably first among unequals.

This view was understandable, but by focusing so much on the passing of one geopolitical era, observers neglected the arrival of another: the age of globalization. And with this transition something of a paradigm shift took place. Competition and conflict among the major powers, which had constituted the principal historical dynamic for centuries, was suddenly superseded by a world in which the principal threat to the U.S. was not a great rival power but global disorder and decay: terrorism, the spread of nuclear weapons, trade protectionism, climate change, infectious disease.

Examples abound: 9/11, what just happened in London, what could and probably will happen here in the United States -- all are signs of American vulnerability to terrorism, one manifestation of globalization’s dark side.

The U.S. cannot manage the terrorist threat by itself. It requires others to share intelligence, to coordinate law enforcement, to cooperate on homeland security, to make sure states do not fail or that they recover when they do, to work together on the reform of Arab societies.

The North Korean nuclear challenge is the same. The U.S. cannot on its own force North Korea to give up its nuclear material; it lacks the means to change North Korea’s regime short of invading and occupying the country along the lines of what it is doing in Iraq. But it is precisely because of Iraq that the U.S. lacks the military means to even contemplate such a policy. And even if the U.S. possessed such means, it would have to contend with the resistance of South Korea, Japan and China.

Hence the significance of the announcement that China will host talks. China has enormous reason to rein in North Korea lest Japan and South Korea conclude that they must follow suit and develop nuclear weapons of their own. China also has the means to influence North Korea because the lion’s share of what goes in and out of that country moves through China.

In the weeks and months ahead, the Bush administration will need to jettison its hope that the North Korean regime will disappear. Instead, the U.S. will need to offer it security assurances, diplomatic rewards and economic benefits -- and convince China, Japan, South Korea and Russia that those incentives must be based on North Korea giving up its nuclear weapons.

The same sort of multilateral diplomacy will be required if Iran’s nuclear program is to be headed off -- or if the world hopes to expand trade and keep protectionism at bay, or deal with phenomena such as HIV/AIDS and global climate change. Global challenges require collective solutions.

The principal policy consequence of the end of the unipolar era is that unilateralism is not a serious or sustainable foreign policy choice for the U.S. The real question is, which form of multilateralism will emerge? When will we go to the U.N.? When will we turn to regional organizations or less-inclusive contact groups (such as the one dealing with North Korea)?

There can be no universal answer to this question. Diplomacy must inevitably be a la carte. It will help, though, if Washington’s consultations with the rest of the world are genuine and not simply efforts to push through an already decided policy. A decision to opt out of formal multilateralism should only be taken when it is truly necessary. And when the United States does break ranks with the international community, it should look to bring in the relevant regional organizations -- or the U.N. -- at the first opportunity.

U.S. leadership remains essential, not simply because of the enormous ability of the United States to affect global developments, but also because the world will not organize itself effectively without American participation. But leadership requires followership, something that can only be engendered by a foreign policy that strives to get others to agree on the principles and rules of international relations and how they are to be enforced when they are violated.