U.S. Turns to Iraqi Insiders in Battle Against Insurgency

Rather than trying to defeat the insurgency in Iraq militarily, U.S. commanders now taking charge here say they are focused on developing better intelligence and using unorthodox tactics to chip away at militant cells with help from Iraqi security forces.

As part of that strategy, commanders and their Iraqi allies say they have had informal contacts with Sunni Muslims who either support the insurgency or are active participants. Some of these Sunnis want to take part in the country’s fledgling political process, intelligence officers say.

The overall strategy reflects the Pentagon’s emphasis on turning over security responsibilities to Iraqis. The commanders say intelligence developed by Iraqi security forces is disrupting some insurgent cells while also leading to roundups of low- and mid-level insurgents.

“We won’t be the ones to defeat this insurgency. It’ll be the Iraqis themselves,” said Army Maj. Gen. Joseph Taluto, who took over command late last month of four provinces north of Baghdad in the so-called Sunni Triangle. “This insurgency can go on low grade for a long time, and the Iraqis will eventually have to put it out.”

After a brief dip following Jan. 30 elections, insurgent attacks have returned to preelection levels, intelligence officers say. Commanders concede that the core of the insurgency will fight indefinitely.

The insurgents are still able to “conduct spectacular attacks, suicide attacks that create mass casualties,” Taluto said. Thousands of Iraqi soldiers, police and government officials have been killed or wounded.

“Nobody here is minimizing the insurgency,” Taluto said from his spacious office at Saddam Hussein’s former palace complex in Tikrit, the deposed leader’s hometown. “We certainly respect it. These people are smart and committed. On the other hand, they’re not 10 feet tall.”

Commanders acknowledge that past U.S. intelligence efforts have been spotty, particularly in the early months of the insurgency in late 2003 and early 2004. They say top-level insurgent leaders are still able to direct a network of largely independent local cells whose attacks have crippled reconstruction efforts.

But they say several cells have been broken up by using Iraqi soldiers as undercover infiltrators. Cell members who are captured are told, falsely, that they were turned in by other cell members, intelligence officers said. They said the tactic had prompted some insurgents to provide the names of other cell members.

“If they think they’ve been dimed out by one of their own people, they’ll start naming names,” one intelligence officer said.

In addition to turning to Iraqis for better intelligence, the newly arriving commanders are creating small reconstruction projects designed to provide jobs for Iraqis. They say many Iraqis who plant roadside bombs are not committed insurgents but unemployed young men paid to mount attacks.

“That’s the way to get security established -- get essential services, get jobs for people,” said Army Brig. Gen. James Huggins, who took over last month as chief of staff for multinational forces. “This is just as important as good intelligence.”

Even so, commanders say resentment toward the U.S. occupation remains so strong that the Vietnam-era concept of winning hearts and minds does not necessarily apply in Iraq. Instead, they are trying to deflect attention from U.S. forces while building public trust in the Iraqi army, police and political institutions.

“We’ll never win their hearts and minds, but we will win their respect,” said Army Brig. Gen. Karl Horst, an assistant commander of the 3rd Infantry Division, which took over control of greater Baghdad late last month.

The size and competence of the Iraqi security forces have been questioned by some U.S. congressional leaders. Last week, the Government Accountability Office accused the Pentagon of inflating the number of trained soldiers and police officers on duty.

Yet commanders say new Iraqi army and police units have improved intelligence-gathering through their knowledge of neighborhoods and local political currents.

And tips by citizens have led to several arrests of cell leaders and seizures of weapons and bomb-making equipment, commanders say. Many tips have come through toll-free lines. Callers are guaranteed anonymity and sometimes offered rewards. Billboards -- 250 in Baghdad alone -- and TV ads urge Iraqis to report suspicious activity.

In Baghdad, tip lines are producing 40 calls a week, said Army Brig. Gen. Jeffery Hammond.

As part of U.S. operations, government-run TV stations have aired tapes in which captured insurgents tearfully confess their complicity in deadly attacks. In addition, U.S. commanders are taking part in call-in shows on Iraqi TV -- such as “Kirkuk and the New Iraqi Future” in the north and “Good Morning Orange City” near the insurgent stronghold of Baqubah, known for its orange groves.

Some insurgents have shown up at “unity day” meetings, in which Iraqis are invited to air grievances with U.S. commanders and Iraqi army, police and council officials. These informal discussions have led to agreements for more substantive meetings with insurgents, intelligence officers say. The U.S. military hopes it can co-opt some of these Sunnis into the political process and end their support of the insurgency.

“These guys recognize that the single biggest threat to the insurgency now is the new government and the new political process. They don’t want to be left out in the cold,” said Army Maj. Michel Natali, an intelligence officer with the 42nd Infantry Division, commanded by Taluto.

Iraqis invited to unity day meetings are assured that they will not be arrested. At a recent unity day in Baqubah, several supporters of the insurgency discussed political accommodation. But five insurgents, along with a representative of the anti-American Shiite Muslim cleric Muqtada Sadr, vowed to “wage jihad forever,” said a U.S. officer who attended the meeting.

“We didn’t try to arrest them, but we damn sure took their pictures,” the officer said.

Such contacts have helped. Intelligence officers say they are developing a better understanding of the insurgency. These officers say most cells have an operations director, who assigns deputies to organize ambushes or to hire people to place roadside bombs or build car bombs. Most cells have at least one financier who raises money, and several pay agents who disburse cash for operations. The typical cell is based on blood and tribal ties, insuring insularity.

Trying to dismantle such cells requires more than just mounting raids or combat patrols, intelligence officers say.

“This is a thinking man’s game now,” said Army Lt. Col. Roger Cloutier, whose battalion outside Muqdadiya northeast of Baghdad has teamed with an Iraqi army unit to develop intelligence that has led to the arrests of 80 members of local cells. “It’s like we’re in the middle of a Tom Clancy novel.”

“Or an episode of ‘The Sopranos,’ ” added Cloutier’s operations officer, Maj. Mark Borowski.

The battalion’s intelligence officer, Capt. Alex Marrone, said it was difficult to decide what information to trust and what to ignore. Insurgents have called in phony tips and then attacked Iraqi soldiers who responded, Taluto said.

“You don’t always know who to trust, but I’ll tell you this: I truly trust the IA [Iraqi army] guys I deal with every day,” Marrone said.

Capt. Ed Ballanco, a U.S. military advisor to the brigade, said Iraqi soldiers’ local contacts and rapport had proved invaluable.

“They are infinitely better at counterinsurgency than we are,” he said. “When we get intel on a bad guy, we ask them. And since they are almost all from Haifa Street [a notorious stretch of central Baghdad where insurgents hold sway], they usually know the guy ... and they grab him. It’s really amazing.”

Commanders say they are encouraging Iraqis to fend for themselves. In Tikrit, Taluto said, a police chief was attacked by insurgents as he arrived home from work. Taking cover inside his house, he radioed for help -- not to U.S. forces, but to the provincial government center, which dispatched an Iraqi army unit that drove off the insurgents.

Although commanders say combined U.S. and Iraqi army tactics are disrupting the insurgency, they acknowledge that it may take years to subdue it. They are still struggling to penetrate cells directed by Jordanian-born terrorist Abu Musab Zarqawi, who has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against U.S. and Iraqi soldiers.

Huggins said intelligence analysts were sifting through information provided by U.S. and Iraqi officers -- and tips from Iraqi civilians -- to better understand Zarqawi’s network of cells.