Let juries decide damages

Re “Punitive clarity,” editorial, Dec. 9

In the second Philip Morris vs. Williams, the Supreme Court decided that courts must have a procedure to assure that juries are not confused about punitive damages and the proper use of evidence when others, in addition to the plaintiff, are harmed. Oregon has such a procedure. Philip Morris failed to comply with it, asking for a jury instruction that misstated Oregon law.

In Exxon vs. Baker, the Supreme Court noted that most punitive damage awards are less than the amount of compensatory damages, and that jurors do a remarkably good job deciding how to punish reprehensible behavior with punitive damages. The idea that such awards are skyrocketing and that lower courts are operating in a rogue fashion has proved to be a myth.

Robert S. Peck

Washington

The writer argued the third Philip Morris vs. Williams before the Supreme Court on Dec. 3. He represented respondent Mayola Williams.

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In your editorial, you argue that the Supreme Court should interfere with the long-standing authority of local courts to award punitive damages in injury cases.

History shows that companies will sometimes balance safety against profits in determining whether to redesign or recall a defective product, clean up a toxic waste site or end a dangerous practice. Juries know that, to a multibillion-dollar company, even a $1-million punitive damages award is barely a slap on the wrist.

It should be the juries’ job, and only theirs, to determine damages based on the facts before them. There are some who still insist that it’s appropriate to set arbitrary limits on punitive damages, so they become little more than a cost of doing business for bad corporate citizens. Given the rash of corporate abuse that has led to our financial meltdown, this seems like the worst possible idea at the worst possible time.

Joanne Doroshow

New York

The writer is executive director of the Center for Justice & Democracy.