The LAPD’s assault on SWAT
On a Sunday afternoon in the summer of 2005, Jose Pena fueled himself with cocaine and grabbed a 9-millimeter pistol. Waving the gun at the head of his 19-month-old daughter, Suzie, he told the LAPD officers who arrived at the scene that he was Tony Montana -- the character played by Al Pacino in “Scarface” -- and that he was going to kill his daughter and himself. He’d already shot at her sister and at the police, so the threat was believable.
The situation was straightforward: If an LAPD SWAT crisis negotiator couldn’t dispel Pena’s narcotic fantasies, the little girl’s life would rest with a SWAT rescue team’s ability to cross a 50-foot alley, access the building, find and enter the room he was in and save Suzie before Pena pulled the trigger.
Now imagine for a moment that you were in Suzie Pena’s position. Would you want the police SWAT team coming through the door to be the best of the best -- the toughest, most highly trained, most elite tacticians in the Los Angeles Police Department -- or would you want the team to “look like L.A.”? Would you want rescuers who had not lost a hostage in three decades, or would you want a team with heartwarming, multicultural diversity?
The answer is pretty obvious, no? You’d want the best. That’s what Suzie got, and even so, the results were tragic. According to the L.A. district attorney’s office, Jose Pena emerged from the building and a gunfight ensued. When Pena retreated to his office, four SWAT officers crossed the alley in a matter of seconds, entered the building, took fire through the walls -- fire that struck one officer -- and entered Pena’s office. There, they exchanged more shots with the gunman, who was standing behind a desk with Suzie. In the chaos, both Jose and Suzie Pena were killed.
Suzie is the only hostage ever lost by LAPD SWAT during its 35 years.
Shortly after her death, Police Chief William J. Bratton appointed a board of inquiry to examine the incident. Its mission, he said, was to investigate the officers’ tactics and other factors in the shooting. “For the safety of the public and officers, we need to understand intimately what transpired in that incident,” he said at the time.
In fact, the board did nothing of the sort. None of the SWAT officers from the Pena shooting were even interviewed by the panel, according to multiple sources. Indeed, the board’s eight members included fewer tactical experts (one) than attorneys (three). In its final report, the board acknowledged that it had been “ultimately precluded from gaining a full and complete understanding of what transpired in Pena until after this report was finalized.”
What’s more, Assistant Chief Sharon Papa privately promised the team shortly after the incident that the report would be aired openly, according to officers who were present. That didn’t happen either. The final report -- completed 15 months ago -- has not been released. Many senior department officials have never seen it, and Times reporters have repeatedly requested it but have been turned down. I received a copy earlier this month from a source.
The report shows that instead of fulfilling Bratton’s promises, the board used the Pena case (with Bratton’s encouragement) as a way to push for a series of politically correct changes within SWAT -- changes that many cops believe will have absolutely no benefit and that they believe will endanger the lives of citizens and cops alike.
From the start -- before the panel examined any evidence -- Bratton made it clear that increasing SWAT’s diversity was particularly important to him. In November 2005, he privately addressed the board about his goals for their inquiry. The final report quotes him: “I’m looking to create change within SWAT. The qualifications to get in are stringent. But are they too stringent? There are no women and few African Americans.... Are there artificial barriers for getting into SWAT that the ‘good old boys’ network has maintained?”
Bratton’s assertion that SWAT has few African Americans is not accurate. Eight of the 63 SWAT members are black, sources say, -- even after the death of Officer Randal Simmons on Feb. 7. That’s 12.6% in a department that is 12% African American.
Nevertheless, in keeping with Bratton’s wishes, the final report devotes substantial space to how to bring in female and black officers. “The absence of women ... and the low number of African Americans in SWAT should be addressed and dealt with, and the membership of SWAT should be reflective of the community,” the report says, although it offers no qualitative or quantitative evidence that this change would save a single life or lead to a single suspect’s apprehension. The unit, the report says, has become “insular, self-referential and resistant to change.”
The report goes on to say that “there is no task in SWAT that a woman could not perform” and that the selection criteria has “underemphasized negotiating skills, patience, empathy and flexibility while overemphasizing physical prowess and tactical acumen.”
But SWAT officers who have actually entered houses to rescue hostages from killers (as they did Feb. 7 in Winnetka, resulting in the death of Simmons and the wounding of Officer James Veenstra) say there is no such thing as overemphasizing tactical acumen or physical prowess for such assignments.
Yes, they say, there are probably women on the force who could and should be admitted to SWAT, but they should be required to meet the same standards as other applicants and should be chosen for skill, not for diversity. The reality, SWAT members say, is that the standards for tactical success apply to everyone equally. Upper-body strength is vital to holding a 12-pound rifle stone-steady to hit a deranged killer while avoiding his hostage in a whirlwind of chaos.
In general, the final board report offers little or no persuasive evidence as to why SWAT should change. “SWAT performs in a disciplined and exemplary manner consistent with its fine reputation,” the report acknowledges. “It has been and remains a source of great pride within the LAPD.”
In fact, according to the report itself, out of 3,771 missions SWAT has performed from 1972 to 2005, suspects have been apprehended without any “untoward” incident in 83% of the cases. (The report does not define “untoward.”) It notes that SWAT members have killed a suspect only 31 times in 33 years -- that’s less than 1% of all engagements, often with the city’s most deranged and violent criminals.
What’s more, SWAT has lost only one hostage -- Suzie Pena -- and the way to ensure it doesn’t happen again is to maintain and raise standards, not to lower them out of political correctness.
None of that matters, though, to the brass. “Bratton wants a woman on SWAT regardless of whether she’s 110 pounds soaking wet and completely incapable of pulling 200 pounds of Jimmy Veenstra and his gear out of a house in the middle of a gunfight,” said one officer who survived the Winnetka shootout in which Veenstra was extracted by his teammates while under fire.
Based on the findings of the report, the LAPD has just instituted a new selection process for SWAT, according to a SWAT veteran who helped in the redesign. Instead of picking cops on the basis of their ability to handle weapons and stress, the new standards specifically exclude video-based shooting simulator evaluations and “Hogan’s Alley,” a daunting series of pop-up targets representing armed crooks and hostages. A simulated raid with flash-bang devices that previously disqualified many candidates who accidentally shot the “hostage” is also gone.
The new test’s only physical challenges are a modest physical fitness qualification and a modified obstacle course. “My preteen daughter could pass that,” one officer said. Applicants’ scores will now largely come from an oral interview conducted by non-SWAT and non-LAPD supervisors. In essence, the test is largely subjective.
Another coming change that SWAT officers criticize is one that would allow officers from anywhere in the department to apply to SWAT, rather than limiting it (as it has historically been limited) to officers from the elite Metropolitan Division. SWAT had argued to the board that continued selection from Metro was “a nearly fail-safe way to select the best of the best,” and the final board report acknowledged that using only applicants from Metro “has produced remarkable cohesion, consistency, mutual trust and commonality of outlook.”
But the board of inquiry ultimately claimed that including people from other divisions “could bring a wider perspective and greater gender and racial diversity.” So the plan to broaden the pool of applicants is expected to go into effect next year.
There are a variety of innocuous recommendations in the board report, such as improvements in risk management, trend analysis and data analysis. The report calls for new accountability measures, including “Compstat-like accountability.” (Compstat is Bratton’s signature system for tracking crime trends.) The report also recommends providing all personnel with take-home cars, something the team has requested for years.
But it is the change in the selection process and the opening up of SWAT to applicants from outside Metro that have motivated SWAT officers’ wives to launch an unusual e-mail campaign directed at Bratton and Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa, stating in part: “We are concerned with the safety of our husbands ... if they are expected to go into these highly dangerous situations with someone who got in under a compromised standard.”
The report says, “SWAT culture and insularity pose a certain danger to the LAPD and the Los Angeles community as a whole.” But the report is based on misconceptions.
SWAT is not a lily-white redoubt of old prejudices. Simmons and Veenstra (who is of Asian ancestry) illustrate this. Suzie Pena’s attempted rescuers had names like Perez, Sanchez and Gallegos. Bratton may not know this; at the annual SWAT dinner, I saw him come in and talk to a couple of senior managers and deputy chiefs for 30 minutes and then leave, having barely acknowledged the officers -- black, white, Latino or otherwise. That evening, he forfeited his last chance to talk to Simmons, who died 10 days later.
SWAT is too important to this city to be weakened in the name of political correctness. Unless the Police Commission or other officials act, the LAPD will make social experimentation a higher priority than tactical excellence.