No to the third degree

Most recent discussion of abusive interrogation tactics has concerned the CIA’s use of torture in questioning alleged terrorists. But long before 9/11, U.S. citizens suspected of crimes were sometimes subjected to what fans of film noir know as the third degree. Often the success of such interrogation depended on postponing the suspect’s arraignment before a judge or magistrate while the police worked him over.

Last week, the Supreme Court forcefully reminded federal law enforcement agents that they can’t stall for time in hopes that a suspect will break. By a 5-4 vote, the court overturned the bank robbery conviction of a Pennsylvania man brought before a judicial officer nearly 30 hours after his arrest, despite the fact that FBI agents shared an office building with federal magistrates. By that time, Johnnie Corley had waived his Miranda rights and signed a confession.

Writing for the majority, Justice David H. Souter said the delay violated past Supreme Court decisions and a 1968 federal law saying that a suspect’s confession should be considered voluntary if it is “made or given within six hours immediately following his arrest or other detention.” Four dissenters, led by Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr., argued that the six-hour provision was overridden by other language in the law allowing the admission in court of a confession that is “voluntarily given.” But Souter noted that if that were the case, Congress would have had no reason to include the provision.

The principle isn’t new. In 1943, the Supreme Court invalidated confessions because federal agents had delayed bringing suspects in the murder of a revenue agent before a magistrate. The court said that the requirement for expeditious arraignment “constitutes an important safeguard -- not only in assuring protection for the innocent but also in securing conviction of the guilty by methods that commend themselves to a progressive and self-confident society.” Fourteen years later, the court had to repeat those words in overturning the rape conviction of a District of Columbia man because he hadn’t been promptly brought before a judicial officer.

Whether aggressive interrogations serve the cause of justice is a debatable proposition; some social scientists argue that the combination of harsh measures and young or impressionable suspects often produce false confessions that impede the apprehension of the guilty. But, whatever the effectiveness of the third degree, it’s incompatible with the protection for individual rights that distinguishes this nation from so many others.