From Tehran to Moscow

INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY over Iran’s nuclear program will shift from Vienna to New York next month, as the International Atomic Energy Agency voted over the weekend to refer the matter to the U.N. Security Council. But the key to solving this dilemma may lie in Moscow.

Russia, along with China, voted to send the case to the Security Council, which is scheduled to take it up next month. The stakes are high, and they demand great diplomatic dexterity from the United States -- toward the government of Vladimir V. Putin. Moscow has strong economic and historical ties with Tehran and should play a crucial role in any plan to defuse the Iranian nuclear crisis.

The first step is simply acknowledging that the crisis exists. Russia’s vote last weekend shows that it appreciates the situation is becoming critical; for too long Russia placed too much emphasis on Iran’s right to make nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. Iran’s intentions to build a bomb are clear, even if its words and actions are often confusing. Last summer, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared that Tehran’s nuclear program was “the absolute right for Iran and every Iranian.” This remains the most pertinent statement of Iranian nuclear policy, despite the nation’s on-again, off-again cooperation with the IAEA.

Russia over the years has helped Iran build and supply nuclear power plants, even proposing a joint venture to enrich uranium in Russia and send it back to Iran. That offer is still on the table, although its status is in limbo. The Bush administration should be grateful for Russia’s contributions to the Iranian negotiations and should work hard to not let its disagreements with Putin elsewhere jeopardize Moscow’s cooperation on Iran.

That doesn’t mean becoming an apologist for Putin’s troglodyte views on democracy. (Though maybe such language is best left to editorialists.) From Moscow’s point of view, what grates the most is what it sees as U.S. meddling on Russia’s “near abroad,” the former Soviet republics. It’s possible for the U.S. to push Ukraine toward democracy without also urging it to sever its many economic ties with Russia, for instance. Likewise, the State Department may want to be more consistent about where it encourages “color” revolutions against repressive former Soviet regimes -- not just in countries with Moscow-friendly governments (Uzbekistan), but also more repressive states that aren’t so cozy with Putin (Turkmenistan).

Washington need not make any concessions to Russia on these issues to ensure Moscow’s continued cooperation on Iran. But surely it’s not detrimental to U.S. interests to stress that friendly relations between Russia and the countries on its borders are in everyone’s national interest. As is a peaceful, workable solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis.