What is counter-insurgency good for?

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Just in time for the renewal of the war debate in Congress, the University of Chicago Press has released ‘The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual’ (420 pp. $15 paper), a thick guide to strategy--both military and otherwise--with forewords by Gen. David H. Petraeus and Lt. Gen. James F. Amos. It’s a nifty volume, not only because it gives you a sense of what our most highly regarded military theorists are thinking, but because sometimes what they’re thinking is the last thing you’d expect. Especially interesting is a section called ‘Paradoxes of Counterinsurgency Operations,’ in which the ‘Field Manual’ tells us: ‘Sometimes doing nothing is the best reaction’ and ‘Sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is.’

In conjunction with the ‘Field Manual,’ University of Chicago has also put out ‘Instructions for American Servicemen in Iraq During World War II’ (44 pp., $10)--a historical oddity that sheds a certain unintended light upon our current woes. Among its suggestions? ‘Manners are important’; ‘Avoid offering opinions on internal politics’; and ‘No preaching.’ Most of all, ‘use common sense on all occasions. And remember that every American soldier is an unofficial ambassador of good will.’

David L. Ulin