European Allies--a Third Voice in Geneva Talks

As U.S. and Soviet officials sit down at the conference table here today, every public move of the two delegations will be the focus of international attention.

But away from the public spotlight, an important third voice will be exerting its own considerable influence on the negotiating process--that of America’s European allies.

Through a consultative process described by U.S. diplomats as “the most intense ever devised,” European members of the Western alliance have been able to help determine the course and content of previous arms control negotiations, and they are certain to play some role in shaping any future such negotiations.

Indeed, continued pressure on the superpowers by their respective European allies is cited as one of the forces that brought about the present meeting between Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

While the United States and Western Europe share the common goal of guaranteeing peace and security with a mininium of weaponry, fundamental differences on how to best achieve this goal have produced a measure of disquiet, have complicated the negotiating process and produced significant changes in the Western positions.

Few issues better illustrate these differences than President Reagan’s controversial Strategic Defense Initiative, a system of anti-missile weapons that would be deployed in space--the so-called “Star Wars” program.

For the President, the concept provides a chance to break the arms race and build instead an airtight defense that would guarantee security. There are doubts about its technical feasibility, but the stakes are high enough to justify the expense of billions on research alone, the President believes.

Western Europeans look on the “Star Wars” plan with a mixture of skepticism and foreboding. They concede that the very prospect of having such a system helped lure Moscow back to the negotiating table, but they are deeply concerned that the idea, if pursued, could eventually drive the Europeans and Americans apart.

“The long-term effect of ‘Star Wars’ would be the decoupling of the alliance,” acccording to Christoph Bertram, former director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and presently an editor of the West German weekly Die Zeit of Hamburg.

Allies Express Dismay

Following detailed briefings on the concept last April by Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger, even America’s staunchest allies expressed dismay. Some dismissed it as hare-brained. Others argued that it would enlarge the East-West conflict and add new financial burdens to the arms race.

Concern was expressed too that a “Star Wars” defense system would probably be less effective against shorter-range Soviet missiles aimed at Western Europe and that a United States fully protected from long-range missiles by such a system might be less willing to defend Europe.

Repeated U.S. assurances to the contrary, coupled with the belief that it makes little sense to risk a major rift with the United States now over a system that may not be in place for decades, have silenced some of the critics, but not all of them.

At a meeting last fall of key West European members of the alliance, French Defense Minister Charles Hernu reportedly tried but failed to rally support for a common European position against the “Star Wars” concept.

For West Europeans, the most important aspect of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting is that it is taking place at all. Its symbolic value as a beacon of hope for the future has been a tonic for leaders such as West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl.

Although the tumultuous demonstrations that greeted the deployment of U.S. medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe a year ago have subsided, the missile issue still carries a greater sense of immediacy and is politically more volatile in Europe than in the United States.

“We want progress (at the Shultz-Gromyko meeting),” West Germany’s commissioner for arms control and disarmament, Friedrich Ruth, said in an interview. “Our interest is that there is agreement on a format that gives us a chance to succeed.”

For Europeans, the top priority in any future negotiations is to reduce the number of medium-range nuclear missiles threatening their continent.

Since the mid-1970s, the Soviets have deployed 378 triple-warhead SS-20 missiles aimed at Western Europe, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has responded, so far, with 54 Pershing 2s and 48 cruise missiles. NATO plans to add 470 additional missiles in the next three years.

Any negotiated reduction of these numbers would constitute an enormous political victory for the leaders who weathered widespread public protest against permitting U.S. missile deployment in their countries. In Belgium and the Netherlands, where deployment of the new missiles has yet to start, any breakthrough would ease severe political pressures.

“For us, a result in this area is vitally important,” said Jan Blaauw, a member of the Dutch Parliament and spokesman on defense matters for Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers’ Liberal Party.

Blaauw and other European disarmament experts interviewed on the eve of the Shultz-Gromyko meeting expressed concern that Washington might underestimate the dangers of new Soviet medium-range missiles in its eagerness to achieve reductions in longer-range intercontinental missiles that directly threaten the United States.

Impatience on Spending

There is also worry in many parts of Europe, especially in West Germany, that American impatience about Western Europe’s reluctance to spend more for its own defense might sour relations within the alliance and also influence the negotiations.

Statements by former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger that Europe must do more for its own defense, legislation proposed last year by Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) to reduce U.S. troop strength in Europe if America’s allies fail to increase their defense commitments, musings by former Under Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger about the vitality of the Atlantic Alliance--these are all cited as examples of the American mood.

Still, Europeans have effectively pressed their interests and helped shape events at the negotiating table through a Special Consultative Group. This was established in 1979 to improve communications among the governments in connection with the so-called Euromissile talks, known formally as Intermediate Nuclear Force negotiations.

The consultative group, which consists of representatives of 13 NATO countries (all except France, Iceland and Luxembourg), met every few weeks for detailed briefings and formulated important negotiating positions.

For example, the opening U.S. proposal at the talks, which called for elimination of all medium-range nuclear missiles--the “zero option”--was essentially a European idea. Subsequent positions and tactics at the Intermediate Nuclear Force talks were also heavily influenced by European thinking.

The consultative group, which itself grew out of a European idea, has met frequently in the advanced stages of the Shultz-Gromyko talks. Moreover, the Europeans have pressed their ideas in recent meetings between Reagan and Kohl and between Reagan and Britain’s Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

But Europeans know that if the medium-range missiles become part of a larger negotiating format that also includes intercontinental missiles, Europe’s influence is likely to decline. Some argue that with Pershing 2 and cruise missile deployment already under way in Britain, Italy and West Germany, the United States is less firmly tied to the wishes of its allies and Europeans may find it harder to press their interests.

‘Walk-in-Woods’ Plan

These people point out that even with the intensity of the Special Consultative Group meetings, Europeans were ignored on the famous “walk-in-the-woods” plan worked out by U.S. negotiator Paul H. Nitze and his Soviet counterpart, Yuli A. Kvitsinsky, during a stroll in the mountains above Geneva in 1982.

That plan, which called for sharply reducing the number of SS-20s in return for reduced deployment of the American missiles, was vetoed by both governments before the West Europeans ever got wind of it.

This lapse upset Europeans, and that attitude persists, even though it is rarely expressed openly. Instead, Europeans have repeatedly stressed the importance of close consultations.

“Even if we are not taking part in negotiations, we are directly affected by their outcome,” West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher said in a policy statement issued late last week. “We will therefore use the alliance consultative process fully and contribute actively to shape the negotiations.”