Divided Latin Nations Warned It Is Now or Never for Peace Agreement

Beset by feuds and stalling among the five nations they are trying to help, the sponsors of the Contadora peace initiative in Central America have sent a signal to the region’s troubled countries that it is now or never for the long-sought negotiated peace agreement.

At the end of their latest meeting here, the four nations of the Contadora Group, which has been trying for two years to mediate a settlement among the Central Americans, produced a declaration saying, in effect, that an acceptable draft peace treaty will soon be placed before them. But there is much evidence that no accord is possible right now.

A key piece of such evidence is an alternative draft for a Central American treaty produced last October by El Salvador, Costa Rica and Honduras. That draft demonstrates that the three countries have important differences with Nicaragua, which they see as their principal adversary.

Yet the joint declaration issued Wednesday by the foreign ministers of the Contadora Group--Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela--represents a subtle but unmistakable way of putting pressure on the Central Americans. The declaration called for a round of talks by the mediators with the Central Americans on Feb. 14-15 to prepare for a conference “destined to subscribe” to the draft treaty that will soon be circulated among the five. Guatemala is the fifth country that would be a party to any final treaty.

With the now-or-never approach, the Contadora Group hopes to produce a final, crucial round of serious talks.

The mediating diplomats have resisted being so categorical in the past, unwilling to prod the small Central American nations too hard lest they turn their backs on the Contadora initiative. Now, they apparently believe the time has come to take a calculated risk--gambling that the Central Americans will opt for here-and-now rather than never.

Furthermore, the action is an acknowledgment that the process is in danger of collapse from its own inability to produce a settlement after two years of unproductive talking and behind-the-scenes diplomatic maneuvering.

The foreign ministers of the four sponsoring countries launched their initiative Jan. 10, 1983, at the end of a meeting on the Panamanian resort island of Contadora, from which the group takes its name.

Expressions of hope for success of the latest effort by the mediators--Foreign Minister Bernardo Sepulveda of Mexico referred cautiously to “reasonable optimism”--are based on a view by the Contadora ministers that the differences among the Central Americans have been reduced to “technical aspects.”

This view, however, disregards the experience that the effectiveness and viability of any multiparty international pact often rests precisely on such details. And it ignores the accumulated layers of suspicion and resentment that years of hostility and conflict have deposited on Central America.

The main disagreements over a draft treaty for peace in Central America are divided into four areas, all dealing with security. They are:

--”Simultaneity.” This is a difficult word used to designate a simple notion: who will place his guns on the table first. A treaty draft prepared for the Central Americans by the Contadora Group last September--a document that Nicaragua endorsed--could permit Nicaragua to purchase more weapons after signing the treaty, although other provisions less favorable to such U.S. allies as El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica would be put into effect immediately. The alternative draft offered by the U.S. allies reverses the timetable in favor of themselves.

--Compliance. The alternative draft, drawn up in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, would create a corps of international inspectors to monitor compliance with the treaty. The Contadora draft referred only to a conventional panel of monitors with somewhat ambiguous investigation powers.

--Armaments levels. The Contadora draft would permit each country to stockpile weapons, “taking into account their national security interests.” This was interpreted by some as giving an edge to Nicaragua, since that country perceives a threat of invasion from the United States. The alternative draft would establish “military equilibrium” as the standard for arms levels, presumably placing a tighter rein on Nicaragua.

--Foreign military maneuvers. These exercises, through which the United States has kept a permanent military presence in Honduras, would be outlawed in the Contadora draft and permitted in the alternative version.

Although differences over such issues appear formidable, Contadora mediators say they are not insurmountable. This view holds that the Contadora initiative is a conventional, if deeply complicated, diplomatic negotiation that has been prolonged because of its complexity.

Fundamentally, however, the Contadora process is much more ambitious than that. It is nothing less than an attempt to rebuild the stability in Central America that existed until July, 1979, when a movement spearheaded by young rebels overthrew Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza, ending nearly half a century of rule in that country by the pro-U.S. Somoza family.

Replacement of the Somoza dynasty by a leftist revolutionary regime forced Washington to strengthen its other allies in the region.

Honduras, a quintessential banana republic, was pressed into the role of bulwark for democracy, something for which it may have been unready. Honduras was also made the staging area for raids by U.S.-financed guerrillas into Nicaragua, a hostile role with which that country is demonstrably uncomfortable.

The Reagan Administration’s main problem in the region has stemmed from the difficulty of drawing a line against communism in Central America after the Marxist-influenced leaders of Nicaragua had already moved in behind the line.

Commander Daniel Ortega, the Nicaraguan revolutionary leader who emerged as the first among equals in the Sandinista government that replaced Somoza, was sworn in Thursday as Nicaragua’s new president, a milestone in the consolidation of the revolutionary government.

For the United States and its allies, formalizing any Contadora treaty would mean having to find a modus vivendi with the new Nicaragua.

For the Nicaraguans, acceptance of a treaty would mean a commitment to live in peace with its neighbors, discarding whatever hopes it may hold that its own revolution should serve as a model for the entire region.

The roles and perceptions of Nicaragua and the United States are central to a solution to the conflicts in Central America.