Can U.S.-Soviet Togetherness Stem Nuclear Proliferation?

The United States and the Soviet Union are adversaries in the arms race that everybody talks about: the big-power competition in nuclear-armed bombers and missiles and high-technology conventional weapons. Fortunately, though, Washington and Moscow frequently find themselves on the same side in trying to cope with another arms race that probably poses a greater danger to world peace.

This other arms race involves the rapid progress of Third World countries toward the ability to build nuclear weapons of their own if they choose to do so.

For 20 years the number of countries that admit to having nuclear weapons has held at five: China, France, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. In recent years a great deal of diplomatic effort has gone into efforts to prevent the nuclear club from growing any larger on the sound ground that the more fingers on the nuclear trigger, the greater the chance that the trigger will be pulled.

Even the limited use of nuclear weapons in a regional war--in the Middle East, the Indian subcontinent or elsewhere--could escalate into a global holocaust involving the great powers. It is frightening to contemplate the Bomb in the hands of such seemingly unstable people as Moammar Kadafi, the Libyan strongman, or the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 required signatory nations that do not have nuclear weapons to pledge that they won’t develop or acquire them. Nuclear supplier countries agreed not to help non-nuclear-weapons states join the club.

The 125 nations that signed the treaty will meet next September in Geneva to review progress under the agreement. Unfortunately, the report card doesn’t look good.

To begin with, two nuclear-weapons states, France and China, refused to sign the treaty. So did several of the nations considered most likely to go for nuclear weapons: Israel, India, Pakistan, South Africa and Argentina. Israel is believed to have 10 to 20 nuclear weapons ready for assembly on short notice. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974; explanations that the test was for peaceful purposes are met with skepticism, especially in neighboring Pakistan.

Western experts see evidence that Pakistan is working hard to develop nuclear weapons, and may actually have some usable A-bombs as early as next year. If that occurs, India is certain to build a nuclear arsenal of its own.

A recent study by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace concluded that Libya, Iraq and South Africa, among others, also had taken important steps toward nuclear-weapons capabilities.

It is against this background that U.S. and Soviet representatives met in Moscow recently and agreed to meet every six months to discuss ways of strengthening anti-proliferation efforts. The problem of nuclear-weapons proliferation also was among the subjects discussed by U.S. and Soviet delegates to a January meeting sponsored by the United Nations Assn.

Prof. William Potter, director of UCLA’s Center for International and Strategic Affairs, was among the participants. He came away optimistic that greater U.S.-Soviet cooperation is likely because the two countries have a common interest in avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons. As he said in a recent speech to the California Seminar on International Security and Foreign Policy, the Soviet record on nuclear exports is mixed, but compares favorably with that of France, West Germany, Switzerland and Belgium.

The Soviet Union has been a commercial nuclear exporter since the mid-1950s, when it supplied nuclear reactors and other facilities to China, Egypt and several East European countries. But Moscow didn’t take the nuclear-proliferation danger seriously until 1958, when the Chinese signaled their intention to build a nuclear arsenal.

The Soviets withdrew their nuclear technicians from China, and pulled back from some of the promised exports to nations of Eastern Europe. To guard against the diversion of nuclear materials into bomb-making, they insisted that purchasers of Soviet reactors obtain their nuclear fuel from the Soviet Union and return the spent fuel rods to Russia for reprocessing.

Potter agrees, however, that there are some blemishes on the Soviet record. The Soviets provided heavy water to India after the 1974 nuclear test without requiring the Indians to accept international safeguards on all facilities where the material would be used. Moscow also provided peaceful nuclear assistance to Cuba and Argentina without insisting on full-scope safeguards and the signing of the nonproliferation treaty.

Libya received Soviet nuclear assistance only after ratifying the treaty. But, considering Kadafi’s reckless behavior and his known efforts to buy or otherwise lay his hands on nuclear weapons, the transaction is hard to defend.

In fairness, though, Washington also allowed political considerations to override nuclear-proliferation concerns by supplying nuclear fuel to India and allowing West Germany to sell U.S.-made heavy water to Argentina. Only recently has Belgium pulled back from assisting the Libyan nuclear program.

The worst offender of all has been China, which supplied unsafeguarded nuclear materials to South Africa and has been accused (justly or not) of aiding Pakistan’s program of nuclear-weapons development. It appears, however, that China may be more careful in the future.

At international meetings of nuclear suppliers, Potter observed, “the United States and the Soviet Union often have worked closely together to tighten nuclear-export controls and to gain greater adherence to the non-proliferation treaty.” Admittedly, though, the Soviets have been more willing to embrace general non-proliferation principles than to point a public finger at questionable actions by Third World countries that are on the “suspect” list.

With nuclear proliferation moving toward reality, the world has a right to expect more from all members of the nuclear-weapons club. It remains to be seen whether the greater U.S.-Soviet togetherness foreseen by Potter and some other analysts will be significant enough to put real brakes on this other arms race.