U.S. Chile Policy Mired in Dilemma : Pressing for an End to Repression Evokes Inaction, Anger

When President Reagan recently named Chile’s rightist military government along with Cuba and Nicaragua as “exceptions to the democratic tide in Spanish-speaking America,” Chilean officials--who like to describe the President as one of their country’s friends--were startled.

But a few days later, the State Department reacted only mildly when the junta of Gen. Augusto Pinochet ignored a private appeal from the Reagan Administration and extended its state of siege, which bans meetings by the political opposition.

Those seemingly conflicting U.S. signals to the Pinochet regime reflect what officials describe as the basic dilemma of U.S. policy toward Chile: The Administration wants Pinochet to move toward democracy but believes that any attempt at overt pressure--or even blunt criticism--would hurt more than it would help.

“If we took a position of public indignation, it would only guarantee that Pinochet will keep the state of siege in effect,” a senior State Department official, who asked not to be identified, said Friday. “We think it’s important to maintain a situation where we can talk to him--even if his response is unprintable.

‘General Frustration’

And Pinochet, who has ruled for almost 12 years since the Chilean army overthrew the Marxist government of Salvador Allende, has reacted to a recent surge in popular opposition by toughening political repression.

“There is general and genuine frustration with Chile and a basic disagreement with their hardening approach to dissent,” another State Department official said. “We feel that Pinochet’s actions play into the hands of the extremists by creating a clandestine opposition which the Communists can control.”

The department’s annual rights report, released earlier this year, criticized the military junta for “numerous violations of internationally recognized human rights and a general deterioration of human rights practices,” including political arrests and reports of torture.

And when Reagan spoke May 7 in Madrid, he cited Chile’s “entrenched military rule” in the same breath as Cuba’s “Communist tyranny.” The Pinochet government, stung, responded: “Chile should not be compared with these other countries. . . . Reagan has forgotten that the Chilean regime came into being precisely in order to prevent the definite installation of communism.”

But if the Reagan Administration is concerned about conditions in Chile, it is also convinced that there is little it can do about them.

“We can’t lean on Pinochet,” the senior official said. “We don’t really have the leverage. There’s no direct U.S. aid to Chile, so all we’d be doing is giving free advice--the kind of free advice that Pinochet doesn’t like. We’ve found that when Americans raise the subject of Chile’s internal system with him, it doesn’t get very far.”

Support Softens

By some measures, the Reagan Administration has come a long distance on the question of Chile. During Reagan’s first years in office, he supported a general warming of relations with Pinochet, including a resumption in arms sales that had been cut off by President Jimmy Carter. Administration spokesmen frequently praised the regime for its anti-communism, its military cooperation with the United States and a brief trend toward progress on human rights.

Democrats in Congress, however, charge that the Administration is not doing enough to pressure Chile and argue that more direct sanctions could force Pinochet toward flexibility. “There is no way that Gen. Pinochet will ease up unless we exercise some economic leverage,” Rep. Tom Lantos (D-San Mateo) said last month during a House debate on a bill that would require the Administration to actively oppose international loans to Chile and end joint U.S.-Chilean naval maneuvers. But the bill, opposed by the Administration and by conservative Democrats, died on the House floor.

The Administration has sent a series of official visitors to Santiago to gently press its concerns, but they have made no visible dent in Pinochet’s resolve.

At one point, some Chilean officials said there was “a reasonable chance” that the state of siege might not be continued. But in the end, Pinochet’s response was “like hitting a stone wall” and the repressive measure was extended for another three months.

When the extension was announced, the State Department’s official reaction was noticeably restrained. “Our position on the state of siege has not changed since it was last extended,” a spokesman said. “A decision to lift the state of siege would be welcomed by all those who support an orderly and peaceful transition to democracy.”

Administration officials acknowledge that they have been pulling their punches. When the Administration objected to a proposed $200 million in World Bank guarantees of commercial bank loans for Chile, for example, the lead role was taken not by the State Department but by the Treasury Department, on technical rather than political grounds.

The Administration has made no decision yet on a more difficult issue: whether to oppose a proposed $250-million World Bank loan to Chile later this year. A senior State Department official noted that, while the United States has already abstained on two Chilean loan applications in international lending agencies this year, it did not actively oppose them--and both were approved.

Transition to Democracy

The State Department would like Pinochet to clearly commit himself to a transition to democracy. Non-Communist opposition groups, meanwhile, have been indecisive about what course to take, agreeing only that they should not cooperate openly with Pinochet.

U.S. officials have met with both sides, but say they do not want to put themselves in the position of seeming to mediate between them. As a result, the opposition cannot agree to move, and Pinochet appears satisfied not to.

“In Chile,” still another U.S. aide said, “we have a choice between a dead horse and a snail. We’ve chosen the snail. But it isn’t getting us anywhere.”