Pretoria’s Regional Threat

President Reagan’s “constructive engagement” with South Africa has now had another setback--its inability to restrain Pretoria from aggressive military interference in the affairs of independent neighboring states. These revelations follow on the heels of the breakdown of efforts to win an end to apartheid in South Africa itself.

There was a certain euphoria in Washington last year when a desperate Mozambique was driven to sign a peace and economic cooperation agreement with South Africa at Nkomati. The radical Marxist, Samora Machel, president of Mozambique, apparently had been tamed, and would convert his courtship of Moscow into nonalignment. South Africa was given credit for arranging this with a promise to end subversive activities and to begin investments.

This coincided with peace gestures by Pretoria toward another Marxist neighbor, Angola. South Africa promised a prompt withdrawal of its troops from Angola. They had operated deep within the country, seeking to destroy forces of the South-West Africa People’s Organization guerrillas that were trying to force the pace of independence for their homeland, Namibia. And they were also busy propping up the UNITA guerrilla movement in Angola led by Jonas Savimbi.

Now, more than a year and a half later, South Africa’s deeds have contrasted with its words. Pretoria has confessed that it breached the Nkomati accords--feeding supplies, including arms, to the MNR rebels at war against the government of Mozambique. And its troops are once again operating deep within Angola--too deep to be exercising a right of legitimate defense for Namibia, but deep enough to help another guerrilla movement at war with the established government.

The United States has protested these operations. Indeed, Washington even temporarily withdrew its ambassador from South Africa after another neighbor was invaded earlier in the year. The new adventures are more ominous, however. The breach of the Nkomati accords indicates that President Pieter W. Botha may not have control of all his forces. And his minister of defense has announced that South Africa will not permit Angola to defeat the UNITA guerrilla force. In both interventions there is a reckless determination of powerful forces within South Africa to roll back history and restore the influence of the Portuguese colonists, who so destructively exploited Angola and Mozambique, and their minions.

The situation has been further blurred by contradictory signals from Reagan. He sent personal words of encouragement to a meeting of anti-communists gathered at the clandestine headquarters of the UNITA guerrilla movement in Angola in June. His gesture of support embarrassingly coincided with U.S. negotiations with the very government of Angola that the guerrillas have been trying to overthrow. Three months later, however, Reagan received, despite shrill objections from the radical right, the leader of Mozambique, who also went on to Houston to talk to American oil company executives about petroleum prospects in his country.

This blurring will continue as long as the United States provides South Africa with the perfect excuse for maintaining its colonial grasp on Namibia and continuing disruption among the Southern Africa neighbors. That excuse is the insistence that Cuban troops be withdrawn from Angola before independence is granted Namibia. South African anxiety about the future radicalization of an independent Namibia may be well placed. But that risk is only being increased by the prolongation of Pretoria’s control of Namibia. It is not Cuba but South Africa that threatens the peace and security of Southern Africa.