Limiting Arms Sales to Third World : Superpower Accord Could Curb Risky Regional Conflicts

It is hardly surprising that there was no meeting of the minds in Geneva on regional political issues.

Despite giving periodic indications to the contrary, the Soviets do not appear to be in any hurry to cease their military engagement in Afghanistan. Nor do they seem inclined to diminish their support for Vietnam’s adventurism in Cambodia or for so-called wars of national liberation in Africa. For its part, the Reagan Administration has only demonstrated rhetorical interest in negotiating a modus vivendi with the Sandinistas.

Yet it is equally clear that the normalization of superpower relations and the negotiation of an enduring arms-control regime require some political understanding between the superpowers concerning their involvement in Third World conflicts. Lest we forget, it was Moscow’s exploitation of regional instability in Angola, Ethiopia and Afghanistan that exacerbated the congressional mistrust that left SALT II stillborn.

U.S.-Soviet conflicts in the Third World are inherent in the rivalry between two powers with competing ideologies and different geopolitical agendas. Superpower interests have historically converged, however, in one important respect: Both sides have sought to contain the escalation of regional conflicts lest they, too, might be dragged into war.

Thus Washington and Moscow might find it useful to resume their 1977-78 discussions to limit the sale of conventional arms to the Third World. In fact, joint Senate-House legislation to invite such discussion was introduced on Dec. 18 by Sen. Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.) and Rep. Mel Levine (D-Calif.).

To Western audiences preoccupied with nuclear disarmament, conventional arms seem almost benign instruments of warfare. Yet the transfer of sophisticated conventional weapons--tactical fighter aircraft, cruise missiles, “smart” munitions--to developing countries, with or without restrictions on their use, increases the risk of expanding regional conflicts into wider wars that could engulf the United States and the Soviet Union.

Based on data supplied by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, worldwide arms sales increased tenfold from the early 1960s to the early 1980s, with exports to the Third World accounting for about 80% of that growth. Congressional Research Service figures show that arms deliveries to the Third World rose from about $16 billion (in current dollars) in 1977 to about $34 billion in 1982. During the past two years, as developing countries have introduced austerity programs to cope with mounting indebtedness, deliveries have declined somewhat. But the overall trend is upward.

While the United States and the Soviet Union remain the world’s largest suppliers, the major West European countries--France, Great Britain, Italy, West Germany--have substantially increased their share of the global arms market. In fact, the real value of all non-communist nations’ arms transfers with the Third World has exceeded that of all communist nations every year since 1977. Indeed, the protracted war between Iran and Iraq has been largely fueled by the avarice of Western arms merchants. To make matters worse, a host of new arms suppliers have entered the market during the past decade. Some of these newcomers--Brazil, Israel, India, South Korea, China--have developed indigenous arms industries to enhance their self-sufficiency, promote economic development and gain technological expertise.

Discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Carter Administration fell hostage to the general deterioration of relations between the superpowers. Given the lethality of modern conventional weapons and the proliferation of suppliers, and the recent resumption of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue, the timing may be propitious to resuscitate the conventional arms talks in spite of the inauspicious record of the past.

In his address before the United Nations in October, President Reagan called on the Soviets to channel their competition with the United States along peaceful lines. Discussions to restrict the flow of sophisticated combat weaponry to the Third World would be a major step in this direction, and a stimulus to the strategic arms talks. In contrast to the Carter Administration’s approach, however, conventional arms talks should be expanded to include the major West European suppliers and, eventually, the smaller Western nations and the newly industrializing countries.

Admittedly, efforts to reach an understanding on arms transfers with even a few countries would be a formidable task, but it is not a hopeless one. The very willingness of the United States and the Soviet Union to agree to conventional arms talks could prove to be the catalyst for a larger process in which others can participate.