The Soviets’ European Card Is a Loser

Not unexpectedly, the Soviet-American summit meeting produced meager results; differences of view about arms control, regional conflicts and human rights are as big as ever. As a result, an important question looms larger today than before: Will Mikhail S. Gorbachev now play “the European card”?

The West was allowed to catch a glimpse of the Soviet Union’s European card just one year ago. Gorbachev, who was then the Central Committee secretary and heir-not-yet-so-apparent to Konstantin U. Chernenko, was visiting Great Britain. In a major address to the House of Commons he spoke of Europe as nash obschii dom-- “our common home.” Europe, he noted, had been “the cradle of detente.” And in a pointed reference to discussions within the Reagan Administration about limited nuclear war, he emphasized that Europe, as a home, was not to be “a theater of military operations.”

In an electoral speech in February of last year, Gorbachev, then definitely the heir apparent, asserted that the Soviet leaders considered a normalization of relations with the United States to be important. However, he continued, “we are not for a moment forgetting that the world is not limited to that country alone.” In other words, if negotiations with Washington failed, there were other options that the Soviet Union could pursue.

In May, now safely installed as party leader, Gorbachev held out his first major bait to the Western Europeans. It was time, he told visiting Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi, for the European Community and Comecon to reach an agreement on mutual economic relations. And, to the extent that the European Community was able to act as one political entity, he said, “we would be prepared to search for a common language with it on specific international problems.”

Finally, as if to demonstrate the priority of Soviet-Western European relations, Gorbachev’s first visit as party chief was not to Washington but to another Western European capital, Paris. Only after this demonstrative gesture did he go to Geneva.

Yet, despite the frequent flashing of the European card, Gorbachev has so far failed to play it. Why? The answer in all likelihood lies in the poor hand that Gorbachev holds and the embarrassment that it would cause him if he were to show it.

Politically, militarily, economically and culturally, Western Europe and the United States are closely linked, and these links may very well be inseparable. Thus, if Moscow wants to loosen, let alone sever, these ties, and strengthen those between Eastern and Western Europe, it must offer something in return.

There are quite a number of offers that Western Europeans would consider attractive. First and foremost would be a lessening of the military competition in Europe. This would be of far-reaching significance, since many Europeans at present do not feel very comfortable at all in a “home” that they must share with an adversary superpower.

A reduction of the Soviet threat profile would help ease current concerns. In particular, Moscow could shift to a defensive military strategy in Europe, recognize legitimate Western European security interests and (in exchange for a curtailment of the American military presence) accept increased Western European defense cooperation.

None of this, obviously, is likely to happen. The military competition has become an important instrument for the Soviet leadership, not only for controlling events in Eastern Europe but also for influencing political developments in Western Europe. To divest itself of this instrument could, in the Soviet view, lead to a major decrease in leverage over European (and global) affairs.

There is another gesture that would be attractive to most Western Europeans. It would consist of the Soviets’ consent to significant changes in Eastern Europe. If, for instance, the various national members of the European “home” were allowed to communicate more freely and visit each other, much would be gained. But there are no indications that Gorbachev would look with equanimity on any loosening of the Soviet reign in Eastern Europe, or on any erosion of control by the various national Communist parties over their societies.

If, then, no Soviet offers will be made concerning a major shift of competition in Europe away from the military to the ideological and economic sphere, and if there will be no Soviet consent to increased “liberalization” in Eastern Europe or enhanced security cooperation in Western Europe, what remains of Moscow’s European option? Not much. In its current form, it is at best an auxiliary means for influencing American foreign and defense policies. But it may fail to be a useful device even for that limited purpose.

Soviet leaders have always been able to tell a strong hand from a poor hand. It is not surprising, therefore, that Gorbachev has put a brave face on the Soviet-American summit and, rather than playing the European card, has agreed to visit Washington this year.