France Wonders if Bonn Is Sufficiently of Europe

Experts and government officials in the Western world may be debating the risks and benefits for peace of the Strategic Defense Initiative, along with its cost and technical feasibility. But one thing is certain: West Germany is seeking a share of American space defense research--a position contrary to the French government’s view. Thus SDI has acted as a catalyzer of Franco-German tensions.

At a diplomatic level, SDI has in effect canceled years of positive U.S. diplomacy in favor of a more European defense of Europe. It remains to be seen whether the present tensions represent one more temporary crisis in Franco-German relations or something far more serious--a critical threat to Europe’s claim to be an independent technological and political force. The most recent examples of the current tensions include the refusal of the Federal Republic to join in the French Hermes European space project, its lip-service support to Eureka (the French alternative to “Star Wars”), and the refusal of the French to fully participate in the European fighter-plane project.

For the members of the European community, relations between France and West Germany have always been a model and sometimes even a source of envy. The rapprochement between the two countries after World War II was the keystone to the reconstruction of Europe.

The two countries are institutionally close. Their links have resisted changes of leadership and shifts in domestic orientations. Out of will and political realism, but also for a lack of a credible alternative (Italy, despite its economic strength, is deemed too weak and Great Britain decidedly not sufficiently European), those in charge in Paris and Bonn know that the evolution of their respective countries is deeply intertwined. Opinion polls in France show that Germany is considered France’s closest friend and ally.

Yet, behind this background of stability, signs of malaise and frustration are multiplying. This uneasiness is perceived differently in the two countries, and is more evident in Paris than in Bonn.

Behind the technicalities and specific difficulties that can account for the collapse of various joint technological Franco-German and European projects lies the most essential issue--political will. France and Germany have recently given the impression of lacking decisive leadership. The European imperative, although accepted in principle does not always withstand political testing.

For the French, Bonn has given the impression of being dominated lately by the concern to ultimately accommodate U.S. pressures over SDI--an understandable choice, given the Federal Republic’s security dependence on America. Furthermore, in the long run Bonn’s concerns about the future of the two Germanys seem sometimes to prevail over Western European priorities. Could it be that the Federal Republic has three identities--Atlantic, European and German--and that today the European component is the weakest?

If that is the case, part of the responsibility lies with Paris. To a large extent the French have the Germany that they deserve. One cannot dispute the sincerity of the commitment of the various French governments during the last 30 years to Europe. But it is a very specific Europe, one that fitted France’s own needs and vision. There was to be enough Europe to integrate West Germany within it, while preventing the Federal Republic from “bad” neutralist or too U.S.-oriented decisions. But there was not to be so much Europe that France could not protect its identity as well as its margin of difference and superiority vis-a-vis the rest of the Europeans--West Germans in particular.

Today’s tensions, which correspond to an undeniable erosion of the European dynamic in Franco-German relations, should not be overdramatized. Yet no French government should ever appear to be in a position to make Bonn choose between Washington and Paris. The answer is bound to be frustrating for Paris.

The initial selling by the French of the Eureka project had a too openly anti-American tone to be attractive to the Germans. In the same vein, French positions on SDI, given the attitudes of the other West European governments, will have to be more flexible. France does not have to be enthusiastic, but reservations--whatever their validity from a strategic, scientific or even economic standpoint--do not have to be too overtly and rigidly negative, particularly given the desire of French firms to compete in the SDI market.

As for the Germans, it is not in their long-term interests to reinforce their strategic dependency vis-a-vis the United States by technological subordination. They need Europe, too, and Europe needs them badly. As the tempo of events accelerates with the speed of technological progress, it may prove impossible to make up for lost time. Since France is bound to enter a period of political uncertainty with forthcoming elections, more time will be lost. The true loser will be Europe.