AFL-CIO Dilemma: Whom to Back in 1988?

Despite the often harsh criticism of the AFL-CIO for making its first-ever early endorsement of a presidential candidate in the 1984 election, most union leaders hope they can once again unite their forces behind one candidate next year, well in advance of the Democratic and Republican nominations for the 1988 election.

The early endorsement issue was revitalized in recent days by the decision of Sen. Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) to firmly take himself out of the next presidential election and the announcement of Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.) not to run for reelection, a clear sign that Hart will again seek the presidency.

Spurred by the Kennedy and Hart announcements, unionists have started discussions about their goal of uniting behind a single candidate before the primaries for the second time in history.

But interviews with union leaders and political operatives for labor around the country indicate clearly that such unity will be more difficult to achieve than it was when the AFL-CIO endorsed Democrat Walter F. Mondale for the presidency in October, 1983.

Former Vice President Mondale, like the late Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, had a long history of close political and personal ties to labor, unlike any of Mondale’s rivals for the early endorsement. That meant that there was almost no serious infighting among union leaders over giving their unprecedented backing to Mondale in the 1984 primaries.

But now there is no obvious choice for the unions in the next election.

If leaders of the 13.5-million-member labor federation fail to get two-thirds of the delegates needed to endorse one candidate at an AFL-CIO political convention in late 1987, most of those interviewed seem to think that they can at least achieve their crucial fall-back position: an agreement not to renew the often bitter battles over their disparate choices for the Democratic nomination that raged between unions for so many years before the 1984 election.

Those inter-union (and often intra-union) battles meant, of course, a divided labor movement that weakened its role in politics, leaving the federation with no choice but to accept the nominee of the Democratic Party, whether they liked him or not.

For instance, the federation did back former President Jimmy Carter in the 1980 general election after several AFL-CIO affiliates fought for his nomination, while many others battled vainly against it.

Once he was nominated, the AFL-CIO endorsed him. But he was generally viewed by unions as a conservative who deserved their support in the general election only because they saw Ronald Reagan as an anti-union reactionary who would be a much worse President from labor’s viewpoint than Carter.

The early labor endorsement, pursued so enthusiastically by AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland, was designed to give labor a significant, united voice in the Democratic Party’s presidential nominating process and, as a result, help labor play a greater role in setting the party’s policies.

The AFL-CIO almost certainly achieved its first goal: It was the decisive force in helping Mondale win the Democratic nomination despite the denunciation of him by several of his Democratic rivals who, after trying and failing to get the federation’s endorsement themselves, rather hypocritically denounced Mondale as a “captive” of organized labor.

But labor has failed to achieve its second goal of uniting Democratic politicians behind its social and economic policies.

When Mondale was overwhelmed in the election by Reagan, many political observers and politicians attributed the loss--in part, at least--to the unpopularity of unions, although there was no verified proof of the charge that labor’s endorsement was a political “kiss of death” for Mondale. And all public opinion polls showed that Mondale had the majority support of union members, not just labor leaders.

But the “kiss of death” accusation has stuck in the minds of many political activists, including some in organized labor, and that, too, will make the problem of uniting behind one candidate for 1988 far more difficult than it was in the last election.

Kennedy has substantial support among unions, almost as great as Humphrey and Mondale. He might have had a relatively easy time of getting their early endorsement, but that is now a moot point since he has declared himself out of the running.

New York’s Gov. Mario Cuomo, who has not said he is seeking the presidency, is widely admired among many unionists as a pro-labor, traditional liberal Democrat. But he doesn’t have Kennedy’s longtime ties with union leaders, which may reduce his chances of getting their endorsement.

Also, some unionists contend that, while Cuomo’s rhetoric unquestionably reflects the kind of traditional liberalism that most union leaders want, he is not as militantly liberal in practice as his rhetoric indicates.

That argument against Cuomo, however, may stem less from their true feelings about Cuomo’s politics than from their concern that, for whatever reason, he may lose the general election.

And, if Cuomo loses, the argument goes, the defeat will reinforce the notion that labor’s early endorsement may help its candidate win the Democratic nomination but is a burden, not an asset, in the general election.

The argument has little credibility, though, because labor has been endorsing presidential candidates in general elections since 1952 and is usually credited with boosting their candidates’ campaigns--until, of course, labor was widely blamed for Mondale’s defeat.

The speciousness of the argument that labor’s support is a “kiss of death” seems even more obvious when one recalls that in 1972 labor did not make an official endorsement in a general election for the first time since it began the practice. The labor federation’s failure to endorse Democrat George McGovern was bitterly denounced by liberals and many columnists who charged that the failure of the AFL-CIO to back McGovern was largely responsible for his devastating defeat by Richard M. Nixon.

Hart says he will actively seek AFL-CIO support if he formally decides to run. But Hart may have a hard time getting an early endorsement because he was one of those who denounced Mondale as labor’s “captive” when the federation endorsed him.

His attacks on labor infuriated many union leaders, who still recall those attacks with bitterness. He has also hurt himself among several unions by his refusal to support “protectionist” trade policies such as the “domestic content” bill pushed by the United Auto Workers and others.

But Hart has a chance to reconstitute his relationships with organized labor and at least block some other candidate from getting an early AFL-CIO endorsement, says Rachelle Horowitz, political director of the American Federation of Teachers. She says Hart has, in fact, already started making overtures to union leaders.

Others talked about as possible challengers for the Democratic nomination are Rep. Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri, Sen. Joseph R. Biden Jr. of Delaware and governors Bruce Babbitt of Arizona and Charles S. Robb of Virginia.

Babbitt and Robb are regarded by most union leaders as far too conservative to justify an early AFL-CIO endorsement. Both Gephardt and Biden, while seen as liberals, have little national recognition and so would have a difficult time winning the endorsement at labor’s political convention next year.

Thus, the quandary facing the AFL-CIO is that, while most union leaders want the federation to make an early endorsement, it has to be made with enthusiasm if it is to succeed. And, so far, none of the probable candidates, except possibly Cuomo, seem able to generate that enthusiasm.

If organized labor is to have the political impact needed to offset the growing power of conservatives, labor leaders will have to be willing to risk their political reputations as they did in 1984 by making an early endorsement.

Executive Pay Climbs

While the total pay for top corporate executives jumped 10.7% in 1985 (14.1% for chief operating officers), earnings of the average worker rose only 2.3%.

That means that, after adjusting their incomes for the inflation rate of 3.4%, corporate executives boosted their real income by 7.3% while the average worker’s real income dropped by 1.1%, according to figures complied from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and studies by private consulting firms.

Many of the executives’ incomes were linked to corporate successes and last year’s bonuses were not as large as in the previous year. But, clearly, the executives are often not reluctant to take hefty salaries and bonuses as they are demanding wage freezes or cuts from their workers.

Even if a major reduction in the total income of executives would not dramatically change the amount available for workers, particularly in a large company, the perception of unfairness can be damaging to employee morale.

Examples of the problem are numerous, but the announcement last week of cash compensation paid to the top two officers of Walt Disney Productions serves to illustrate the point.

The company endured a 22-day strike by nearly 1,900 workers at Disneyland in 1984 before getting the workers to accept a company demand for a two-year freeze of their wages, which average $9.80 an hour.

There were some compromises on other disputed issues, but the company said Disneyland was just not profitable enough to justify boosting workers’ wages for at least two years.

However, no such limits were put on Disney’s officers. The firm’s chief executive, Michael D. Eisner, was given a total cash compensation of $2.12 million and its president and chief operating officer, Frank G. Wells, received $1.09 million in salary and bonuses. In addition, they were given stock options to acquire shares in the company for about half of the current market price.

Like other executives, Wells and Eisner may have been so largely responsible for the corporation’s earnings that their huge incomes could be justified. But, when their Disneyland employees took a 3.4% cut in their real income because of inflation and the wage freeze, the appearance of unfairness can do little to boost employee morale.

Appearances were obviously not the concern of the Disney executives. Eisner’s compensation, for example, had been worked out in large part by a formula written in advance of his employment. It included a $687,000 bonus along with a second, deferred bonus of an equal amount, in addition to his salary of $750,000.

His contract calls for bonuses equal to 2% of the dollar amount by which the company’s net income exceeds a 9% return on stockholders equity.

But, regardless of the calculations used to arrive at his total compensation, the fact remains that his earning were substantially above the inflation rate while the workers’ incomes were frozen for two years, regardless of inflation.