Prepare Now for Worst in the Philippines

Twice in the past 10 years American strategic interests have been hurt by rapid and radical political changes in countries with which we had a close relationship.

In 1975 the government of South Vietnam collapsed in the face of a North Vietnamese military attack that unexpectedly ended the Vietnam War and led to the communization of Indochina. In early 1979 the Shah of Iran was forced to flee the country, and shortly thereafter Iran became engulfed in a wave of religious fundamentalism. In both cases the United States lost an ally and access to a geographically strategic country.

In 1986 the United States faces a disaster of equal magnitude in the Philippines.

President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his wife, Imelda (estimated to be one of the wealthiest women in the world), and the nation’s Supreme Court frequently are accused of corruption; recently the court acquitted the armed forces’ chief of staff and 25 others accused of assassinating Marcos’ chief political rival after dismissing virtually all of the evidence that pointed to the general’s guilt. On Feb. 7 Filipinos will vote in an extraordinary national presidential election. Few observers think that the election will be fair.

The Philippines also faces a full-scale insurgency led by a sophisticated guerrilla force known as the New People’s Army. The NPA may control as much as 25% of the country’s villages, and is active in 59 of the 73 provinces. Its size and appeal continue to grow. If these trends continue, U.S. government intelligence reports suggest, the New People’s Army will attain military parity with the Philippine armed forces within three years.

The Philippines is important to the United States. U.S. private investment in the country totals more than $3 billion. The largest air and naval bases outside the continental United States are located on its territory. We pay nearly $1 billion in what is essentially rent for these bases, and we are planning to spend $1.5 billion more to upgrade them over the next three years.

At the moment the New People’s Army is only calling for an end to the U.S. presence, and is concentrating its efforts on fighting the Philippine army. But many observers think that the bases will shortly be targets of NPA attacks.

All of this is known in Washington--to a degree. In November, for example, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a frank and pessimistic report, the findings of which have been echoed by both the State Department and the Defense Department.

The Senate report concluded that “in the absence of a government in Manila (that) is seriously committed to reforms, the strength of the insurgency will continue to grow . . . . Even with the most vigorous reform measures, it would take several years to reverse the tide of insurgency.”

The Philippines’ minister of defense has said publicly that it will take 10 years to defeat the insurgency.

U.S. officials appear fully aware of Philippine political, economic and military problems. But they are likely to be surprised by how quickly the situation worsens and hostility to the U.S. presence grows. Before the end of his term, it is not inconceivable that President Reagan could either lose the Philippine bases or lose American lives defending them.

In the Philippines today the armed forces are not winning the war against the New People’s Army. For the moment, the military is making live-and-let-live accommodations with local NPA commanders. But the U.S. bases are not part of those deals. So it is just a matter of time before they come under attack. When they do, Reagan will be faced with having to send in U.S. troops in an election year. The risk is that the Administration will delay doing so, making the Marines’ job all the more difficult and dangerous when they are called on to intervene.

The United States probably cannot avert a political or military crisis in the Philippines. Nor should we expect to have access to the bases indefinitely. The U.S. lease on these facilities, which are Philippine property, will expire in 1991. The opposition presidential candidate has already called for closing the bases in 1991 (as has the NPA), provided no other foreign power establishes a similar presence.

Thus we should be taking steps now to prepare for that change. U.S. preparations should include substantial increases in security for the bases and the creation of a special reaction force close to the Philippines that could carry out an evacuation in an emergency. We also should begin a search for alternative base sites, and save the money planned for upgrading the present facilities. Relocation would be difficult and expensive, but it would be even more difficult and far more costly to wait until we are forced out by a revolution.