Next Test May Be the Shift From Crisis to ‘Multicrises’

Two seemingly unrelated events last week underscored the danger and complexity lurking in the ambiguous world of international politics.

On Sunday, Iranian sailors stopped, boarded, searched and then released a U.S. merchant ship, the President Taylor, in the Persian Gulf. A day later, two Libyan MIG-25 aircraft approached an unarmed U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft flying in international airspace off the Libyan coast.

In neither case did any confrontation or hostile action take place. However, it is important to understand the possible implications stemming from these events and from future events of similar character.

Three crosscurrents intersect these events. The first has to do with terrorism and its relationship with broader policy objectives. The second has to do with measuring and employing effective U.S. responses. And the third has to do with the specter of “multicrises.”

Multicrises are simply two or more crises taking place at the same time. In 1956, when British, French and Israeli military forces seized and occupied the Suez Canal, the Soviets chose to brutally suppress the Hungarian revolution. In early 1968 North Korea pirated the Pueblo, an American intelligence-gathering ship, in international waters while the Tet offensive was raging in Vietnam. When multicrises occur, the issue becomes one of how to cope successfully with direct involvement in simultaneous events that dramatically stress all the intellectual and physical resources of government.

Much is known about terrorism, its relationship to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the complicity of Libya and Iran in supporting terrorists. What is never known in advance is how the United States will react to countering terrorism. That ambiguity is probably a good thing because it may restrict both Libya’s Col. Moammar Kadafi and Iran’s Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini from complete freedom of action.

To the American public, distressed and frustrated by these painful terrorism pinpricks, inaction and ambiguity are not attractive outcomes. But suppose these crosscurrents of terrorism collide, causing a genuine multicrisis. Then U.S. policy choices become more restricted, more frustrating and filled with more potential danger.

Consider what might have happened if the MIG-25 interception of the Navy reconnaissance plane had resulted in outright attack, and the Iranian navy had seized the President Taylor or U.S. citizens aboard. The multicrisis would have grown out of terrorist-related actions (the Rome and Vienna attacks) and the objectives of Libya and Iran to publicly humiliate the United States. It is also mildly plausible to consider that both events could have been related and coordinated. This leads to certain policy implications.

First, the Libyan and Iranian actions could have been purposeful signals to the United States, demonstrating the ability of both countries to test Washington to respond beyond its means. The message is clear: “Proceed with care, you may not be as strong as you think.”

Second, the Soviets’ intentions must be questioned because they have positioned their Mediterranean naval units among the U.S. Sixth Fleet and established a “picket line” off the Libyan coast.

Third, Libya’s MIG-25 supersonic interceptors and the Soviet long-range SA-5 anti-aircraft missiles stationed in that country pose a real threat to all commercial and unarmed military aircraft in the region.

So the Iranian action to stop a U.S. merchant ship, coming at about the same time as the MIG intercept, reinforces the potential weaknesses of the United States to crisis in a second region. Establishing a “second front” or diversionary act to occupy or dilute attention can be very unsettling to the United States and an effective measure for our adversaries.

The analogy here is with the aircraft carrier Saratoga, now momentarily caught between two potential crisis areas. The ship is proceeding at high speed to the Mediterranean but conceivably could be required back in the Persian Gulf.

There are no easy answers to these potential scenarios, which in fact may never arise. Soviet actions are most predictable. In past crises their navy has generally behaved itself and would probably do the same in the future.

But neither Kadafi nor Khomeini should be counted on for such accommodation. The point is that through simultaneous provocations, whether coordinated or not, the hint of multicrises must neither daunt nor discourage us in future planning or in future actions. The United States maintains an enormous capacity to respond to these events. Geography may prevent immediate reaction in all phases of multicrises, a reality that substantially contributes to public frustration. However, we must not mistake that for weakness. Despite the complications of multicrises, the capacity for bold, innovative and decisive action--including use of military force--must not be limited by self-imposed doubt and confusion.