Price of Staying Strong

Long before the Gramm-Rudman budget-balancing law was enacted late last year, it was obvious that the federal budget deficit could not be controlled merely by cutting domestic spending programs, as President Reagan says it can. Some combination of tax increases and restraints on defense spending will be required.

By refusing to accept this reality, the President brought on the enactment of Gramm-Rudman, an exceedingly blunt instrument that will deal a devastating blow to national security unless the Administration finally works with Congress to fashion affordable as well as effective defense forces.

Under Gramm-Rudman, federal budget deficits must be progressively reduced in order to achieve a balanced, zero-deficit budget by 1991. A reduction of $12 billion from the projected deficit of $220 billion is required in the current fiscal year. The next deficit must be slashed to $144 billion.

If Congress and the President agree on a spending and revenue package that comes within $10 billion of the post-1986 targets, the mix can be any combination of spending reductions in military and non-military programs. But if the goals are not met, an automatic process is triggered that requires across-the-board spending cuts shared 50-50 by military and non-military programs.

In fiscal 1986 Reagan is allowed some flexibility in cutting military programs--a power that he is using to shield his “Star Wars” program from reductions at the expense of other vitally important areas of military research. Next year the reductions must be made item by item, without regard to relative merit.

This would preclude the Pentagon’s meeting the targets by eliminating some weapons programs in order to fund others. It would make multiyear funding next to impossible. It is hard to imagine a process more calculated to destroy rational management of the nation’s defense.

Some analysts think that the Pentagon can adjust to next year’s deficit-reduction goal without excessive pain. But over the five-year period there is no way that substantial reductions in projected military spending can be avoided.

It is essential that the deficit reductions in both civilian and military programs be made rationally and selectively, without triggering the automatic formula with its crippling effects on national preparedness. But that requires a willingness by the President to accept some kind of tax increase plus restraints on defense spending--probably a freeze plus inflation adjustments, instead of the 3% growth that his anticipated defense budget of $311 billion for fiscal 1987 would require.

In the long run, controlling the defense budget requires far-reaching reforms in the process by which military needs are determined as well as in actual procurement. Meanwhile, the Administration must choose among military programs and forces that it needs and those that it merely wants.

Which programs to reduce or eliminate is a matter of judgment. But William W. Kauffman of Harvard University, an expert of long standing, observes that settling for a 12-carrier instead of a 15-carrier Navy would open the way for large five-year savings in such things as personnel costs, procurement of aircraft ($12.5 billion for the F/A 18 alone) and missile-armed destroyers (as much as $28 billion).

If the Administration considers the 600-ship Navy sacrosanct, then it must make larger cuts elsewhere. The Army could do with fewer M-1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles. Spare MX missiles are prime candidates. So is the Star Wars program, where $10 billion to $20 billion could be saved just by holding the program at or near present levels. Whether to proceed with the “stealth” bomber program or depend more heavily on cruise-missile-carrying B-1s merits study.

The point is that choices must be made, and made quickly. If they are not made, the President must bear full responsibility for the damage done to national security by Gramm-Rudman.