Blundering Into a No-Win War : We Will Pay for Choosing Guns Over Diplomacy in Angola

The United States is now involved in Angola’s civil war, without the benefit of congressional or public debate. The assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester A. Crocker, surprised the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tuesday when he said that the Central Intelligence Agency was in the process of sending military equipment to the National Union for the Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Initially, President Reagan sounded out the Senate and House intelligence oversight committees about aid to UNITA, but found stiff opposition. He then sought a Senate resolution (still pending) that would give the Administration broad latitude to intervene in Angola. But the President doesn’t want to risk congressional interference. Anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons are already being sent, covertly, to the forces led by Jonas Savimbi, who until now has received most of his support from South Africa.

This is no way for the United States to get into a war, especially in a country so distant from U.S. strategic interests.

While UNITA’s interests and those of the United States may coincide in some ways, they clash in other, fundamental ways. Thus, no matter how attractive Americans may have found Savimbi on his barnstorming tour here last month, or how righteous they find his cause, it is not in the best interests of the United States to give military support to UNITA.

There are considerable differences over means and goals among those who favor the aid. The means range from overt to covert, and from “humanitarian” to military, from a modest $15 million to as much as $200 million. The goals range from doing what is “morally right,” to making the Marxist government and its Cuban helpers pay a higher price in blood, to driving the Cubans out, to forcing a coalition government, and, finally, to outright victory for UNITA.

Given that the government is said to have imported $2 billion worth of weapons from the Soviet Union over the last two years, there is no prospect that $15 million or even $100 million would affect the course of the war. Only months ago there was grave concern voiced in Pretoria and Washington that UNITA was about to be crushed. In fact, South Africa used this alarm to justify sending its own troops into Angola to help. UNITA was in no danger of being crushed at the time, but neither has it been any closer to winning since then.

Can aid at least drive the Cubans out? Savimbi says that the Cubans are afraid of UNITA, which claims to control one-third of Angola’s countryside, and prefer to stick to the towns. It is true that most of the fighting between the government and the insurgents does not involve Cubans (or South Africans), although Cubans (and South Africans) do occasionally enter the combat. It is highly unlikely that American aid would significantly increase Cuban losses, but it is almost certain to raise the number of Cuban troops in the country to protect the government against the added threat that the U.S. aid would carry.

In 1975 the CIA predicted that the American-backed force could not win the war, and that U.S. aid in collaboration with South Africa would cause a 10- to 15-times increase in the number of Cuban troops in Angola--an estimate that turned out to be right on the mark. Today, neither the CIA nor the State Department’s intelligence office believes that it is possible to realize a military victory or force a coalition government under the policies being advocated by the Administration or in Congress.

Not only is the United States in danger of shooting itself in the foot; Washington also courts widespread condemnation of the new military alliance that would be forged with South Africa. Most advocates of aid to UNITA ignore or greatly downplay the negative implications of the South African connection, but it will not be lost on the rest of the world. Washington has received no encouragement, let alone support, to intervene in Angola from any of our Western European allies. In fact, some of them are selling the government weapons to protect themselves. Could it be that they know something?

Savimbi and his supporters argue that, after five years, the Administration’s policy of “constructive engagement” in southern Africa has failed to achieve results, so now it’s time to try military pressure to achieve U.S. goals.

Constructive engagement has three prime objectives: to achieve independence for Namibia (now occupied by South Africa), to significantly move South Africa away from apartheid, and to remove Cuban combat troops from Angola. It is true that constructive engagement cannot claim a victory on any of these fronts, but the main fault lies with Pretoria.

While the Reagan diplomacy has yielded no victories, it has at least suffered no great defeats in southern Africa. There are reasons for believing that it still might succeed in some measure. But it does not follow that if diplomacy can be considered a failure, military pressure will bring success. A military failure will have far worse consequences than five years of diplomatic failure have had.

And who will gain? Not UNITA, but the Soviet Union and Cuba. The American backing of South Africa’s aggressive military posture in southern Africa will both legitimate the Cuban presence and concede to the Soviet Union the mantle of the struggle against apartheid.

If the United States is seriously interested in helping to broker peace in southern Africa, it must continue with its current diplomatic initiatives. A U.S. military connection with the South African patrons of Savimbi will not loosen South Africa’s grip on Namibia or hasten the liberty of blacks within South Africa. It will add years to Angola’s quarter-century of war, which could not have lasted this long without foreign props and encouragement. Only when all foreign influence is withdrawn will Angolans be able to sit down together and seek national reconciliation.