Putting Pressure on Nicaragua

President Reagan worked hard to make his latest aid request for the rebels fighting Nicaragua’s Sandinista regime sound plausible. But the bottom line is the same: Reagan thinks that he can force the Sandinistas to “say uncle” through military pressure. He can’t, so Congress must not let him try.

The request that Reagan sent to Capitol Hill this week asks for permission to transfer to the Nicaraguan rebels, the so-called contras , $100 million already approved for the Defense Department. Under the plan, $30 million would be used for “humanitarian assistance” similar to that voted the contras by Congress last year--food, clothing and other forms of non-lethal aid to help support a guerrilla army estimated at 10,000 to 20,000 men. The remaining $70 million could be used for anything that Reagan deems appropriate, and could be funneled through any agency in the executive branch--including agencies involved in intelligence activities. Does anyone doubt that the funds would be used to buy arms for the contras? Or that the money would go to the Central Intelligence Agency, whose covert war against the Sandinistas was halted by Congress in 1984?

The aim of this lethal aid is to pressure Nicaragua into agreeing to several things that Reagan believes U.S. security in Central America requires: the expulsion of Soviet Bloc military advisers, an end to Nicaragua’s military buildup, an agreement to not export the Nicaraguan revolution into neighboring countries, and a dialogue between the Sandinista government and its critics--not just the contras but also the Roman Catholic Church and Nicaragua’s private sector. All legitimate goals. But the underlying flaw to Reagan’s plan is his assumption that the only way to reach those goals is to intimidate Nicaragua through military force.

One key weakness to Reagan’s reasoning is the fact that his surrogate fighters are simply not effective. The contras do not have the popular support that a truly indigenous guerrilla force would have. The contra war is no more than harassment to the Sandinistas, but they use it as an excuse to crack down even more harshly on their own people.

Even if pressure might work, there is a better alternative to Reagan’s strategy of bloodshed: negotiations sponsored by the Contadora Group--Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela. All are U.S. allies bordering on Central America and interested in the same things that Reagan wants. They have no illusions about the Sandinistas and how difficult it will be to change their ways. But they also know that, given the sad history of U.S.-Nicaragua relations, the one way guaranteed to fail is for the United States to try to force Nicaragua to do anything.

Contadora Group diplomats think that the better way to moderate the Nicaraguan revolution is to negotiate a peace treaty between Nicaragua and its four neighbors, a treaty that would be guaranteed not just by the Contadora countries but also by a support group made up of Brazil, Argentina, Peru and Uruguay. Once the treaty was in force, those nations could help Nicaragua rebuild its war- ravaged economy, and start wooing it away from the Soviet Bloc and back into a close relationship with its Latin neighbors, where it belongs culturally and historically.

Reagan gives lip service to the Contadora process in his contra aid plan, arguing that the contras will force Nicaragua to cooperate with the Contadora Group. But that is not what Contadora officials think. They warn that as long as Reagan threatens Nicaragua, directly or indirectly, the Sandinistas will not let their guard down and negotiate. They are right, and Congress must reject Reagan’s aid plan for the contras in order to give the Contadora Group a free hand to settle the Central American conflict peacefully.