Advertisement

Shuttle Veteran Charges Earlier Safety Lapses

Share
Times Staff Writer

Pressure to meet space shuttle launching schedules seriously compromised safety even before the Challenger disaster and endangered the lives of “some very lucky” flight crews, chief astronaut John W. Young charged in an internal memo released Saturday.

In the memo, dated last Tuesday, Young, chief of the astronaut office at the Johnson Space Center here, warned that steps must be taken to ensure that “we do not lose any more space shuttles and flight crews.”

“If the management system is not big enough to STOP the space shuttle program whenever necessary to make flight safety corrections,” he wrote, “it will NOT survive and neither will our three space shuttles or their flight crews.”

Advertisement

Young served as commander of the first space shuttle mission in April, 1981, and has flown more missions on the spacecraft than any other astronaut. He also has walked on the moon and served as co-pilot of the first Gemini flight in March, 1965.

Discontent Among Astronauts

His scathing memo is the first sign of serious discontent in the astronaut corps since the explosion of Challenger on Jan. 28.

Besides addressing the pressure to keep the shuttle on schedule, Young also questioned those who testified before a presidential panel that they were “absolutely correct” in their procedures, while at the same time allowing the shuttle to go up with seals on the booster rockets that had a history of problems.

He said it was “difficult to believe that any humans can have such complete and total confidence.”

The booster seals, which have troubled shuttle flights in the past, are the main suspect in the Challenger disaster.

“There is only one driving reason that such a potentially dangerous system would be allowed to fly--launch schedule pressure,” Young said.

Advertisement

The 12-page memo, which included a list of four earlier missions in which flight safety issues were questioned, was released by Rear Adm. Richard H. Truly, associate administrator for spaceflight, after it was outlined in a copyright story Saturday in the Houston Post.

In a statement he issued shortly before leaving the Kennedy Space Center for Washington, Truly said: “I have just received copies of two memos written by John Young which I am releasing. I certainly concur with John’s thrust--that flight safety must be NASA’s first consideration.

“We will not launch again until safety-related issues have been properly addressed throughout the total NASA system.”

Some ‘Lucky People’

Young wrote that the list of safety compromises made in the shuttle program months before the Challenger’s disastrous launching “proves to me that there are some very lucky people around here.”

Young said problems arose as early as October, 1984, that were “potentially as catastrophic” to the shuttle program as the Challenger explosion, in which seven crew members died.

The memo listed these previous problems on shuttle flights and the possible effects:

October-December, 1984--Flapper valves on fittings between the shuttle and its huge liquid fuel tank were “extremely sensitive.” If any of the four valves should close, the memo said, “the result is loss of vehicle and crew.”

Advertisement

August, 1985--The shuttle Discovery was launched during a period of moderate turbulence and rain on an emergency landing runway at the Kennedy Space Center. “If the tile damage assessment was realistic, winds in storms plus tile damage drag might lose the vehicle and crew in an abort,” the memo said.

October, 1985--A regulator on one of Challenger’s maneuvering jets locked up. “The cause of the lockup was not known,” the memo said, but NASA decided to launch anyway. It counted on another backup regulator, which also “indicated failed” as the shuttle reached orbit, the memo said.

January, 1986--A delay in launching Columbia revealed a critical failure of a liquid oxygen prevalve, the memo said.

‘Continuing Pressure’

Saying that NASA should make flight safety its first priority, Young asserted that “we have already . . . launched with less than certain full reliability and full redundancy of the systems, including the flight crews, that we operate. We are under continuing pressure to launch without full-up avionics from computers to other sensors.”

Copies of the memo were sent to Truly, George Abbey, chief of flight crew operations at the Johnson Space Center, other top NASA officials and the astronaut corps.

Meanwhile, according to United Press International, NASA officials at Cape Canaveral, Fla., reported that salvage crews had recovered large pieces of Challenger’s rear fuselage and a 4,200-pound section of the left-side rocket booster.

Advertisement

The priority for salvage crews is recovery of components from Challenger’s right-hand solid-fuel rocket booster.

Advertisement