Is It Time to Move In on Nicaragua? : It Would Be--if the Threat Were as Pressing as Reagan Says

Hindsight on history often provides clear vision of turning points, the time when the future was changed.

Versailles and Munich helped set the stage for World War II. An incident in the Tonkin Gulf in 1964 meant our getting into Vietnam. The Tet offensive in 1968 meant our getting out. In the next few weeks the future of U.S. involvement in Central America may turn on whether Congress will back the so-called contras --the guerrillas fighting the Nicaraguan regime.

President Reagan has again raised the stakes. Three years ago covert support for the contras was ostensibly designed to interdict Nicaragua’s subversion of neighboring countries. Now Reagan foresees “the map of Central America covered in a sea of red, eventually lapping at our own borders.” If the Sandinistas “are allowed to consolidate their hold on Nicaragua . . . we’ll have a permanent staging ground for terrorism, a home away from home for Kadafi, Arafat and the Ayatollah.”

This is a declaration that the very existence of the Sandinista government poses a threat, that its revolutionary nature impels it to subversion, that it must be extirpated. Missing in this mimicking of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Pearl Harbor speech is only a paraphrase of F.D.R.’s punch line: “A state of war exists between the United States and (Nicaragua).”

If the threat is as serious as the President argues, it is mystifying that he seeks only $100 million for the contras. By almost all accounts, the military effort to unseat the Sandinistas is virtually moribund. It would need massive transfusions of military capability before even dreaming of its declared goal: to force the Sandinistas to negotiate. Even then no one has explained how, short of destruction on the battlefield, a regime resolutely committed to its dogma canbe induced to negotiate its own demise.

It is time, therefore, to face the issue directly, to turn the point of history. If the threat is so pressing and the job is worth doing, it should be done by American armed forces, and “damn the torpedoes.”

Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger has argued that failure to fund the contras could lead to the introduction of American troops. It would be far better, however, to get it over with, to pay the price now rather than later. U.S. casualties will no doubt be higher when our troops are sent to redeem the contras’ failure. Then Nicaragua will have received more East Bloc arms, its army will be far better trained and its people will be more deeply imbued with a sense of siege by the United States and its agents.

No doubt this is a shocking proposal. But it follows a logic of combat commitment that has a long pedigree. It accepts the force of a mournful prophecy made 150 years ago by Prussian strategist Karl von Clausewitz and validated so often since then: When military costs rise, political goals also rise to justify what is already lost. This is happening again in Central America, as the Reagan Administration raises the political goals that it sets for the contras in step with their military failures.

Yet, as we think about what we want in Nicaragua, we may decide that destruction of the Sandinista government is not worth many thousands of Americans dead and billions of dollars in added military spending. If so, now is the time for the United States to try a different tack before continuing losses by its contra clients tempt us to direct military involvement. That new tack means lowering our political goals and settling for less than military victory over the Sandinistas.

Two years ago the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, headed by former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, outlined a comprehensive regional settlement for Central America. It proposed negotiations to secure pledges from each country--meaning Nicaragua--not to attack or subvert its neighbors, transfer arms to insurgents or train military personnel in neighboring countries. Each country would limit the size of its armed forces and the type and quantity of its weapons. No foreign bases or advisers would be allowed. Agreement would be subject to verification. The United States would support these arrangements.

The Kissinger Commission did not “imply the liquidation of the Sandinista government,” which didn’t even have to give up its “revolutionary ideals.” It only had to “submit itself to the legitimating test of free elections.”

Of course, the Sandinistas were unwilling to risk that step. Yet baby and bathwater went out together. The Reagan Administration brushed off the Kissinger Commission and chose not to pursue America’s real purpose--hamstringing Sandinista subversion and communist connections. Instead, it has demanded democracy in Nicaragua as a condition for calling off the contras. It has placed that goal, worthy as it is, ahead of the search for security.

After two wasted years, it may be too late for negotiations to succeed. The United States may ultimately have to choose between lowering its goals in Nicaragua and backing them up with blood and treasure. But as the President appoints a new special envoy to Central America, Ambassador Philip C. Habib, he should recognize the wisdom of the Kissinger Commission’s strategy for security. And if talk fails, war can always come later.