Seven Years Later : Iran Regime Retains Its Mass Appeal

At busy intersections in the heart of Tehran, entrepreneurs stroll among the cars stuck in traffic to hawk bananas. Like a rare flower, the precious fruit is sold individually for $10 each.

A solitary can of Chase & Sanborn coffee, carrying an $80 price tag, occupies an entire store shelf.

“If I could just import some goods,” laments the owner of a Tehran shop, “I could sell them as fast as I got them, no questions asked. The demand is that great.”

After seven years of Islamic revolution in Iran, a stumbling economy continues to haunt the government more than just about any other problem. Even the 5 1/2-year-old war with Iraq, by providing an external threat that unites the nation, seems less intractable.

No Serious Opposition

“I think the revolution is broadly popular here,” said a Western diplomat who has traveled widely throughout the country. “There is no serious opposition to the regime. But the economy is killing everybody.”

“Part of the problem,” commented another Western resident of the capital, “is that they can’t seem to decide whether they want to be Islamic or a revolution.”

Indeed, the government is increasingly divided into two distinct “tendencies” or factions: The “traditionalists,” symbolized by President Ali Khamenei, support private business, while the “radicals,” led by Prime Minister Hussein Moussavi, are pushing for increasing nationalization of private firms and centralization of the economy.

Last November, one-third of the members of the Majlis, Iran’s Parliament, refused to support Moussavi for a second term as prime minister, even though he had been personally endorsed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s revolutionary leader.

While the Majlis vote was a striking example of the kind of outspokenness that is still permitted in Iran, it also illustrated the regime’s division over economic policy.

Alienation at Bazaar

The economic doldrums have also led to the increasing alienation of the so-called bazaaris, the small shopkeepers around the Tehran bazaar who were instrumental in supporting the 1979 revolution that toppled Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

The reason for Iran’s predicament is simple: Plummeting world oil prices have reduced its income while the expenses for the war against Iraq continue to pile up.

Iran gets more than 90% of its foreign exchange earnings from oil. Last year, the government predicted it would earn $19.5 billion in the current fiscal year ending March 21. According to diplomats here, it will actually earn only $12 billion. The diplomats expect next year’s earnings to plunge to $7 billion or less.

Meanwhile, the government faces an import bill of $4 billion to $5 billion for war materiel, $3 billion for food and $750 million for medicine. In the 1986 fiscal year budget, there will be no room for anything else.

The impact on Iranian factories, which must import their raw materials from abroad, has been devastating. Most firms are operating at 25% to 40% of capacity.

“There’s no money around,” said a Tehran businessman. “A lot of factories are on the verge of closing.”

All of this means severe belt tightening in the years ahead. Most government salaries have already been scaled back. A university professor earns 7,000 Iranian rials a month, which at the official rate of exchange is just $81. At the more realistic black market rate, it is just $11.

Despite the parlous economic picture, the radical faction in the government is trying to assert greater government control over foreign trade, which is already 80% in the hands of the state.

Land reform programs backed by the radicals have been approved several times by Parliament, only to be rejected by the Council of Guardians, a sort of Islamic supreme court that is controlled by conservative elements.

Nonetheless, according to Western diplomats here, large landowners are so fearful of land reform that many have stopped planting crops, which has contributed greatly to Iran’s food shortage.

The government provides basic foodstuffs at subsidized prices--bread costs less than 10 cents a loaf--through a system in which local mosques hand out ration cards.

As the conflict on economic policy illustrates, Iran’s government does not have a strong central leadership that is capable of making decisions on pressing domestic issues. Among foreigners here, the consensus is that many decisions just don’t get made because of this lack of cohesion, even at the top.

“Decision-making is very slow,” said one Western diplomat. “Khomeini is supposed to be the ultimate arbiter in these matters, but often he doesn’t take a role in deciding them.”

In part, according to diplomats, this may be because Khomeini truly wishes his subordinates to have a certain freedom of action. But Khomeini, who is variously reported to be 83, 84, 85, or 86 years old, is also frail and is unable to maintain the kind of workload demanded of a key decision-maker.

Khomeini does have two personal representatives on the Supreme Defense Council, which is in charge of the war against Iraq, but the prosecution of the war now seems largely in the hands of the Revolutionary Guards, the radical group established as a counterbalance to the strength of the armed forces.

The guards, known as Sepah Pasdani, now have their own government ministry, a reflection not only of their increased power but also their claim to a slice of the government budget. Last year, Khomeini authorized the guards to establish their own air force and navy, and they control the estimated 2 million volunteers, or basij, who are now at the front.

Khomeini Successor Picked

In an attempt to avoid upheaval when Khomeini finally dies, last fall a so-called Council of Experts, an 80-man body, named Ayatollah Hussein Ali Montazeri, 63, as Khomeini’s successor.

Nonetheless, a number of important policy questions, such as peace talks with Iraq and resumption of relations with the United States, are in suspense until Khomeini dies. Montazeri is not as revered as Khomeini and may not be able to command as much support.

“Everyone worries about what happens when Khomeini dies,” said a foreign resident of Tehran. “The allegiances of the people are going to be up for grabs.”

Some diplomats expect groups of Iranians now in exile, such as the Paris-based Moujahedeen organization, to try to assert themselves when Khomeini dies. But such groups have virtually disappeared here except for their press statements issued abroad, and most diplomats doubt their strength.

“There is very little serious opposition to the regime,” noted one diplomat. “Everyone blabs openly, (and) there is criticism of the government and ministers by name. It’s a good safety valve.”

Nonetheless, reports of human rights violations persist, with one U.N. report saying allegations of systematic torture and executions “cannot be dismissed as groundless.”

The London-based human rights organization Amnesty International said last month that it continues to receive “disturbing reports of torture and ill-treatment of political and other detainees.” It said that it has evidence that torture is “widespread and in some places systematic.”