’ ‘Twas a Famous Victory’ : But Why America Chose to Fight This Fight Is Still a Mystery

“And everybody praised the Duke,

Who this great fight did win.”

“But what good came of it at last? “

Quoth little Peterkin .

“Why, that I cannot tell,” said he;

“But ‘twas a famous victory.”

Robert Southey, “The Battle of Blenheim”

U.S. armed forces had every right to be in the Gulf of Sidra and every right to respond to Libya’s attack. But American foreign policy, unlike Libya’s, is presumably based on an exercise of considered reason as well as asserted rights.

The world is full of more important waterways where we could challenge disputed territorial claims. In choosing this particular place at this particular time to conduct large-scale military maneuvers, knowing that Libya’s quirky Col. Kadafi would feel compelled to take the bait, the United States must have decided well in advance that a combat exchange with Libya would serve U.S. foreign-policy interests. Living in a nuclear tinderbox, we surely would not be so careless as to toss about lit matches of this kind without some national objective more serious than bloodying the colonel’s nose. What was that objective?

- Were we trying to undermine Kadafi at home? We have given him instead the global limelight and importance that he has long craved, forced Arab moderates to conceal their disdain for his irresponsible behavior, and cast him in a David vs. Goliath role to bolster his shaky standing with Libya’s discontented military.

- Were we trying to fulfill our earlier threat of “swift and effective retribution” for terrorist attacks--specifically for the Palestinian bombings at the Rome and Vienna airports? Assuming that secret Administration evidence directly links Libya rather than Iran or Syria to those December incidents, a March destruction not of terrorist headquarters or training camps but of anti-aircraft sites and patrol boats may not impress the world as particularly swift or effective. On the contrary, the homes and neighborhoods of Libyans killed by American missiles may prove fertile ground for the recruitment of new anti-American terrorists. Kadafi is erratic, but not crazy enough to choose as his ultimate response a direct and prolonged military confrontations with our overwhelmingly superior forces. Nor would his uncomfortable Soviet patrons permit that. Open conventional warfare is our playing field. Terrorism, in this country or any other, against our military and diplomatic installations or our private citizens, is his.

- Were we trying to rally the lagging allied effort to punish and isolate Libya politically and economically? By not enlisting in this effort or even consulting the West European countries with historic ties to Libya, we merely reinforced the excuses of those who prefer to leave the dirty work to us and the fears of those who regard President Reagan as a trigger-happy cowboy.

- Were we trying to “make a point” to Kadafi, to “send him a message” about freedom of navigation, African self-determination or the risks of sponsoring terrorism? Effective communication requires a willing recipient as well as sender. Moammar Kadafi, who is not much of a listener, has received a bewildering variety of American messages since the Rome and Vienna incidents: American threats of retaliation that were forcefully uttered but never implemented, an American ambassador whose freewheeling amateur diplomacy was unauthorized but never repudiated, American businessmen who were ordered to leave Libya but were never prosecuted, and now American missile attacks that were justified by our government as simply a response to his attacks on our planes. When the 6th Fleet departs, Kadafi will still rule Libya, still harbor terrorists, still intimidate his neighbors, and still claim the Gulf of Sidra. No hostages will have been released; some new victims may have been seized. Some message.

Discerning no long-range U.S. interests abroad to be served by escalating our undeclared war against this relatively minor menace, many Americans suspect domestic political motives: a President’s bow to the restless right wing of his party, a boost to the Pentagon’s beleaguered budget, a boon to a President lacking public support on Nicaragua. One can almost hear Commander-in-Chief Reagan saying “make my day” as he sailed into range of Libya’s minuscule forces, and, as expected, Kadafi was just bull-headed enough to make it.

Let us hope that some better reason will ultimately emerge. I am reluctant to believe that any President would impair our long-term reputation in the Arab world in order to enhance his short-term reputation here at home.

To be sure, “ ‘twas a famous victory” for our forces in the Gulf of Sidra (as it was 22 years ago in the Gulf of Tonkin). Our military, whose lives were put at risk by this strategy of confrontation, did their job with reassuring courage, skill and technological effectiveness. Did our political leaders, whose lives were not at risk, also do their job--which was to think through in advance the long-range purposes and consequences of this challenge?

Crossing a line drawn in the dust (or ocean) by a loudmouth who dares you to cross it is a game for children. Great powers generally take a longer view.