Emulating Gromyko : U.S., Allies Now Appear the Stonewallers on Arms Control

“Nothing is settled until all is settled” seemed to be the principle on which former Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko based many of his negotiations. In essence it was a form of linkage that often made concrete progress hostage to the comprehensive breakthrough, the achievable deal vulnerable to the unreasonable demand.

The Gromyko maxim was the source of much consternation for Western diplomats. Sound agreements languished on the verge of signature, sometimes for years, as Soviet diplomats stonewalled on relatively minor points of dispute. In many instances the doctrine produced an unyielding rigidity that bred stalemate when more agile diplomacy could have brought timely compromises. Time and again this characteristic of Soviet negotiating style thwarted Western ambitions for pragmatic, step-by-step accommodations.

One recalls this hallmark of Soviet diplomacy for several reasons. To begin with, recent initiatives from Moscow show a suppleness and innovative quality quite different from what we have known over the last decades. Indeed, in some respects Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s maneuvers have been so “un-Soviet” that many suspect that they must be mere propaganda ploys.

After all, skeptics say, Soviet leaders simply don’t make the kinds of up-front concessions that the new general secretary has offered. Is he really serious when he accepts President Reagan’s standing demand for deep reductions in strategic nuclear forces and agrees that the cuts must apply to warhead totals, not only to launchers? Does he really expect us to believe him when he proposes limits that would halve the number of warheads on Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, eliminating more weapons than the United States had demanded in its original Strategic Arms Reduction Talks proposals? Could he possibly mean to suggest arrangements that virtually guarantee drastic cutbacks, perhaps to zero, in the so-called heavy missiles that have been the main object of U.S. proposals? And is he not a sly fellow to have his deputy foreign minister say right out loud that the issue is negotiable as to which weapons should be counted against the proposed limits? Why, he is pretending that he would actually like to reach an agreement.

If Gorbachev’s rash of proposals on strategic arms are suspect, his movement on intermediate nuclear forces only confirms that you cannot trust the man to act like a good Soviet. Is he gulling us by agreeing to Reagan’s call for the elimination of INF forces in Europe? What does he have up his sleeve when he abandons Moscow’s adamant demand to count the British and French nuclear forces as part of any agreement on SS-20s and their U.S. counterparts? And what could be more out of keeping with Muscovite tradition than his declaration that an INF agreement should not await settlement of other disputes, particularly concerning the Strategic Defense Initiative?

Poor Andrei. How chagrinned he must be to hear Mikhail Sergeyevich taking his cues from, of all people, that notorious advocate of agreeing now on what can be agreed, George P. Shultz.

Gromyko need not abandon hope. His doctrine may yet survive--in the West. As Gorbachev has brought new momentum and flexibility to Soviet negotiating tactics, some Americans and allies have been emulating Gromyko. They are upping the ante in ways that suggest more interest in avoiding agreements.

To the offer of an early deal on INF in Europe, the United States appears to be saying, “Fine, but of course you also have to get rid of your INF systems in Asia and the shorter-range rockets in Europe as well.” Pressed by our allies, we are also alerting the Soviets to the necessity for solutions to conventional-force imbalances before we move very far on curbing nuclear weapons.

Similarly, as the Soviets declare a readiness to meet U.S. insistence that on-site verification accompany any comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons tests, the American position shifts. Our repeated professions of commitment to a comprehensive test ban notwithstanding, we now assert that there can be no such accord so long as we rely on nuclear weapons as part of our arsenal.

As one watches the process of Soviet concession breeding an escalation in U.S. demands, there is the eerie sensation of a diplomatic inversion. Classical Gromykoism acquires an American accent. “Nothing is settled until all is settled . . . . What’s mine is mine, what’s yours is negotiable . . . . Concessions are the sign of weakness or trickery, not of a search for common ground.”

There is a danger that the fluidity in East-West relations may be disorienting U.S. diplomacy. Gorbachev’s fancy footwork has distracted some observers from noticing the enormous opportunity that his policy shifts create. The urgent need now is to probe them cautiously and thoroughly.

Having staked so much on achieving real arms control, America cannot afford to give the impression that it is evading meaningful agreements by changing its terms. To do so would sap public confidence in the government’s good faith. It would hand Gorbachev the very propaganda victory that the skeptics think he is seeking.

A specific imperative flows from these considerations: an early compromise on INF reductions in Europe. There is a clear and present danger that the entire arms-control process may bog down once more on the INF issues, as it did during Reagan’s first term.

In overall strategic terms the INF weapons are trivial, hundreds of weapons among the thousands deployed in the growing strategic arsenals on both sides. If every INF were eliminated, every relevant target in Europe, Asia and America would still be targeted by strategic weapons.

The United States and its allies have got to keep their eyes on the larger problem of regulating those strategic arsenals. It will serve no one’s interest if the negotiators dawdle over INF and delay addressing the more complex issues lurking on the strategic agenda.

Reagan’s goal of deep cuts in strategic forces may now be achievable, but we will never know unless he breaks through the INF impasse. Emulating Gromyko is not the way to do it.