Afghan Aid: How Much?

The question of American military aid to the Afghan guerrillas, who are fighting for the liberation of their country from Soviet military occupation, poses a painful moral and political dilemma for the United States.

The Mujahedeen have a clear moral claim to sympathy, political support and, within reason, military aid from the United States and other nations. Up to 1 million Afghans have been killed by the Soviet invaders and their puppet Afghan army; 4 1/2 million more, a third of the population, have been driven into refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. Calculated atrocities have been documented by international investigators.

Morality, however, has more than one dimension. The guerrillas’ calls for outside help must be balanced against the fact that, beyond a certain point, support for them could create a wider war that would not be in the interests of this country, Pakistan or the anti-Soviet freedom fighters themselves. President Reagan’s reported decision to supply Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to the Afghan guerrillas does not seem to have taken this fact into account.

The military need for such weapons is undeniable. As things stand, the anti-Soviet rebels have no effective defense against Soviet jets and helicopter gunships--a deficiency results in heavy guerrilla casualties.

But the Soviets, who share a border with Afghanistan, can match and exceed any escalation of U.S. military aid to the guerrillas. The only way to get weapons to the Mujahedeen is through Pakistan. And the fact is that the Pakistanis are increasingly nervous about the use of their territory for military escalation of the war in Afghanistan. They also worry that growing numbers of armed Afghan refugees will ultimately have a destabilizing effect on Pakistan itself.

President Zia ul-Haq supports the Afghan resistance on the ground that, if the Soviets remain in Afghanistan, Pakistan may be next on their menu. Like the Reagan Administration, he insists that “the Soviet Union must withdraw. The refugees must return (to their homes in Afghanistan), and it would be left to the Afghan people to decide what kind of government they want.”

Moscow has flatly warned Pakistan of “disastrous” consequences if it cooperates in the supplying of anti-aircraft missiles, and the Pakistanis obviously fear that the Soviets may mean it. Since the United States is committed to Pakistan’s defense, Washington should consider that possibility, too.

Much anti-Americanism already exists among Pakistani intellectuals and opposition politicians, who claim that their country is being put at risk for U.S. purposes. It is possible that Pakistan may at some point strike a unilateral deal with the Soviets and terminate its help to the guerrillas. That would be a catastrophe for the resistance fighters and an embarrassment for American policy.

Zia himself now finds it convenient to believe that Moscow is seriously interested in a political settlement. Indeed, the Soviets have professed a willingness to withdraw their forces, but have been studiously vague so far about the conditions and the timetable. Indirect negotiations under auspices of the United Nations are scheduled to resume in May.

Meanwhile, Zia plainly had an eye on U.S. plans to supply the guerrillas with Stinger missiles when he told an interviewer recently, “If anybody is thinking that the greater the heat of the insurgency, the easier the solution, he is wrong. The freedom fighters must continue their effort at the present level.”

Washington would be wise to listen.