Europe Runs Scared From Kadafi : It’s Understandable, but the Continent Shows Little Courage

The view from Europe is of a continent running scared--but with good reason. It is not that Moammar Kadafi has many friends and supporters in Europe. He has not, for we have had direct and painful experience over many years of the cost and dislocation that a relatively small and intermittent terrorist threat can inflict. I do not say that we have become used to terrorism, but rather that we have had to learn to live with the pain, the grief and the damage caused by indiscriminate violence perpetrated by callous and unprincipled groups with political axes to grind.

We have learned, too, how difficult it is to act against terrorism, and there is a sense of weariness when simple solutions are proposed that are intended in one glorious stroke to “solve the problem.” Some solutions make the problem worse, and the predominant European criticism of American action against Libya is that it is not possible under these circumstances and against this opponent to counter state-sponsored terrorism by punitive strikes against the country of origin.

At the level so far sanctioned by President Reagan, the pain inflicted on Libya is more likely to enrage than to persuade Col. Kadafi of the folly of his ways. He has, I would judge, many more shots in his locker, and it is of these that Europe is running scared. It may not be a dignified sight, but it is understandable.

What is less understandable is the failure so far on the part of most European governments to take the kinds of measures that could prove effective over the longer run--measures that could make it not only much more difficult for Libya to institute acts of terror but also much more painful. I refer to closing down Libya’s embassies (the so-called people’s bureaus), imposing severe restrictions on all movement of Libyan citizens, banning direct flights to Libya and imposing economic sanctions. Given its parlous state after the oil-price fall, the Libyan economy could be caused to collapse. If this were seen as a direct result of Kadafi’s policies, his removal by a coup is not an unreasonable possibility.

Europeans also see that America’s actions against Libya risk alienating all Arab states, few of which have any love for Kadafi but are bound by the spirit of Arab nationalism to condemn attacks against him. This will make life more difficult for everyone having dealings with the Middle East, and European governments will want to distance themselves from the United States, as they did in 1973. Again, it may not be dignified, but it is understandable.

Where the United States can hardly be faulted in this instance is in the matter of consultation. Europeans cannot say that the Reagan Administration kept them in the dark. The United States took great pains to enlist European support for the action that it proposed to take. The Europeans, with the possible exception of Great Britain, remained unpersuaded that a military strike was the best course, yet they failed to offer a convincing alternative.

It looked from here as if the President was earnestly seeking a way out of the box in which he had confined himself. By agreeing to positive policies of another kind, the Europeans could have provided a graceful exit that would have allowed the President to shelve punishment while other, perhaps more fruitful, policies were given time to work. Sadly, that did not happen.

Only Britain, perhaps less exposed and closer in many ways in instinct to the United States, was prepared to implicate itself in the American attack by agreeing to the use of F-111 fighter-bombers (and tankers) based in the United Kingdom. The Reagan Administration judged well. Britain could hardly refuse, not least because of memories of American support for British actions in the South Atlantic in 1982. But acquiescence in this instance should not be taken to indicate that Margaret Thatcher’s government believes that the U.S. action was prudent--only that it was not possible to say “no” and risk an unholy row when the sympathy of many Britons remains with the United States in its frustration and anger at terrorist attacks against American citizens.

Whether the damage to U.S.-European relations is transitory or long-lasting depends on what happens next. If there is an upsurge of Libyan-sponsored retaliatory attacks in Europe, there will be an irresistible urge to say “I told you so,” and anti-Americanism may be hard to contain.

The only way of limiting further damage and, perhaps, restoring good will and mutual confidence is for Europe now to take the useful steps that it ought already to have taken to constrain and compel Kadafi. I wish I could believe that Europe would show such courage.