Blundering Militarily From One Dilemma to Another

The latest round of U.S.-Libyan violence has shown America the future. This is the contemporary model of President John F. Kennedy’s “long, twilight struggle.” Now and for years to come, states, groups and individuals will search for unconventional means to equalize American power. Terrorism will thus continue.

In retaliating against Libya the Reagan Administration has achieved some of its purposes--but not all.

Most important in its calculus, the Administration has reassured the American people that it will respond to terrorism, which, in its partnership with television, has vividly shaken our sense of well-being. That reassurance has value. A nation uncertain of itself can be of little help to anyone else.

The Administration also has shown the world that there is risk in twisting the lion’s tail. This, too, has value. In a world balanced on the U.S. alliance system, demonstrations of American impotence, however minor the context, do no one any good. Provided we do not suffer more than our enemies, occasionally lashing out in anger can help keep them from calculating precisely what they can do to us.

The West European allies are now on notice that they must get serious in helping Washington contain Col. Moammar Kadafi. Washington believes that Europeans must understand the intensity of American concern and must support American policies simply because we are the alliance’s superpower and the linchpin of their security. If we will not respond when our people are being killed, commitments to allies will be worth much less.

The value in this demonstration must be contrasted with bewilderment in most of Western Europe. It is almost universally believed that the United States is over-reacting to terrorism that is commonplace on the Continent. The prevailing European view is that Kadafi is the wrong target, that the United States has chosen wrong or ineffective instruments, that terrorism won’t be stopped even if Kadafi is removed, and that Washington is doing little to counter the causes of terrorism.

In its frustration the Administration is numb to these views. There has rarely been so much bitterness in Washington--such open contempt, even--about most of the allies and their unwillingness to support U.S. policy.

The Soviets, meanwhile, will feast off a banquet of propaganda. Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze has canceled his scheduled visit to Washington to plan the next superpower summit meeting. Whether this is just gamesmanship or a sign of trouble in U.S.-Soviet relations, Moscow is clearly trying to enlarge the gulf between the United States and its European allies over Libya.

Monday’s air strike also showed Kadafi that Libyans must pay some price for his actions. The Administration argues that this will lead to his overthrow. In time, perhaps. For now, Kadafi is even more secure, politically.

With other Arab states, U.S. actions will cut different ways. The moderates’ verbal denunciation will mask quiet plaudits, coupled with wistful regrets that we didn’t finish the job against Kadafi. States that have worried whether the United States would use force to defend interests in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf area, will be more confident. Israel, as well, will see the United States as a more reliable partner.

As time goes by, however, Arab reaction is likely to reverse. For the first time, the United States has attacked an Arab state. However unfairly, this act will shape attitudes throughout the Arab world. And Arab radicals will step up efforts to undermine fragile governments, like Egypt’s, that support the United States.

This leaves for last what should be first: the effect of the Libya raid on terrorism. Like the existence of a snowball in hell, it is possible but not likely that Kadafi will be chastened. It is even less likely that other Middle East terrorists, more persistent and elusive, will hang up their weapons.

Where does this leave us? President Reagan has promised to continue meeting fire with fire. That may be fine with regard to Libya. Unlike other states more prominent in supporting terrorism, such as Syria, Libya boasts of no Soviet forces or friendship treaty, and has no compensating value for the United States in regional diplomacy. Will we attack Syria if need be, or terrorists flitting from one sanctuary to another?

As the euphoria over beating the devil subsides, we must start wondering about a broader strategy that has more elements than the use of blunderbuss military force. That means starting to get at the causes of terrorism. It means politics.

It’s convenient to call Kadafi a mad dog, but there is certainly method in his madness, based first and foremost on exploiting the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict. This is a truism for serious students of terrorism. But it has yet to penetrate the Reagan Administration, which continues to act as though terrorism is not a purposeful if perverse strategy, but rather emerges, unbidden, from some swamp of the human mind.

Until the Administration sees the connection between politics and violence, it will have no course but to blunder from one dilemma to another in the use of military force. The twilight struggle will plunge further into darkness.