Testing the U.S. Definition for Terrorism

An infuriating aspect of the recent military clash between the United States and Libya was the lack of international support for the U.S. response. Why do foreign governments refuse to support the U.S. position on terrorism?

Perhaps Americans should understand that one reason is the unusual way the United States defines the phenomenon. In February, 1986, for example, the Administration released the report of the Vice President’s Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, officially defining terrorism as “the unlawful use or threat of violence against persons or property to further political or social objectives.”

Such a sweeping definition enables the Administration to denounce as terrorist such self-proclaimed national liberation movements as the the African National Congress, the Irish Republican Army or the Palestine Liberation Organization. In addition, the definition enables the United States to denounce as terrorist all attacks worldwide on American officials, civilian or military.

But its sweeping terms could also be used to brand as terrorists such figures as George Washington, Robert E. Lee, the French Resistance and even those who broke German law trying to assassinate Adolf Hitler during World War II. Obviously, such a definition is untenable.

The traditional American position is that individuals and groups, after legal remedies have been exhausted or denied, have the right to resort to violence in resisting foreign oppression or overthrowing domestic tyranny. And in today’s world there is much of both.

To start with the more sensitive cases, blacks in South Africa or, to a lesser extent, the Palestinians on the West Bank and Catholics in Northern Ireland, face intolerable oppression. So do the Shias in Lebanon who are trying to end the domination of their country by a determined Christian minority. So do countries in Eastern Europe that have tried to throw off the Soviet yoke.

The list can be continued. The Afghan and Cambodian resistance movements have the right to try to drive the foreign invader from their country. Those in Nicaragua or El Salvador who find the government an oppressive tyranny also have the right to revolt.

Yet if a group’s resort to violence under certain conditions is not a priori terrorism, what then constitutes terrorism? The recent bloody American experience in Lebanon may offer an answer.

In Lebanon, the Reagan Administration became a participant in a civil war by using the guns of the U.S. battleship New Jersey to support the Christian minority against the Muslim majority. The Muslim response was the devastating car-bomb attack on the Marine barracks, another on the American Embassy and several kidnapings of U.S. civilians.

The United States denounced all these as acts of terrorism. But the car bombing of the Marine barracks was more in the nature of a military counterattack. Even the bombing of the embassy was not clearly an act of terrorism, since the U.S. diplomats in Lebanon were official agents of a government participating in a civil war against the Shias. The seizure of the innocent hostages certainly was an act of terrorism because the American citizens in question had absolutely no connection with U.S. policy.

One reason the United States enjoys so little international support for its approach to terrorism is that it defines the problem in ways that force others to take sides in what are in effect civil wars: All acts of violence, including those against military targets, become, in American eyes, terrorist actions. There is, however, one mammoth exception: Attacks against civilians in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia or Nicaragua are tolerated on the grounds that the fight involves freedom from communist rule.

In the Middle East, the United States, through its strategic consensus agreement with Israel, has become a participant on Israel’s side in the war between the Israelis and the Palestinians. The U.S. position is that the Palestinians do not have the right to resort to violence under any circumstances, even if they are permanently denied their political rights on the West Bank.

The West Europeans are determined to avoid what they regard as a U.S. mistake. No amount of American pressure for Europe to accept the U.S. definition of terrorism will work because the West Europeans have determined that they will not join the United States as a participant on Israel’s side. The most the United States can expect is neutrality. The stakes for Western Europe are too high. Effects of the Israeli-Palestinian civil war have already spilled onto European soil. By becoming direct participants in that struggle, West Europeans would simply increase the number of terrorist acts on their territory.

Central America presents a different problem for Western Europe: America’s double standard leads the Reagan Administration to denounce all attacks against civilians by the IRA or PLO while excusing such attacks by the contras. For Europeans this is especially troubling because many terrorist acts by the contras have been directed against Europeans working in the area. In February, for example, contra forces murdered a Swiss employee of a Catholic charity. Many of the contra attacks have singled out European medical technicians in the area.

In addition to the conceptual problems posed by the U.S. approach to terrorism, there remains the special case of countries like Iran or Libya, each motivated by forms of religious or political fanaticism. Most political movements employing violence seem to have a concrete goal: a free Afghanistan, a united Ireland, a Palestinian state. The leaders of Iran and Libya employ violence to promote a total religious or political transformation of society. Avoiding participation in their struggle is difficult because they are determined to carry it to other countries.

There are only two solutions in such cases: work to overthrow the government or attempt to isolate the state sufficiently to persuade it to alter its behavior.

In the case of Iran, a policy of isolation has begun to show some success. In June, 1985, Iran played a helpful role in resolving the TWA hijacking crisis in Lebanon; and the following month the speaker of the Parliament, Hashemi Rafsanjani, called on the United States to take the initiative in resuming relations with Iran. Unfortunately, the Administration’s reaction was President Reagan’s July, 1985, denunciation of Iran as a terrorist state.

Toward Libya, the United States must continue to press a policy of isolation on the West Europeans. The recent action of European Economic Community members to reduce Libyan diplomatic presence in Western Europe was the most minimal step possible in the current crisis. The United States should continue to look for discreet ways to assist the opposition to Moammar Kadafi.

And for the larger issue of terrorism, perhaps there are some common sense rules: First, individuals and groups have the right to fight, if necessary, for their freedom; and the act of rebellion itself, even against America’s friends, is not, a priori , terrorism. Second, the existence of this right does not mean that outsiders have to support it. Third, acts of violence in a struggle for freedom should be directed against government agents, not against innocent civilians. Fourth, the struggle should be confined to the territory in question. Finally, means should be appropriate to ends.

A sound definition of terrorism does not itself bring sound policy, but it is difficult to have the latter without the former.