Pushed and Pulled, Aquino Strains for Stability

Since it burst into bloom last February, Philippine democracy remains a fragile flower, a hothouse blossom emerging from four days of popular uprising, needing continued sustenance and care lest it wilt under the hot sun of a trying political season.

Almost two months in power, the government of Corazon Aquino still has to consolidate control over the armed forces, bureaucracy and local government structure, which for two decades have been held in the dictatorial grip of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The need to do this becomes more urgent as the streets of the capital, until recently the domain of pro-Aquino forces, have been taken over by unruly crowds shouting support for the ousted strongman.

It is a bizarre twist: Marcos loyalists invoking “people power,” the rallying slogan of the February uprising that brought about the dictator’s downfall. The occurrence in the last week of fairly large pro-Marcos demonstrations attests not so much to the popularity of the ousted president, but to the still significant organizational and financial resources of the loyalist forces, which, deprived of a forum in the recently abolished and largely pro-Marcos legislature, have made cynical use of the “parliament of the streets” instead.

In several instances, loyalist demonstrators have deliberately provoked confrontation with government troops. What role Marcos, now in exile in Hawaii, plays in these rallies remains unclear. Some believe that he finances and directs these activities to destabilize the new government. Others say that these are merely the defensive stand of politicians closely linked to the deposed President who still refuse to fade away from the scene.

Whichever the case, the size and composition of these recent demonstrations are disturbing. They are made up mainly of slum-dwellers and the unemployed, lured to the rallies by promises of cash rewards and susceptible to demagogic rabble-rousing. Some fear that they may already have the makings of the descamisados (“shirtless ones”) of Latin America, an angry mob of poor people manipulated by agitators who play on their poverty and discontent to pave the way for the return of authoritarian leaders.

This projection may seem distant, but the basis for fear remains. Aquino herself, in a recent interview, said that her greatest frustration so far has been the government’s inability to deal with the pressing problems of poverty and unemployment. Though these are problems bequeathed by Marcos, her failure to deal decisively with them will fuel mass discontent, particularly since her government is founded on the people’s collective hopes for democracy and a better life, both long denied by the old regime. Once these hopes dim, so will the chances for long-term political stability, especially in resolving the problem of insurgency. In the meantime, too, even loyalist forces might be able to draw strength from these grievances.

Already, coffee-shop talk here centers on how long the government will last, how long before it gives, pulled as it is on all sides by conflicting forces. The economy remains a major problem: The ravages of the Marcos years, especially the downturn resulting in negative growth rates the past three years, will not be easily reversed. Foreign aid, loans and investments come in trickles, despite the international approval and popularity of Aquino and her government. Investors, both local and foreign, are hedging because of the seeming fragility of the new regime.

So far what the Aquino government has accomplished is in the area of human rights, as shown by the release of hundreds of political prisoners and an initial probe into human-rights violations; the investigation of the “ill-gotten wealth” accumulated by Marcos and people closely associated with him, and the restructuring of government along the lines set in the interim “Freedom Constitution,” eventually to be replaced after a plebiscite by a permanent constitution.

Ironically, the very areas where the new regime can boast of accomplishments are the same ones where there have been vocal opposition from within the ranks of the government itself. The investigation of human-rights abuses, for example, remains a touchy subject with the military, even with the reformist faction that staged the coup helping bring about Aquino’s rise to power. Significant elements within the military see the human-rights probe as an attempt by the more radical officials within the Aquino government to undermine the strength and unity of the armed forces.

On the other hand, the investigation of military abuses during the Marcos regime was one of the major points of Aquino’s campaign platform; the various organizations that supported her expect her to abide by her promise. So, too, do the other elements of her government. These naturally exacerbate mutual suspicions between the civilian and military sectors of the regime and may set both on a collision course.

Even the investigation of Marcos’ ill-gotten wealth has proven to be controversial, since it has implicated people within the Cabinet itself. Meanwhile, attempts to restructure the government, especially at the local level, where many Marcos loyalists have been replaced by politicians associated with the new regime, has met resistance not only from members of Marcos’ political party but from disgruntled elements of the various political parties supporting Aquino who have, in their view, not been given their dues in local patronage.

The paradox is that these problems arise from Aquino’s very source of power: her broad base of support. It would seem that the source of her government’s strength is also its source of weakness. For the range of sectors, classes and political groupings that supported her rise to the presidency is so wide and so diverse, they encompass many conflicting interests. These forces now struggle for influence, even supremacy, within her government; whether she likes it or not, Aquino must play the arbiter.

So far, her approach to governing has been, as she had promised, consultative. In Cabinet meetings, it is said that she listens rather than talks. Cabinet members say that once she makes up her mind, she remains firm. Yet she has already been criticized, even by supporters, as not moving swiftly enough; as reacting to, rather than shaping, events; as having no integral approach to governing as yet.

But hers is a tough task, even for a seasoned politician. A political neophyte, she must wield together, in her Cabinet alone, people who in the old days could not be put in the same room because they represent such divergent interests and standpoints. They include people who have supported Marcos for years and others who have fought him, also for years. Even then, the Cabinet has been criticized as not representative enough of the society as a whole, since it is composed mainly of people at the top of the social strata and draws largely from politicians and businessmen who organized and financed her candidacy.

In the meantime, the people power that seated Aquino in Malacanang Palace after a dramatic four-day uprising remains an amorphous, unconsolidated mass whose involvement is now limited to wearing yellow T-shirts and displaying people-power bumper stickers. This is unfortunate, since this movement could serve as a buffer against the congealed interests now battling for supremacy within and outside the government.

In the end, if Aquino is to remain on the populist path she has chosen, she must have, most of all, the people behind her--united against those who, in the struggle for power, risk trampling this fragile bloom, Philippine democracy.