We Lust for Energy, But Not for Its Risks

The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor in the Soviet Union raises again the question of the safety of nuclear power technology in the United States--a question that has been largely quiescent since the Three Mile Island accident on March 28, 1979.

The assertion that the use of nuclear energy is perfectly safe cannot be defended. All that can be reasonably stated is that the technology of nuclear energy is no more inherently dangerous than other complex technologies developed to meet important human needs.

Still, nuclear technology creates greater fears in the public mind. It is more mysterious than other technologies, and an accident--as Chernobyl illustrates--may be catastrophic. Also, the environmental effects of the nuclear fuel cycle are so long-lasting as to raise unanswerable questions for mere mortals.

Yet a society with an insatiable lust for more and more energy to meet its every need, no matter how trivial, cannot justifiably argue against accepting the incidental adverse consequences of that lust. Nor can it single out one energy technology for opposition over others equally or more hazardous. But it can seek to control that lust and it can demand increasingly high standards of safety and environmental quality for all of its energy and other technologies.

In pursuing that course we probably should eschew the extremes of the neo-Luddites, for we are not a nation of saints and ascetics willing to sacrifice the material benefits of modern technology for perfect safety and a pristine environment. Nor should we be guilty of the sin of technological hubris, for the gods of chance will not be mocked. The tragic end of the Challenger crew, after repeated assurances from our political and bureaucratic leaders of the safety of space shuttle launches, reminds us of this fact.

Indeed, we need to look at the accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl and see if the cost of nuclear power is comparable to other technologies that we take for granted.

With about 100 nuclear plants in operation, the United States now has about 1,050 reactor years of experience (a reactor year of experience is the number of reactors times the number of years they have been in use). Last year the Nuclear Regulatory Commission concluded that a Three Mile Island-type accident might occur once in 3,300 reactor years (or 33 years if 100 plants are still in operation), and that such an accident would have very small public health consequences.

But the reality is that Three Mile Island occurred at a time when there were about 60 reactors, averaging seven years of operation--or a little more than 400 reactor years.

There is speculation that the Chernobyl accident is a catastrophic meltdown, an event that earlier studies estimated would occur only once in a billion reactor years. Yet the Soviets, with their 40 reactors, have only about 450 reactor years of experience.

So what would it mean to the United States in loss of lives and dollars if catastrophic nuclear accidents occurred at even one-tenth the Soviet rate?

Extrapolating crudely from present U.S. and Soviet experience, a worst-case scenario might mean that we can expect an accident similar to the one at Three Mile Island every 5 to 10 years, with no deaths and a minimal number of delayed cancer cases from release of nuclear materials. A Chernobyl-type accident might occur once every 40 to 50 years, with a few hundred immediate deaths and tens of thousands of delayed cancer deaths.

The cost of such accident rates might be around $2 billion per year. But with one of our most basic forms of advanced technology--the automobile--we already are paying out $6 billion to $7 billion a year, not to mention a price of more than 50,000 lives, in accidents alone.

Chernobyl teaches us that nuclear power technology remains hazardous and possibly catastrophic, and thus U.S. efforts to improve reactor safety, accelerated after Three Mile Island, are justified and worth the cost. Utility companies that objected to those costs should cease their protests and concentrate on getting the job done, as quickly and efficiently as possible.

It also teaches us that American decisions to move from the technology of graphite-moderated reactors, such as Chernobyl, to light-water reactors were probably wise, and that our requirement that reactors be housed in containment vessels is prudent. We should probably consider at least one more major lesson: the need for an expedited solution to the problem of permanent safe storage of high-level nuclear waste.

But nuclear technology does not differ in kind or consequences from the other technologies. If we don’t like it, we must adopt a different set of public policies governing our acceptance of all technologies that are destructive of human lives and humane environments.