Chernobyl Can Give Life to Arms Control

Twice recently, we saw that popular American reaction to events doesn’t necessarily correspond to rational judgment. The destruction of the Challenger called into question the entire manned space program and raised doubts about the quality of American technology. A rash of terrorist incidents, magnified by television, has made Americans fearful of travel to Europe despite reassuring statistics, a reaction close to mass hysteria.

The same pattern can now be seen in the reaction to the Soviet nuclear plant accident. The meltdown of a reactor at Chernobyl, now Topic No. 1 in the West, has elements of drama similar to Challenger and terrorism: A much-vaunted technology has proved deficient, and innocent people fear that their lives have been put at risk. There is also a mad scramble to make sense of what has happened, to try drawing some universal lessons.

In each case, the driving force has been the role of the media. With the Chernobyl reactor, that role has been heightened by the lack of very much to report. Something has happened, it must be important, but we can’t learn much about it. Nevertheless, we will devote entire evening newscasts to it. Ironically, coverage of Chernobyl has been more effective than anything done by the U.S. government in breaking the American national fever over terrorism.

The Soviets are partly to blame for the degree of media attention. In their secret society, they are endemically opposed to “coming clean,” either with their own people or with anxious outsiders. Moscow’s reputation for dissimulation and deceit is so great that it wasn’t believed when it denied that a second reactor had exploded. Only two days later did it become clear that Western commercial satellite photos, on which that rumor was based, had been wrongly interpreted.

The gap between the demand and supply of information points to one of the few conclusions that can be confidently reached: that Moscow’s failure to be forthcoming has produced significant anger in Western Europe. For a time, it will refocus attention on Soviet shortcomings. Suddenly, the spotlight has shifted from the recent American raid on Libya. For a change, the irrational superpower (as seen on the Continent) is on the other side of the East-West divide.

Two other conclusions are now possible, even with such a dearth of hard fact. Most obviously, opponents of using nuclear reactors to generate electricity will gain political support, both in Europe and the United States. No matter that design of the faulty Soviet reactor and Soviet safety procedures differ significantly from the West’s. This kind of distinction tends to fall on deaf ears. Whenever anything nuclear seems to be out of control, the intensity of response reflects a widespread, primal fear. The disaster at Bhopal, India, did not bring down the chemical industry. But popular attitudes about the deadly neutron--the unseen, silent killer--mean that no amount of risk, once exposed, is tolerable.

When the first rush of concern is over, what has happened at Chernobyl will also affect attitudes toward nuclear weapons, especially in Western Europe. Politically, it is immaterial that nuclear weapons and nuclear power generation are quite different. Chernobyl will lead to renewed questioning on the Continent about the role of nuclear weapons. The anti-nuclear movement has gotten a shot in the arm.

Secretary of State George P. Shultz recognized the implications of Chernobyl for nuclear arms when he called on the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on arms control. He is right in making the connection. But he did not go far enough.

Drama in disaster should remind us that major steps forward in international politics also often rely on the triumph of theater over bureaucratic plodding. Modern summitry has little to do with negotiations, but with validating in nations’ politics what has already been agreed.

President Reagan made the right gesture in offering U.S. aid to the victims of the Chernobyl accident; humanity comes before politics. He should now propose a major new initiative in arms control. Its content is less important--say, in the area of nuclear testing--than the act itself. For example, the test-ban treaty of 1963 was intrinsically not that important. But what it did politically in superpower relations, in beginning the process of arms control, was of inestimable value.

There is a practical side as well. We can reasonably expect that the Soviets will, as usual, attempt to play on West European nuclear fears for political gain. Preempting the Soviets and thus sidetracking Kremlin propaganda can be a useful goal.

The Chernobyl accident will rapidly give way in the media to newer fare. Political fallout will remain. But Ronald Reagan can also turn it to account with a display of imagination and useful drama about the most important concerns of mankind.