‘They Understand Us’ : U.S.-British Special Tie Still Binds

When the United States tried to convince its allies last month that it had hard evidence linking Libya to the April 5 bombing of a West Berlin discotheque, it was hardly surprising that Britain was among the first to accept the connection.

It is even likely that it was British monitoring stations in the Mediterranean that listened in on the telltale transmissions between the Libyan government and its East Berlin mission.

Under a 40-year-old agreement, the United States and Britain divided the globe into areas of responsibility for intelligence-gathering and agreed to share even the most secret information. As a result, British listening posts in Cyprus and Malta were ideally placed to overhear the Libyan communications.

(Canada, Australia and New Zealand have since joined this arrangement, but Britain and the United States still play the dominant roles.)

Political Bond

Such collaboration between nations in an area as sensitive as intelligence-gathering is highly unusual. It is one of the most striking examples of a unique political bond that has linked Britain and the United States for nearly half a century.

Those actively involved in Anglo-American affairs say the ties have evolved into what they call a “special relationship.”

Although some call that expression an outdated myth, the events surrounding the April 15 American bombing raid on Libya proved that this relationship remains a powerful, influential force in global affairs.

The government of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher was the sole European voice to support President Reagan’s use of force to retaliate for the La Belle discotheque bombing, in which a U.S. serviceman and a Turkish woman died. It also was the only nation that helped--by allowing U.S. F-111 fighter-bombers to take off from air bases in Britain.

Early Days of WWII

Anglo-American relations first warmed in World War I, but historians here trace the origins of the special relationship to the early days of World War II, when an ostensibly neutral America first provided Britain with aid in its fight against Nazi Germany, then actively joined the fight against the Axis powers.

Collaboration in such sensitive areas as intelligence and nuclear technology during the war led to cooperative ventures that extended into the peace that followed.

Britain’s nuclear arsenal, for example, is today built around U.S. Polaris missiles and will soon be upgraded and replaced by the American Trident missile system.

A 1951 agreement signed by President Harry S. Truman and Prime Minister Clement Attlee outlining joint consultations on the use of American military aircraft based in Britain was the same one invoked last month when Reagan and Thatcher conferred before the Libya raid.

In the intelligence field, British and American operations have frequently overlapped, and contact remains close. A U.S. representative reportedly sits in on weekly intelligence briefings at the prime minister’s 10 Downing St. offices.

In 1953, the CIA combined with Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service to overthrow Iran’s anti-Western prime minister, Mohammed Mossadegh, and restore Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi to power.

An ailing Prime Minister Winston Churchill is said to have told the American who led the operation that if he had been healthy and a few years younger, he would have enjoyed taking part in the venture.

During the 1982 Falklands War, the United States reportedly passed on to Britain satellite surveys and radio intercepts of Argentine military movements, information that is believed to have been vital to Britain’s success in retaking the South Atlantic islands.

‘Our Greatest Ally’

It was a degree of help that Thatcher did not forget when Reagan asked for assistance to strike against Libya.

“The United States is our greatest ally, the foundation of the alliance which has preserved our security and peace for more than a generation,” Thatcher told Parliament in one of many spirited defenses of her decision to assist in the attack on Libya.

Several British commentators maintain that Thatcher did nothing more than any British leader would had to have done under the circumstances. But former Prime Minister Edward Heath, a member of Thatcher’s Conservative Party, disagreed, pointing out that he had refused to help the United States resupply Israel during the 1973 Middle East War.

To be sure, the relationship has not always been a smooth one.

A latent, low-level anti-Americanism has long been a characteristic of British society. Britons, once mildly annoyed that America’s wartime armed forces were “overpaid, oversexed and over here,” now worry that the 28,000 U.S. servicemen stationed here are “over-armed and over here.”

Lack of Consultation

Anti-American sentiment rose sharply when President Dwight D. Eisenhower refused to back military action by Britain in the 1956 Suez crisis. Britons were also upset about the lack of consultation before the 1983 invasion of Grenada, a member of the Commonwealth whose head of state is none other than Queen Elizabeth II.

But in relative terms, these have been weak counter-currents in a relationship more notable for its closeness than its irritations.

According to those who have studied it, the close Anglo-American relationship stems from a variety of factors, including shared political values and a common heritage and language, which tend to produce both similar world views and like-minded ways of assessing problems.

“We’re not as tidy as the Germans or as worried about logic as the French,” noted Michael Palliser, a recently retired permanent undersecretary in the British Foreign Office. “We’re basically pragmatic, and the Americans are similar.”

An Unusually Close Link

In a speech last year in Washington, Thatcher avoided explanations but accepted the principle that the link is unusually close.

“It is special,” she said of the relationship. “It just is. And that’s that.”

Thatcher’s own friendship and shared political philosophy with Reagan have accentuated this closeness, but a heavy exchange of routine business and private contact also plays its role.

The U.S. Embassy in London hosts a constant stream of visiting senators, congressmen and high-level government figures.

Forty cents of every dollar invested by American business in Europe is located here, while one in every eight workers in Britain’s manufacturing sector is employed by a subsidiary of an American company.

In normal years, nearly half of the American tourists traveling to Europe stop in Britain.

Reading America’s Mood

Such an intense level of contact, combined with other factors, leads many Britons to believe that they can read America’s mood better than other Europeans.

“I think we understood better than others the depth of frustration that existed in the U.S. and how dangerous it would have been for Europe to refuse to help at all,” a close Thatcher aide said of Britain’s decision to assist in the Libya raid. “I don’t think they (other Europeans) realized how important it was.”

Britain’s entry into the European Communities has in some instances loosened the transatlantic link, but in other instances, it appears to have strengthened the ties.

During the flurry of foreign ministers’ meetings that followed the attack on Libya, it was British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe who consistently pushed the other 11 European Communities members to take more forceful diplomatic action of the type sought by the United States.

A Subtle Influence

The nature of the Anglo-American relationship gives Britain an unusual, but often subtle, influence over U.S. foreign policy.

Soft-sell British lobbying was said to have played a role in tempering tough Washington rhetoric about scrapping the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty and also in moderating the way in which the Reagan Administration sold its Strategic Defense Initiative, or “Star Wars” space-based anti-missile defense program, to European allies.

“Pound for pound, the British have more influence to change or temper U.S. policy than anyone else,” noted an American diplomat here. “They understand us. They have the ability to make us think twice, yet still express their own interests.”

Since the raid on Libya, senior British officials have not been bashful in attempting to convert American gratitude into political pressure. They have lobbied hard for Senate confirmation of a controversial extradition treaty that could allow Britain to request the return of those accused of terrorist acts in connection with Northern Ireland.

Opposed by Irish-Americans

The treaty is opposed by many Irish-Americans.

“Virtue has its rewards,” said Conservative Party Chairman Norman Tebbit, a close Thatcher associate, when asked if Britain expected anything in return for its support. “I just hope it comes in this life rather than than next.”

Despite the strength of Anglo-American relations and the recent British assistance against Libya, there is a level of concern about the future.

An older generation, weaned during the war on the importance of close cooperation, is gradually being supplanted by younger people whose experiences are less powerful and whose ideas are shaped by a Britain now politically tied to Europe.

Anti-American feeling bubbled higher than usual in the months before the attack on Libya because of two highly controversial attempts by American companies to take over British companies.

Seen as a Threat

For a Britain struggling to retain control of its manufacturing sector in an increasingly competitive world, U.S. industrial wealth is sometimes seen as a threat.

The low level of public support for the U.S. raid on Libya has also clearly surprised the British government, although there are signs that this may now be turning around.

Since it was last in power, the main opposition Labor Party has adopted policies calling for the removal of all U.S. nuclear bases from Britain, the decommissioning of Polaris nuclear submarines and cancellation of the Trident program.

“If I were President, I’d be worried about this special relationship lasting through another Labor government,” Tebbit said.

But Tebbit agreed that for now, the unusual link remains intact.

“The special relationship does still exist in absolutely every respect compared to other allies,” he stated.