Saudi Arms Puzzle

Overwhelmingly, even ferociously, the Senate and the House have rejected President Reagan’s proposal to sell Saudi Arabia $354 million worth of air defense and anti-ship missiles. That would seem to put an end to the issue, except that a final vote on this arms deal has yet to be taken. Reagan, preparing to veto the resolutions of rejection, seems confident that he can win over at least enough senators to sustain his veto. If he can do that the sale will go through.

The Saudis were not treated gently in the congressional debate. They were accused of a failure to play any credible role in advancing Middle East peace prospects, of indirectly subsidizing radicalism through cash payments to Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization, of a record of unbroken animosity toward Israel, and of joining with other Arab states to criticize last month’s U.S. raid on Libya. None of these charges is untrue, though the truth in each says more about the Saudis’ deepest fears than it does about any systematic policy of hostility toward U.S. interests.

Its great riches notwithstanding, Saudi Arabia is a weak country that is all too vulnerable to the forces of religious and political extremism. The Saudis try to assure self-preservation by being followers rather than leaders within the Arab camp, and by paying tribute to those--like Syria and the PLO--who have the means to foment subversion within their borders and in the smaller Persian Gulf states. All this, in practice, makes Saudi Arabia something less than a consistent supporter of U.S. political interests. But it also helps to maintain the survival of a regime that happens to control 35% of the world’s oil.

The Saudis intend to have the means to defend themselves against external attack, the greatest threat of which comes from Iran. If they can’t get American arms they most certainly will go elsewhere, as they did earlier by concluding a huge aircraft deal with Britain. It is preferable that a U.S. arms relationship be maintained, not least because that will continue to give this country--through training, maintenance agreements and the like--a means of control over those weapons that otherwise would be lacking. Saudi security is of strategic importance to the United States, and to the West. That, and not overblown claims about the Saudi regime’s true-blue friendship with the United States, is what the President ought to talk about as he sets about trying to change some minds and some votes in the Senate.