Rockwell Scrambles to Extend Life of B-1 : Program Set to End in 1988

Sam Iacobellis has dreaded the day he would have a red devil on his back. Iacobellis, president of Rockwell International’s B-1 bomber organization, invented the red devil to symbolize any breakdown in B-1 production that would disrupt schedules and drive up costs.

In a large executive conference room at Rockwell’s North American Aircraft headquarters in El Segundo, dozens of detailed charts and graphs covering the walls depict the production status of the bomber program.

So far, he has not seen even one of the red devil drawings in the conference room. As a result, the B-1 is being praised by Congress and the Pentagon as a model of efficiency in the often-troubled U.S. defense procurement system.

But there is another devil looming on the horizon, something that is proving far more damaging to Iacobellis’ enthusiasm and hard-sell attitude. It is the approaching expiration of the $27.5 billion in funding to build 100 of the large, swing-wing nuclear bombers.

Rockwell said last week that it will lay off 6,800 of its 27,000 employees on the B-1 program by October. And these job cuts are just the beginning of continuing layoffs that will occur through April, 1988, when B-1 bomber production is scheduled to come to an abrupt stop.

Wants to Continue

However, if Rockwell and its supporters in Congress have their way, the B-1 assembly line will pass through 1988 still “turning out B-1s like pancakes,” as Iacobellis sometimes likes to say.

Through two decades of B-1 controversy, Rockwell has demonstrated an often-deft political hand and a financial iron will in sheltering the program from potentially fatal attack by politicians, competitors and pacifists. The B-1’s demise has been prematurely predicted more than once.

Now, a major political battle in Congress is shaping up for this summer as Rockwell attempts to gain support for $200 million in initial funding to continue B-1 production beyond the original 100 craft.

Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) and California Rep. Duncan L. Hunter (R-Coronado) said they will introduce amendments to the defense authorization bills for fiscal 1987 to provide funding for early production work on as many as 48 additional B-1s.

“I would like to see at least 130 B-1 aircraft,” said Hunter, whose district does not have employment on either the B-1 or its competitor, the stealth bomber. “I am a neutral as far as the jobs go, so I am looking at it from the strategic point of view.”

If the effort is successful, it would mark a major reversal in the Reagan Administration’s plan to build only 100 B-1s and then shift production to Northrop’s new Advanced Technology Bomber (ATB), better known as the stealth.

Thus, the longstanding competition between the B-1 and stealth, which dates back to President Jimmy Carter’s decision to scuttle the B-1, will play out at least one more act in Congress.

Controversial Program

“The B-1 was controversial all through the 1970s,” said James Stewart, a retired Air Force lieutenant general who was in charge of aircraft procurement at the time of the inception of the B-1 program. “Rockwell was more astute politically than many of us gave them credit for. I wouldn’t be surprised to see the B-1 survive longer.”

But current Air Force leadership is dead set against the proposal because it believes that any continued funding for the B-1 would virtually kill the stealth bomber. In an era when the growth of defense budgets is being sharply reduced, elimination of the stealth could be a big-ticket savings--as much as $80 billion.

“The guy in uniform gets paranoid when something threatens his program, even if it is a small dollar figure,” said Gen. Bennie L. Davis, recently retired commander of the Strategic Air Command. “When somebody even talks about an alternative, it is perceived as a threat.”

Nonetheless, Davis believes that keeping the B-1 production line open as an insurance policy against potential problems with development of the stealth is “a prudent, reasonable investment.”

Rockwell’s ostensible position is that it does not seek to kill the stealth program.

“We have accepted the two-bomber philosophy of the government,” Iacobellis said in a recent interview. “I would rather not have more B-1s at the expense of the ATB. But what we are saying is that the number of each isn’t fixed. Shouldn’t it be variable?

“Continuation of the B-1 line would promote a competitive environment that would benefit the government and the taxpayers. There is a national resource going on here at Rockwell. Isn’t it foolhardy to let it go? The critics want to stamp it out. Kill it. Turn off the pilot light so it can’t be restarted,” he added.

The rationale for additional B-1 funding is based on keeping the Rockwell factories in a position to restart production if the stealth bomber encounters technical problems or costs more than Congress is willing to spend.

Viewed as Insurance

“I look on any program to bridge the gap between the B-1 and the Advanced Technology Bomber as an insurance policy,” said Rep. Hunter, a member of the House Armed Services Committee. “We may also end up slowing down production of the 100 B-1s and buying more of them to keep the program alive.”

The stealth is based on a variety of new technologies to enable it to elude detection by radar. Its very aerodynamic configuration represents such a major leap in aircraft design that it carries significant risks.

Prototypes of the B-1 were flight-tested for more than four years before production was started, but the stealth bomber is expected to enter production with substantially less testing. Some experts say that the program is being rushed to meet schedules designed to head off the B-1.

“I have enough hunches that the Advanced Technology Bomber doesn’t cut the mustard to be suggesting that we keep a production capability to produce more B-1s,” said Rep. Mike Synar, (D-Okla.). “If ATB does not fly, we have to get a bomber into the Air Force fleet until it does fly. The B-1 is such a bomber.”

Air Force officials, discounting the possibility of such a catastrophic blunder as building an airplane that does not fly, are attempting to reassure Congress that the stealth’s risks have been significantly reduced. Nonetheless, the secrecy shrouding the program has created many doubters.

Citing the program’s secret status, a Northrop spokesman said he could make no comment on the matter. Northrop employs more than 8,000 workers at its Pico Rivera plant and another 1,500 in Palmdale at a new assembly plant directly across a runway from the B-1 bomber plant.

Critic of Price

Synar, whose home district is near a B-1 plant, is a vocal critic of the stealth bomber’s price, asserting that the planes will cost $600 million each, more than double the B-1’s $275 million price. “What we are talking about in the Advanced Technology Bomber,” Synar said, “is the most expensive weapon program in the history of this nation.”

Glenn has also asserted that the Air Force has engaged in “patently absurd” cost comparisons between the stealth and the B-1, disguising the stealth’s true costs. Demands for declassification of the aircraft’s cost are gaining momentum in Congress among both supporters and opponents of the stealth program.

“Lacking such declassification, . . . I intend to vote against providing for any funding for the ATB program,” Glenn said in a letter to Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Rockwell faces a difficult challenge in winning additional funding, but it has strong support scattered among an unusual group of liberals and conservatives. For example, late last year, eight conservative senators wrote a letter to President Reagan calling for production of 100 additional B-1s.

The outcome of the fight is difficult to predict, however, because the armed services committees have not begun their debate on the fiscal 1987 defense budget. “So, there is no direct judgment one can make,” one congressional staffer said. “There is a lot of noise about it, though.”

The B-1’s geographically dispersed employment has historically created a broad base of political support. The stealth also has been an easy target for opponents, because its secret status has prevented Northrop from fighting back.

Much of Rockwell’s success in picking up congressional support is due to its performance on its existing contract for the 100 B-1s. “It is a tremendous success story,” Iacobellis said unabashedly.

At the firm’s huge Palmdale assembly complex, Rockwell has just completed assembly of bomber No. 32 and is rapidly building up to its so-called rate production, a maximum of four aircraft per month.

The Air Force has never before structured an aircraft program to build up production so quickly and then drop off so precipitously.

“It is a very weird way to build airplanes,” said Stewart, the retired Air Force general. “Everybody associated with building aircraft looks with horror at this production schedule, building up to four a month and then stopping so suddenly.”

A Major Challenge

At the rate of four aircraft per month, Rockwell will be delivering $1.1 billion worth of product monthly. Moving that much material in a coordinated manner has been a major challenge in the B-1 program.

Six months ago, Rockwell had built only a few B-1s after four years of work. Production of four aircraft per month is not a rapid pace in itself, but to sharply accelerate production to that rate in so little time has left no room for error or schedule slippage.

Three years ago, for example, Rockwell scheduled parts production on each of hundreds of automated machine tools for every hour of every day at its plants in El Segundo. Production of those parts will be completed by October.

Aft fuselage sections are shipped in from Texas, wings from Tennessee, engine nacelles from Ohio, tails from Maryland and avionics from Washington. Even in precision aircraft work, parts do not always fit and a fuselage not going together properly could cost millions of dollars in delays.

Minor problems recently forced Rockwell to increase its estimated cost of completing the B-1 program by $100 million and to set up an additional $400 million reserve against future cost increases. But those revisions, which represent cost growth of less than 1%, did not push the program over the $27.5-billion cost cap on the program.

As a result, congressional sources said, the cost revisions did not generate any significant concern about the B-1, especially since the program had been running about $1 billion under the original cost ceiling.

Faces Demanding Test

Despite every appearance that the B-1 program is healthy, it still faces a demanding test in the months ahead when production rate moves up to four aircraft a month.

“Is it a shoo-in? No,” Iacobellis said. “But I have passed through some of the mine fields already. Getting to rate production is still a challenge, but everything still points to success.”

A half-dozen partially assembled B-1s were crowded into the main assembly room at Palmdale last week under an enormous cloth banner that reads “Prepared for Peace.” But many of the workers there are also prepared for being laid off.

Even if Rockwell wins a contract to build additional B-1s, it is not clear how many jobs would be saved. If Rockwell builds 48 additional B-1s, for example, it would probably be at the rate of two a month rather than four a month, requiring far fewer workers than it now has.

Ultimately, B-1 production will end, but the B-1 program will continue. There is an estimated 30 years of service business on the B-1 for Rockwell. That alone will require a work force of 8,000 to 12,000 workers, Iacobellis said.

“There will be spare parts, modifications, support. We shouldn’t view it as the demise of North American Aircraft after the B-1,” he said.

“I imagine that (Northrop Chairman) Tom Jones is more worried there won’t be an ATB than I am worried about the 101st B-1. If it wasn’t for the ATB, we would be putting improvements on these ships as we make them. As soon as this dust settles, there may be significant modification work for us.”