The Case for Contra Aid: An Administration Brief

In the last few months, Nicaragua’s communist regime has stepped up censorship, entered Honduras to strike at the contras and driven thousands of Miskito Indians to seek refuge in Honduras by bombing their villages in Nicaragua. These acts are not excesses or mistakes committed in the blush of revolutionary youth. They are part of a careful, systematic consolidation of power.

The Sandinistas want a monopoly on power; this we expect from dictators, and the Sandinistas are fulfilling our expectations. Their mentor is Castro, and Cuba is their model. Their totalitarian beliefs require that they attempt to wipe out all sources of organized opposition. In doing so, the Sandinistas are giving us a course in applied Leninist theory.

The recent debates in Congress suggest that most congressmen now understand that the Sandinistas are communists, but that many still do not realize what this means in practice. When we review some of the basic elements of Leninist theory revealed in Sandinista behavior, it is clear that the comandantes are in fact not simple thugs but communist true believers.

--The Sandinistas see themselves as a “vanguard” movement. As communists, they claim to represent “the forces of history.” Thus, theirs is the exclusive right to represent all Nicaraguans and to lead the transformation of society. Unless faced with pressure they cannot resist, they will never allow a free election to determine who the people really support.

--The Sandinistas also see themselves as having an “internationalist” duty to support communist revolution in neighboring countries. This is inseparable from their role as revolutionary “vanguard” at home; as one comandante put it, “We cannot cease being internationalists unless we cease being revolutionaries.”

--In true Leninist fashion, the Sandinistas use patient, flexible tactics while pursuing without compromise their strategic objectives. For example, pending the full consolidation of power, they permit some independent, but increasingly controlled, labor, political and pastoral activity. The Sandinistas have shown the flexibility to take temporary, tactical retreats: Lenin called this two steps forward, one step back. Censorship and other controls were briefly eased before the 1984 election; Nicaraguan aid to the Salvadoran communist guerrillas was reduced after the liberation of Grenada. Then in the winter and spring of this year, the Sandinistas moved to crush the democratic opposition. They bombed Miskito villages, banned the church’s radio station and crossed into Honduras.

--The Sandinistas practice deception to broaden their base of support and to conceal their strategic aims. When the triumph of the anti-Somoza struggle depended on its democratic and nationalistic appeal, the Sandinistas intermittently concealed their Marxist-Leninist beliefs to attract business and international support. Today, the few pockets of pluralism that survive in Nicaragua are used by the Sandinistas to pretend that they are not totalitarians. The surviving business community, for example, is useful for “display” purposes, according to one comandante . Similarly, circulation of a draft constitution to foreign audiences gives the appearance of allegiance to the rule of law.

Policies based on the assumption that we are dealing with misguided would-be democrats are extremely dangerous in a region as vital as Central America is to the United States.

Our objectives are clear. We want to protect Nicaragua’s neighbors and help Nicaraguans achieve democracy. From a moral standpoint, these are obligations that derive both from our position as the strongest democracy in the Americas, and from the role we played in helping to ease Somoza out of power in 1979. From a strategic standpoint, the more the Soviets and Cubans arm the Sandinistas, the more our responsibility grows. How can we expect our neighbors to deal with Soviet power if we seem to wish to ignore it? Silent as our Latin neighbors often are on this score, they recognize this and expect us to fulfill our obligations.

In Nicaragua, our moral and strategic interests--freedom and security--are not only in harmony, they are inseparable. As Violeta Chamorro of Managua’s La Prensa realized after sharing power with the Sandinistas for nearly a year, “Without freedom first, there will never be peace.”

At the summit of the Central American presidents in Esquipulas, Guatemala, in May, Daniel Ortega acknowledged to his democratically elected colleagues that the Sandinistas’ conception of “democracy” was of the Leninist variety. This revelation has galvanized Nicaragua’s neighbors in their determination to assure that democratization is guaranteed as an essential element of any negotiated regional settlement. Following the Esquipulas summit, Honduran President Jose Azcona Hoyo told a Washington audience: “There can be no peace, even if the (Sandinistas) throw all their artillery and their helicopter gunships into Lake Managua, if there is no democratic opening in Nicaragua. The Nicaraguan people, both inside and outside, will keep fighting for their freedom . . . . “

Americans too must realize that a just and last peace will only come to Central America when the Nicaraguan people win their freedom.

President Reagan supports the democratic resistance not only because their pressure puts a brake on Sandinista aggression, but also because the resistance is trying to bring democracy to Nicaragua. We support the 21 Objectives of the Contadora process not only because they call for an end to military tensions, but also because they address the problem of democratization. Here we see--to the extent that they work toward assuring peace through democracy--the goals of the resistance and the original objectives of Contadora are nearly identical.

Despite the Sandinistas’ refusal to negotiate with their critics in and out of Nicaragua, and despite their clear isolation from the four Central American democracies, the latest criticism of Administration policy is that it is the U.S. position that is blocking a diplomatic settlement. We have made clear our support for a comprehensive, simultaneous and verifiable Contadora agreement--one that brings peace and pluralism to Nicaragua. But, say our critics, this position prevents a pragmatic compromise that promises security and thereby creates the confidence needed to negotiate the more difficult political issues later.

But would this compromise bring peace? By its advocates’ own arguments, it would not address the root cause of the Nicaraguan conflict, which is Sandinista oppression. And that is the problem. Compromise on this point, abandonment of any concern for human rights in Nicaragua, would suit Marxist-Leninist tactics all too well. It would give the Sandinistas a chance to take “one step back” to earn international good will by claiming to reduce support for armed subversion abroad (in return, of course, for a cessation of all aid to the Nicaraguan democratic resistance). Then, with their image refurbished and the resistance disbanded, the Sandinistas could move in for the kill and put the final squeeze on their opponents. In the name of “pragmatism” and “moderation,” our democratic values would be sold short for a compromise that does not change the Sandinistas’ political monopoly or strategy, a “compromise” that could bring neither peace, justice, nor security. Such a compromise would leave communist control of Managua totally intact--and an agreement to such a compromise would leave it enormously strengthened.

A process of internal reconciliation, allowing for competitive elections, freedom of the press and an end to the Sandinista stranglehold on government institutions, would deal with the key issues. This would begin with negotiations between the Sandinistas and their opposition, accompanied by a cease-fire. True reconciliation--not on paper but in fact--must be the basis of any settlement that the United States supports. On numerous occasions, the democratic resistance has offered a cease-fire if the Sandinistas would negotiate a reconciliation. But being interested in dictatorial power rather than in democratic pluralism, the Sandinistas have always refused.

The Sandinistas’ continued refusal entitles the freedom fighters to receive from the United States the support they need to defeat the Sandinistas’ totalitarian design. By delaying action on the President’s aid request, the House of Representatives has given the Sandinistas every incentive to avoid serious negotiation and to step up repression. Those who would deny arms to the resistance are reducing the options available to the United States in response to a clear threat to regional security.

It is time for the House to act. Today, many members agree that the Sandinistas are communists. Yet they continue to approach the debate as if they believe the Sandinistas are the democratic reformers they portrayed themselves to be in 1979. This wishful thinking is not a realistic basis for policy. The security of our hemisphere and nation, and the hopes of Nicaragua’s people demand support for a democratic outcome that will bring peace to Central America.