S. Koreans Spar Over a Democratic Way to Choose New Leader

‘What counts is whether the new system will be fair and allow people to express their opinions.’

An unprecedented effort is under way to work out, through dialogue and compromise, a way of choosing a new national leader for South Korea.

Success could mean that democracy will take the place of authoritarian rule. Failure, as opposition leader Kim Young Sam said the other day, “would make either a military coup or a popular uprising inevitable.” The outcome is likely to be clear by early next year.

A special committee on constitutional reform, authorized last month by the National Assembly, is charged with “guaranteeing the people a free choice of government.” This was spelled out o1847610721ruling party of President Chun Doo Hwan and the opposition parties.

According to Roh Tae Woo, chairman of Chun’s Democratic Justice Party, the committee is a break with the past, when constitutions were revised frequently but always by the dominant political force.

Compromise Required

This time, there will have to be a compromise, since constitutional amendments require approval by two-thirds of the National Assembly and Chun’s party has only a simple majority. Once approved by the assembly, amendments must be submitted to a national referendum.

If the present effort succeeds, and a presidential election is carried out late next year as expected, it will be South Korea’s first peaceful and democratic transfer of power. Since it was established in 1948, after the 1945 division of the country, South Korea has changed leaders by means of a student uprising that toppled the government in 1960, a coup in 1961, an assassination in 1979, and a takeover by a military strongman in 1980.

For six years, since he and his colleagues in the military took over the government, Chun has promised the nation a peaceful transfer of power in 1988, when the constitution he imposed under martial law requires him to step down. But until last April 30 he offered no assurance that the transfer of power would be a democratic one.

Under the present constitution, a high government official said privately, “Chun could have named anyone to succeed him. Political support would not have been necessary.”

Now an Electoral College

The present constitution specifies that the president is to be chosen by an electoral college of more than 5,000 popularly elected members.

As recently as last February, Chun ordered the detention of leaders of the opposition New Korea Democratic Party when they began a nationwide campaign to obtain a million signatures on a petition calling for direct election of the president. And he threatened to arrest anyone signing the petition.

Naming his own successor would allow Chun to secure a guarantee of safety against retribution in retirement. He is widely held responsible for the deaths of 193 people in the insurrection at Kwangju in 1980, which erupted in protest against his seizure of power, and it is believed that he still wants a guarantee of safety.

But on April 30, Chun announced at a meeting with leaders of two opposition parties that he would permit revision of the constitution even before he steps down in March, 1988, thereby apparently forgoing any such reassurance.

His announcement was widely interpreted as a major concession. An increasingly unpopular leader, Chun’s legitimacy as South Korea’s ruler has never been accepted by great numbers of Koreans.

‘Free Choice’ Promised

On May 29, Chun went a step further, authorizing Roh to promise that constitutional revision will “guarantee the people a free choice of government.”

What caused Chun’s about-face is not known, but it appears to be related to an unpublicized meeting Chun had in Seattle, on the way home from a trip to Europe in April, with two of his most trusted confidants, men who helped put him in power in 1980.

Three different sources, in and out of government, confirmed that Chun met secretly there with Huh Hwa Pyung and Huh Sam Soo, both of whom are living in the United States. The two Huhs, who are not related, are graduates of the 17th class of the Korean Military Academy, a class that also includes many commanding generals. Both were colonels in 1980 and both retired as brigadier generals and joined Chun’s staff after he became president.

Huh Hwa Pyung now lives in Washington, Huh Sam Soo in California. They reportedly told Chun that the time had come for action to defuse mounting political unrest. Their academy ties with army leaders regarded as most capable of carrying out a coup make it seem certain that Chun listened to what they had to say.

By April, said a Western diplomat who asked not to be named, even the leaders of the ruling party “probably had come to realize that they had not been able to broaden their support among the public in the last few years, that the method for choosing a new leader specified by Chun’s constitution would simply not be acceptable.”

Appeal From Cardinal

A public appeal to revise the constitution and restore democracy, made in March by Roman Catholic Cardinal Stephen Kim, also appeared to “offer convincing evidence that it was not just Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung (the behind-the-scenes leaders of the opposition) who demanded constitutional reform,” the diplomat said.

Koreans and foreign diplomats agree that Chun’s about-face at least temporarily defused a political situation that had been heading toward a blowup.

But there may be more trouble ahead. Compromise will be needed to reform the constitution and, according to another Western diplomat, compromise is “unfortunately . . . not often found in Korean politics.” And Chun’s announcement, far from ending public protests, was followed three days later by street demonstrations in Inchon, the largest and most violent in South Korea since the 1980 insurrection in Kwangju.

Moreover, because of opposition resistance, there still have been no actual negotiations on reforming the constitution or rewriting the laws that will be affected.

Meanwhile, time is running out. A high government official said that more than 200 laws will have to be revised to implement expected amendments to the constitution. A series of authoritarian curbs on freedom of the press, speech and assembly and on the rights of labor will have to be removed if full democracy is to be achieved.

Compromise on constitutional reform, under the most optimistic of expectations, is not expected until late this year, leaving only about 12 months for carrying out a national referendum, revising the laws, naming candidates and organizing new elections, which are expected for the National Assembly as well as for a new leader.

Skepticism About Chun

There is widespread skepticism about Chun’s about-face, and about the ruling party’s public pledge to guarantee “a free choice of government.”

Chun’s Democratic Justice Party “must take some action to appease the people,” a Protestant church leader said, asking not to be identified by name, “but I don’t know how much fairness they will permit in any new system. What counts is whether the new system will be fair and allow the people a chance to express their opinions. This is a very crucial moment for the nation as a whole.”

The key issue faced by the National Assembly committee on constitutional revision is what form of government will replace Chun’s. The only point on which the ruling party and the opposition agree is that the present style of authoritarian rule, with all power concentrated in one man’s hands, is out of the question.

Even Roh, chairman of the ruling party, has said that dispersal of power is necessary. The opposition is pushing for a clear division of power among the executive, legislative and judicial branches.

Beyond that, there is no sign of agreement or willingness to compromise on anything. Korean political analysts, government officials, opposition leaders and foreign diplomats all agree privately that Chun’s people are not prepared to give up power and that the opposition is equally determined to have its turn.

Jealous of Power

Lee Man Sup, leader of the Korea National Party, a minor, middle-of-the-road opposition group, described the dilemma at a breakfast meeting in early May with Secretary of State George P. Shultz.

“There are too many in power who refuse to share it and too many out of power who want only to grab it,” Lee said. “Those who advocate compromise gain no respect.”

With this, he looked at Roh, the ruling party leader, and Lee Min Woo, president of the opposition New Korea Democratic Party.

The main compromise that must be reached involves a head-on conflict over demands that seem to defy compromise.

On one hand, the New Korea Democratic Party, particularly Kim Dae Jung, insists that only direct election of the president can achieve democracy and assure its survival by suppressing military intervention in politics. On the other hand, the people in power--though they have not said so officially--insist that only an indirect system of choosing a new leader, as under the parliamentary system, can prevent authoritarian rule and an emotional split of the electorate as in past presidential elections.

Both Sides Worried

The ruling group fears that no candidate it could field would be able to win a direct popular election, and the opposition fears that it has no chance to win under the parliamentary system, in which the leader of the party that controls Parliament becomes the head of government.

Also complicating the situation is the growing violence and militancy among radical dissidents, along with rising feelings of anti-Americanism. The radicals, a Western diplomat said, will continue to exert pressure on the left flank of the opposition New Korea Democratic Party against any compromise with the ruling party.

“The radical element is interested in a revolution, not a compromise,” the diplomat said.

Students and some laborers have resorted to violence, the Protestant leader said, “because there is no mechanism or forum to absorb their voices. Our whole society is constructed so that there is no outlet for the sentiments of the students and the people.”

Also threatening to cause trouble is the way Chun has dealt with Kim Dae Jung, who in 1971 was the last opposition candidate for president in a free and open election. Kim is a driving force behind the opposition New Korea Democratic Party although, technically, he cannot legally belong to the party. In 1980, he was sentenced to die for sedition--the State Department said the charge was “far-fetched”--but the sentence was reduced to 20 years in prison and has since been suspended.

With the sentence hanging over him, Kim has been deprived of his civil rights and cannot run for public office. But any election in which he is barred from taking part would fail to meet the opposition’s definition of “guaranteeing the people a free choice of government.” Nonetheless, the military is said to be firmly opposed to restoring Kim’s civil rights.

No one is making any confident forecast that the reform movement will succeed, but there is widespread agreement on what failure would mean. Most analysts agree that there would be another coup--ousting Chun for failing to manage the political situation on the eve of the 1988 Seoul Olympics, purging the opposition again for its failure to act “responsibly,” and bringing on new oppression to curtail the popular unrest that would be sure to accompany the crushed hope of achieving democracy.