Chile: Another Nicaragua? : U.S. Can Stop It by Aiding Shift From Pinochet to Democracy

Now that longtime dictators have fallen in Haiti and the Philippines, attention has turned to Chile and Gen. Augusto Pinochet. U.S. policy may decide whether Chile becomes another Philippines--or another Nicaragua.

Although the three countries are quite different from one another, there are striking similarities. Like Haiti and the Philippines, Chile is a country that is in dire economic straits, with a burdensome foreign debt, high unemployment, little productive investment and a great need for U.S. assistance. Like Ferdinand E. Marcos and Jean-Claude Duvalier, Pinochet came to power with the support of Washington, which helped sustain his dictatorship for most of the past 13 years. All three, however, experienced a dramatic erosion of their domestic political support by the mid-1980s, including the defection of sectors of the armed forces. Only Pinochet still clings to power in the face of popular demands for a restoration of democracy, bucking a historical trend that has replaced dictators with democrats in six South American republics during the past decade.

Chile, like the Philippines, has a strong democratic opposition, mobilized with the active support of the Roman Catholic Church (also a factor in Haiti) and dominated by centrist parties that would be the primary beneficiaries of a rapid restoration of democracy. As in the Philippines, the continuation of dictatorship strengthens Chile’s Communists, whose growing support among students and slum dwellers is striking. Both the Philippines and Chile have large Communist movements that have endorsed armed struggle, but in the Philippines guerrilla warfare is far advanced, whereas in Chile it is just beginning and thus easier to halt. Chile’s Communist Party, with its parliamentary history and its recent meetings with the Christian Democrats, might be won back to the ballot box if there was a way for it to participate in politics other than with bombs and bullets.

Pinochet has promised elections, but is in no hurry to hold them, and he wants to control their outcome. If Pinochet has his way, the military junta will choose a president (who could be Pinochet himself) in 1989 for an eight-year transition to democracy. Chileans would not fully recover their democratic rights until 1997--if then.

Chile cannot wait that long. Like Haiti, it has a younger generation of slum dwellers who have never had jobs and are unlikely to find them under a socially regressive and politically repressive dictatorship. The destitute youth of Chile’s shantytowns are increasingly attracted to leftist groups that take for granted that “in Chile, it will be like Nicaragua”--not the Philippines. As in Nicaragua, these desperate children of poverty form a perfect recruiting ground for those who argue that violent revolution is the only way to end a brutal and intransigent dictatorship.

Whether Chile becomes “another Philippines” or “another Nicaragua” may well depend on the United States, which controls financial and political levers that could push Chile in a democratic direction. U.S. backing has kept Pinochet from diplomatic isolation and financial bankruptcy in the past, and, with a weak economy and the hemisphere’s highest per-capita debt, Chile cannot afford to alienate its major overseas benefactor.

The Reagan Administration recently signaled a shift in its prior support for Pinochet, in keeping with its new policy of opposing “tyrannies of the right” as well as of the left. An able new U.S. ambassador, Harry G. Barnes Jr., has made a point of meeting openly with opposition leaders, and the United States has publicly condemned the regime’s human-rights violations and endorsed a return to democracy. A more telling signal to Chile’s civilian and military elites, however, will be sent by Washington’s votes on pending Chilean requests for more than $700 million in multilateral loans. Some people in the Reagan Administration have urged that the United States cast a negative ballot. This would make it clear to Chile’s rulers that political change must precede further financial assistance.

Yet recent public U.S. government statements reveal a reluctance to press for a hasty ouster of the dictator, as in Haiti and the Philippines. If the Reagan Administration sends strong signals to Chile that it is time for a change, it will promote a democratic transition with stronger prospects for success than in either the Philippines or Haiti. If the United States fails to press for a rapid restoration of democracy in Chile, it may inadvertently promote “another Nicaragua” in the hemisphere.