Mideast Policy: U.S. Basking in in Better News

American policy-makers have usually found the Middle East a treacherous place to do business. Now, however, the Reagan Administration points to the region as a political plus--at least temporarily. Two weeks ago, the White House championed the first public meeting between the leaders of two of its closest Middle East allies, Israel and Morocco. Last week, the President personally greeted the just-released Father Lawrence Martin Jenco, one of four American hostages held in Lebanon. And this week, Vice President George Bush, his eyes focused on 1988, will complete a 10-day good-will visit.

The dramatic Jenco release understandably grabbed the biggest headlines. After all, Jenco is a U.S. citizen and concern about his safety and that of his compatriots evokes a far greater emotional, not to mention political, response at home.

Moreover, the media opportunities for interviews with the Jenco clan, not to mention reactions of the still imprisoned hostages’ families, surpasses those available in the faraway Atlas Mountains of Morocco where Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres and Morocco’s King Hassan met behind closed doors.

But even while basking in the reflective glory of these events, some U.S. officials were expressing doubts about the significance of it all. For example, they noted that the Administration’s role in arranging the summit and the Jenco release was relatively modest. It did use its good offices to promote the Moroccan-Israeli meeting. But Hassan has maintained direct, if discreet, links with Israel for years. And for close to a decade, he has toyed with the idea of a public face-to-face meeting with an Israeli prime minister.

Hassan was promised no reward if he met with Peres and, given U.S. fiscal constraints, he would be well advised not to expect any. Although President Reagan indicated he was willing to host the Peres-Hassan summit--in response to a request from the Israeli prime minister--the invitation was quickly withdrawn when Hassan made it clear the meeting would be on his home turf, or not at all.

For the Jenco release, the Administration was delighted to fly its top terrorism expert, Robert B. Oakley, to Damascus to be on hand at the former hostage’s arrival from Lebanon. And major preparations were made for press coverage of the released priest’s visit to the White House on Friday.

Nonetheless, Administration officials were as surprised as the public by Jenco’s new freedom. The firm policy of not negotiating with terrorists remains unchanged and unchallenged within the Administration. So, while the Administration is trying to gain some political capital from the release, it was a Syrian show from beginning to end, according to informed State Department sources.

Meanwhile, some Administration insiders argue that Jenco’s release, and the Hassan-Peres summit, if not the result of carefully crafted policy, are benefits accrued from the Administration’s unwavering strategy toward the region.

Immeasurably assisted by declining oil prices and the coincidental rise in Arab terrorism aimed at the United States, the Reagan team has, to an unprecedented degree, employed tough rhetoric and at times military force against radical Arabs. At the same time, it has effectively bowed out of the Arab-Israeli negotiating process--leaving the moderate Arabs to go it alone. But in so doing, the Administration has not, as widely predicted, had to face united Arab wrath. Instead, it has been able to achieve a limited number of modest successes like the Peres-Hassan summit and the Jenco release.

The April 15 U.S. air strike on Libya was a watershed for U.S.-Arab relations. No Arab leaders came to the aid of Libyan strongman Moammar Kadafi. Even those, like Syrian President Hafez Assad, who offered rhetorical support were clearly shaken. Subsequent exposure of the Syrian hand in the attempted bombing of an Israeli El Al airliner at London’s Heathrow Airport further discomforted the Syrian leadership. So, say Administration officials, Assad sought to limit his exposure. What better way, they ask, than relinquishing a hostage? “It buys Syria some time,” was one State Department analyst’s view.

To the Administration’s credit, after April 15, it did not let up on Assad. With the Syrians becoming ever more bogged down in the morass that is Lebanon, and worried about whether Israel might misinterpret military moves there, the United States was able to deliver a series of warnings to Syrian leadership. Most recently, Central Intelligence Agency Director William J. Casey was dispatched to Damascus--not to negotiate the release of Jenco or the other hostages, as initially reported, but to talk tough. Similar visits had been proposed for Secretary of State George P. Shultz and Bush.

Shultz, still reluctant to revisit the scene of his major diplomatic setback (it was Assad who torpedoed Shultz’s Lebanon policy in 1983 and 1984), managed to avoid the call.

Bush was urged by a wide range of Administration officials to make a stopover in Damascus during his current Middle East tour. However, some White House officials thought Bush incapable of delivering a tough message. Others, notably his political advisers, feared a public meeting with Assad could come back to haunt Bush’s presidential aspirations. “Who knows what Assad will do between now and November, 1988?” said one Bush adviser. “But you can bet, anything he is held responsible for will result in our opponents whipping out a picture of our man and Assad together in July, 1986.”

On the other hand, Bush was only too pleased to offer his services to promote the Peres-Hassan meeting. “It sure beats going out there in a vacuum,” said one Bush aide on the eve of the trip.

Yet the vice president has little of substance to offer either the Israelis or the Arabs, other than what one State Department insider calls “some more benign neglect.”

“Still,” this official added, “benign neglect has already produced another Arab leader willing to talk about peace with the Israelis.” Another insider said, “The Arabs are finally getting the message that we are not going to be more pro-peace than they are.”