Arms Control: Reagan Must Be Firm : Deal Now, While the SDI Bargaining Chip Remains

President Reagan has the opportunity to conclude the most comprehensive arms limitations in history. But such an agreement, which would be the crowning achievement of his presidency, would require stronger hands-on leadership than he has practiced thus far.

To date, Reagan’s “detached” stewardship of arms-control policy has been paradoxically successful. While some have criticized his failure to resolve the deep divisions among his principal advisers, the paralysis that those divisions have caused has also seen the Soviets advance some very positive proposals. But creating an opportunity for arms control is only half the battle. To turn it into reality, the President must first address four basic questions:

Does the United States really want arms control? Of course we do. Reagan has long stated his commitment to deep cuts in both Soviet and American nuclear arsenals. But among his advisers, particularly in the Pentagon, are those who do not share this commitment. Their advice is designed to produce no agreement at all. Some of them have deftly shifted positions on issues like mobile missiles and land-based vulnerability to ensure that our Geneva positions cannot possibly be acceptable. Others have been quietly asking if what America really needs isn’t outright nuclear superiority. These men are not serious about arms control. Since Reagan is, he must face an inevitable, fundamental split with the Pentagon’s civilian leadership.

Can we accept Soviet realities? The mention of nuclear superiority raises what is surely the most important of these: No Soviet leader can accept a position of nuclear inferiority. And those who predict that the Soviet economy will collapse if we only push a bit harder are wrong. Time and again the Russian people have borne up under tremendous hardships. Whatever its ills, the controlled Soviet economy, unhindered by popular demands or congressional cuts, can still match or exceed this nation’s in any arms race. Mikhail S. Gorbachev would certainly prefer to invest in domestic reforms, but he is prepared for the worst.

Can we face facts on the Strategic Defense Initiative? More than three years since Reagan announced the goal of rendering nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete,” it is undeniably clear that this is simply not possible with existing or foreseeable technology. The most that SDI can do is improve the survivability of our land-based missiles--something that can be done cheaper and more effectively through arms control, mobile missiles or both.

Can we quit while we’re ahead? Reagan’s hard line in Geneva has brought important Soviet concessions, but with each passing month his hand grows weaker. There are several reasons. On the Soviet side, Gorbachev has come under increasing pressure, especially from his military. If his arms-control offers, his unilateral test ban and other initiatives don’t bear fruit soon, he may be forced to retreat to a harder line. The Kremlin will decide that it can do worse than to ride out Reagan’s term and hope for better under his successor.

On the domestic side, the decline has already begun. Defense budgets will grow no further, and SDI is being cut by Congress. Even the unity of the North Atlantic alliance is being threatened. America’s allies, opposed to Reagan’s decision to discard SALT II, are worried about the future of the anti-ballistic-missile treaty and are dismayed by continuing disunity in the Administration on key arms issues.

For these reasons, the best time to strike a deal has arrived. Reagan’s first step must be to take charge of arms-control policy. In the past he has resolved disputes between the State and Defense departments by “splitting the difference.” This approach has generally produced positions that are neither negotiable nor even in America’s best interests. Our current position in the strategic arms reduction talks, which would make our land-based missiles even more vulnerable, demonstrates the weakness of this Solomon-like management style.

With a firm hand, Reagan must personally decide the contours of a plausible U.S.-Soviet agreement. Such a deal must inevitably include a trade-off between the ambitious SDI and deep cuts in the Soviets’ most destabilizing multiple-warhead missiles. Reagan’s latest response to Gorbachev, proposing to ratify SDI to proceed full tilt toward a mid-1990s deployment, is a “non-offer.” Gorbachev will not wait forever if Reagan continues to answer each Soviet step forward with another U.S. step backward.

The President must beware of the self-serving advice of the Pentagon’s amateur Kremlinologists. They interpret Gorbachev’s “serious” mood as proof that he will eventually accept SDI. This is a dangerous delusion. Today Reagan can trade curbs on “Star Wars” for deep cuts in Soviet missiles. But tomorrow, as Congress continues to chip away at SDI, his hand will be much weaker. Gorbachev has toned down his rhetoric because he sees that time may be on his side after all.

The choice is Reagan’s. The “window of opportunity” before him is quickly sliding shut. Will Reagan’s successors inherit history’s best arms-control treaty or its worst arms race?