Soviets’ Talks With Israelis Are a Step, but Not a Thaw

The low-level consular talks scheduled to open today in Helsinki between Soviet and Israeli officials indicate that Moscow has finally realized that it made a major blunder in 1967 by cutting off diplomatic relations with Israel.

At the time, this was a Soviet expression of displeasure with Israel’s victory in the Six-Day War. It was also a symbolic gesture toward the Arab countries, which foolishly believed that the Soviet Union would intervene militarily on their behalf.

Since then, vilification of Israel, sometimes bordering on the obscene, has become a staple of Soviet propaganda. Moscow has always publicly said that once Israel withdrew from all territory occupied in 1967 it would resume diplomatic relations. But by cutting relations with Israel the Soviets effectively barred themselves from any constructive role in the Middle East peace process. Whatever has been achieved in this area--such as Camp David and the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement --was chaperoned by the United States, and it was Washington that reaped the political dividends. The Soviets remained outside the process, furious and with their clout in Mideast affairs greatly diminished.

In his U.N. speech last fall Prime Minister Shimon Peres of Israel threw the Soviets a glove: While toughening Israeli opposition to an international conference on Mideast peace, Peres made the reasonable suggestion that only countries having relations with both sides in the Mideast conflict could participate.

This put the ball squarely in the Soviet court and created consternation in Moscow. Another major embarrassment to the Soviets has been the plight of Soviet Jews. After allowing more than 200,000 Jews to leave the Soviet Union, mainly for Israel, the Soviets virtually stopped Jewish immigration in the last few years. This issue has become uncomfortable for the new Soviet leader, Mikhail S. Gorbachev. While generally enjoying a friendly press in the West, in which he is heralded as a potential innovator and reformer, the persecution of Jewish activists in the Soviet Union causes acute embarrassment for Gorbachev whenever he meets Western heads of state or talks to Western journalists.

The embarrassment is not lessened by the Soviet contention that the number of Jewish people wanting to emigrate is minuscule. If so, why not let them out? The spectacular release of Anatoly Shcharansky suggests how sensitive the Soviets are on this issue.

The meeting in Helsinki has been initiated by the Soviets for its public-relations value. Look, they are saying, we are talking to the Israelis. And in the last few months the Soviets have shown other small indications that they are reconsidering their attitude toward Israel. Poland and Hungary have recently developed cultural contacts with Israel, certainly not without Soviet knowledge; an Israeli expert was allowed to accompany Dr. Robert P. Gale to treat the Chernobyl victims; individual Israeli scholars have been invited to the Soviet Union, and at least in one case an interview with an Israeli scholar in which he expressed the hope of extending this to mutual visits was allowed to appear in the Soviet press .

The present disarray in the Arab world also makes any Soviet move toward Israel less risky than before. Egypt and Jordan welcome any Soviet-Israeli normalization as one way of getting the Soviet Union involved in an international conference on the Mideast, and while Syria may be far from happy about the latest Soviet moves, there is little that it can do except sulk.

The issues that the Soviets said they would like to discuss in Helsinki are marginal--Soviet property in Israel (mostly belonging to the Russian Orthodox Church) and consular services for the few Soviet citizens residing in Israel. Both have been handled successfully for 19 years despite the lack of diplomatic relations.

Though not urgent, these are convenient issues to raise. It is obvious that the next step would not be a restoration of diplomatic relations; this is still far away. But further contact can be envisaged, possibly in Israel and/or the Soviet Union, and Israel would certainly raise questions relating to Soviet Jews. The Soviets may not be happy, but they will have to listen.

All this is still not a thaw, let alone a breakthrough. But it shows that the new leadership in Moscow is not committed to perpetuating the mistakes of its predecessors. It is also an encouraging sign on the global level: It may mean that Soviet positions on other issues are under review in the Kremlin. This is not the beginning of a new detente. It calls, however, on the part of the West (and Israel) for imagination, readiness for hard bargaining, patience and an adequate understanding of the political processes now under way in the Soviet Union.