South Korea: a Fading Goal

Once again, as so often in the last 40 years, the forces of political moderation in South Korea are in danger of being overwhelmed by the forces of extremism. A parliamentary committee that was to propose constitutional changes in advance of the 1988 elections has deadlocked, and the air is filled with mutual accusations of bad faith and deliberate obstructionism. Compromise, that salvation of democratic politics, seems beyond reach. If the opportunity for consensual reform is truly lost, the streets and campuses will almost certainly again become the arena for violent anti-government demonstrations. The government will respond by stepped-up repression, and the chances of martial law or even a military coup will grow.

The New Korea Democratic Party, the principal opposition, insists that the next president must be chosen by direct popular vote. It does so in full confidence that such a process, carried out unimpeded, would bring it to power. President Chun Doo Hwan’s Democratic Justice Party, having enjoyed the rewards of strongman rule since 1980, now suddenly perceives the virtues of adopting a parliamentary form of government, with a prime minister chosen by the legislature. In the opposition’s view this would simply give Chun, who has promised to step aside in 1988, full freedom to continue calling the shots. That in turn would perpetuate the inequities and abridgments of basic liberties that have been the rule rather than the exception in South Korea’s postwar history.

Chun is a notably unpopular leader who came to power through a military coup after the assassination of his predecessor. The New Korea Democratic Party is probably right in believing that, given a free choice, he and his party would be repudiated by a majority of the electorate. But, as NKDP leaders well know, their base of support could quickly erode if more radical student-led opponents seize on the political impasse to renew turmoil in the streets. South Koreans don’t like repressive military rule, but they don’t like the threat of instability, either, and those who are involved in or associated with that threat will not have a popular mandate.

The United States wants to see a legitimate, freely chosen government in South Korea by 1988. But that goal is fast fading. Unless an agreement on constitutional change is reached soon, extremists on both the left and the right will feel that they have an excuse to act. Chun says that he wants to preside over the first peaceful political transition in South Korea’s history. He may still be able to do so, but only if those charged with constitutional reform accept the urgency of compromise.